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Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining

In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Diermeier

    (Northwestern University)

  • Rebecca Morton

    (New York University)

Abstract

Summary We investigate the predictive success of the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining in laboratory environments. In particular, we use a finite period version of the bargaining game under weighted majority rule where a fixed payoff is divided between three players. We find that our subjects’ behavior is not predicted well by the Baron-Ferejohn model. The model predicts hardly better than a coin flip which coalition partner is selected by the chosen proposer, and proposers allocate more money to other players than predicted. A sizable number of proposals are rejected in the first proposal periods, and subjects who vote to reject a proposal on average receive a higher payoff from the new proposal. We find that a simple equal sharing rule yields point predictions that can account for 2/1 to 4/3 of all accepted proposals.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Diermeier & Rebecca Morton, 2005. "Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: David Austen-Smith & John Duggan (ed.), Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, pages 201-226, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-27295-3_8
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_8
    as

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