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Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

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  • Nunnari, Salvatore
  • Zapal, Jan

Abstract

We investigate the implications of imperfect best response—in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF)—in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem—that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response: receivers vote probabilistically; proposers allocate resources mostly within a minimum winning coalition of legislators but do not fully exploit their bargaining power. Incorporating history-dependent beliefs about the future distribution of proposal power into the QRE model (QGF) leads to an even better match with the data, as this model implies slightly lower shares to the proposer, maintaining similar or higher frequencies of minimum winning coalitions and similar voting behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Nunnari, Salvatore & Zapal, Jan, 2016. "Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 275-294.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:99:y:2016:i:c:p:275-294 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nucera, Federico & Schwaab, Bernd & Koopman, Siem Jan & Lucas, André, 2016. "The information in systemic risk rankings," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(PA), pages 461-475.
    2. Maaser, Nicola & Traub, Stefan & Paetzel, Fabian, 2017. "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168155, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislative bargaining; Experiments; Quantal response; Gambler's fallacy;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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