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Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis

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  • Maaser, Nicola
  • Traub, Stefan
  • Paetzel, Fabian

Abstract

In real world bargaining the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect real power. Game-theory predictions are insensitive to nominal differences. We refer to the converse idea that nominal differences matter as power illusion. We experimentally study the Baron-Ferejohn model with variation in nominal power. We find strong evidence for the existence of power illusion. Thus, attention needs to be paid to nominal power in the design of weighted voting systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Maaser, Nicola & Traub, Stefan & Paetzel, Fabian, 2017. "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168155, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168155
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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