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Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms

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  • Page, Frank H, Jr

Abstract

We study the problem of optimal mechanism design for incomplete information Stackelberg games with several followers in which each follower, guided by his own probability assessments concerning the characteristics of the other followers, behaves as a Bayesian in choosing a reporting strategy. Allowing for uncountably many types and infinite dimensional type descriptions, we present a new, general existence result for Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanisms. Because the existence problem is infinite dimensional, novel existence arguments are required. Our existence proof is based on two results: one on the sequential closure of the subset of BIC mechanisms with respect to K-convergence, and the other, a new result on sequential compactness in spaces of vector-valued functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(4), pages 509-524, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:4:p:509-24
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    Cited by:

    1. Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    2. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2002. "Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 71-79, February.
    3. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2020. "Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 1023-1047, June.
    4. Atin Basuchoudhary & John R. Conlon, 2000. "Are People Sometimes Too Honest? Increasing, Decreasing, and Negative Returns to Honesty," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(1), pages 139-154, July.
    5. Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Existence of optimal auctions in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.

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