Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
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- Rosen, Christiane & Madlener, Reinhard, 2013. "An Experimental Analysis of Single vs. Multiple Bids in Auctions of Divisible Goods," FCN Working Papers 8/2013, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN), revised Nov 2013.
- Lionel Thomas, 2001. "Les marchés à tranches," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 67(4), pages 437-451.
- Csapó, Gergely & Müller, Rudolf, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 229-242.
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design," CARF F-Series CARF-F-279, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Domenico Menicucci, 2003. "Optimal two-object auctions with synergies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(2), pages 143-164, October.
- Levent Ülkü, 2013. "Optimal combinatorial mechanism design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 473-498, June.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-292, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
- Ülkü, Levent, 2014. "Implementation in an interdependent value framework," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 64-70.
- Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(3), pages 213-243, September.
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