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Structural econometric analysis of descending auctions
[[Analyse économétrique structurelle des enchères descendantes]]

Author

Listed:
  • J.J. Laffont

    (Inconnu)

  • Q.H. Vuong

    (Station d'économie et sociologie rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

Cet article s'intéresse à une approche structurelle à partir de données d'enchères. Il s'agit d'enchères descendantes où seule l'offre du gagnant est observée. Les modèles économétriques structurels correspondant aux paradigmes de la valeur privée, valeur commune et valeur officielle. On montre que les méthodes d'estimation basées sur des simulations permettent de résoudre certaines difficultés de calcul. Le problème d'identification lié à l'approche structurelle est discuté.

Suggested Citation

  • J.J. Laffont & Q.H. Vuong, 1992. "Structural econometric analysis of descending auctions [[Analyse économétrique structurelle des enchères descendantes]]," Post-Print hal-02846223, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02846223
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    Cited by:

    1. Véronique Flambard & Pierre Lasserre & Pierre Mohnen, 2007. "Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, informational rents, and procurement management," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(1), pages 245-277, February.
    2. Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant’Anna, 2020. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in US Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(10), pages 3872-3912.
    3. Gordy, Michael B, 1998. "Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common-Value Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 12(1), pages 61-78, August.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1998. "Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 121-137.
    5. Anne Épaulard & Jean-Pierre Laffargue & Pierre Malgrange, 2008. "Présentation générale," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 1-13.
    6. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Le Roux, Yves, 1996. "Tenders for European Cereal Export Refunds: A Structural Approach," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 23(1), pages 5-26.
    7. Philip A Haile & Yuichi Kitamura, 2019. "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 22(1), pages 1-19.
    8. Bierens, Herman J. & Song, Hosin, 2012. "Semi-nonparametric estimation of independently and identically repeated first-price auctions via an integrated simulated moments method," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 108-119.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
    10. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2002. "Identification of Standard Auction Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2107-2140, November.
    11. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    12. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    13. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1997. "Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity," NBER Working Papers 6269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Bernard Elyakime & Patrice Loisel, 1997. "Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(4), pages 835-851.
    15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
    16. Takahashi, Hidenori, 2015. "Strategic design under uncertain evaluations : structural analysis of design-build auctions," Working Papers 15-08, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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