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Tenders for European Cereal Export Refunds: A Structural Approach

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  • Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
  • Le Roux, Yves

Abstract

A large part of the EU's export refunds are awarded through tender procedures. We apply auction theory to model the traders' behaviour for weekly tenders of soft wheat intervention stocks. Specification and estimation of the optimal bidding strategy are developed under two opposing assumptions about the traders' valuation of grain, each corresponding to a particular functioning of international soft wheat and related markets. This structural approach allows us to conclude that the traders' market power is relatively weak. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Le Roux, Yves, 1996. "Tenders for European Cereal Export Refunds: A Structural Approach," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 23(1), pages 5-26.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:5-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Y. Le Roux, 1999. "Traders' bidding strategies on EU grain export refunds : an analysis with limited dependent variables," Working Papers hal-02290683, HAL.
    2. Wilson, William W. & Dahl, Bruce L., 2000. "Import Tenders And Bidding Strategies In Wheat," Agricultural Economics Reports 23285, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.
    3. Hervé Guyomard & Nadine Herrard & Chantal Le Mouël & Yves Le Roux & Thierry Trochet, 1996. "L'accord agricole de l'Uruguay Round et la réforme de la Politique Agricole Commune : éléments d'analyse et de prospective," Working Papers hal-01594019, HAL.
    4. Tostao, Emilio & Chung, Chanjin & Brorsen, B. Wade, 2006. "Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21244, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. John M. Crespi & Richard J. Sexton, 2004. "Bidding for Cattle in the Texas Panhandle," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 660-674.
    6. William W. Wilson & Bruce L. Dahl, 2004. "Transparency and Bidding Competition in International Wheat Trade," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 52(1), pages 89-105, March.
    7. Roeber, Ronald, 2002. "Linear Feedback Between European Wheat Export Refunds And World Wheat Prices," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19847, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Bernard Elyakime & Patrice Loisel, 1997. "Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(4), pages 835-851.
    9. Yves Le Roux & . Esr. Département d'Economie Et Sociologie Ruralesivry & . Université Laval,québec (can), 1994. "The Uruguay Round agreement and cereal exports : are export refunds the "Achilles heel of Europe" ? [L'accord de l'Uruguay Round et les exportations de céréales : les restitutions à l'exp," Post-Print hal-02850477, HAL.

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