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Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret

  • Bernard Elyakime
  • Patrice Loisel

[fre] Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret Les bois sont le plus souvent vendus en France par enchères avec prix de retrait secret. Celles-ci peuvent être raisonnablement modélisées dans le cadre de la valeur privée. Avec des acheteurs supposés symétriques, le vendeur a alors intérêt à annoncer son prix de retrait. Les acheteurs n'étant pas tous de même type, ce résultat est-il encore vrai ? Pour cela nous proposons un modèle d'enchères asymétriques à valeurs privées, sans annonce du prix de retrait du vendeur. Nous nous limitons à deux acheteurs, un de chaque type, pour déterminer l'espérance d'utilité du vendeur et la comparer à celle d'un modèle à prix de retrait public. Nous montrons que ce dernier modèle procure la plus grande espérance d'utilité au vendeur. Une hypothèse explicative du prix de retrait secret est alors proposée en conclusion. [eng] Asymetric auctions with secret reservation prices We examine a first-price sealed-bid auction in which the seller's reservation price is not announced in advance, and in which buyers are not symetrie. We pro­pose a model in private value of these auctions with a secret seller's price reservation. We study this model with only two buyers : one of each type. So we can compute numerically bidders'strategies and we evaluate the expected gain for the seller in this model and in the model with a public reservation price. This last one has the higher expected gain. Another possible explanation is given to the secret reservation price in wood-auctions.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/reco.1997.409918
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_4_409918
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 48 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 835-851

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_4_409918
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1997.409918
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/reco

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  1. Bernard Elyakime & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrice Loisel & Quang Vuong, 1994. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 71-114.
  2. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Yves Le Roux, 1995. "Politique européenne d'exportation de céréales et comportements des opérateurs : une analyse économétrique des adjudications de restitutions," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 117(1), pages 31-48.
  4. Cox, James C. & Smith, Vernon L. & Walker, James M., 1982. "Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 319-325.
  5. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:04 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-80, July.
  7. Philippe Benilan & Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "Enchères asymétriques: contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d'équilibre bayésien," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 46, pages 225-251.
  8. Vuong, Q. & Laffont, J.J. & Elyakime, B. & Loisel, P., 1995. "Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Papers 9502, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  9. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Le Roux, Yves, 1996. "Tenders for European Cereal Export Refunds: A Structural Approach," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 23(1), pages 5-26.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Vuong, Quang, 1993. "Structural econometric analysis of descending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 329-341, April.
  11. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
  12. Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers 9504, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  13. Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
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