Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices
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More about this item
KeywordsEVALUATION; ECONOMETRICS; MATHEMATICS; AUCTIONS;
- C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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