Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2017

• Vlad Radoias & Simon J. Wilkie & Michael A. Williams, 2017, "Rules of evidence and liability in contract litigation: The efficiency of the General Dynamics rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 19, issue 6, pages 1139-1150, December.
• Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017, "Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 119, issue 4, pages 1167-1200, October, DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12204.
• Peter Eccles & Nora Wegner, 2017, "Scalable games: modelling games of incomplete information," Bank of England Staff Working Paper series, Bank of England, number 641, Jan.
• Gerardo Ferrara & Xin Li, 2017, "Central counterparty auction design," Bank of England Staff Working Paper series, Bank of England, number 669, Aug.
• Newbery, D., 2017, "What future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1714, Mar.
• Teirila, J., 2017, "Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1727, Jun.
• Greve, T. & Teng, F. & Pollitt, M. & Strbac, G., 2017, "A system operator's utility function for the frequency response market," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1728, Jul.
• Azacis, Helmuts, 2017, "Information Disclosure by a Seller in Sequential First-Price Auctions," Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, number E2017/2, Feb.
• Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017, "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt3xp2110t, Nov.
• Decio Coviello & Stefano Gagliarducci, 2017, "Tenure in office and public procurement," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, number dp1465, Jan.
• Martin F. Quaas & Ralph Winkler, 2017, "A Market Mechanism for Sustainable and Efficient Resource Use under Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6524.
• Axel Bernergard & Karl Wärneryd, 2017, "Self-Allocation in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6636.
• Deniz Dizdar & Benny Moldovanu & Nora Szech, 2017, "The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6803.
• Gabrielle Demange, 2018, "Mechanisms in a Digitalized World," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6984.
• Ying Liu & Sebastian Vogel & Yuan Zhang, 2018, "Electronic Trading in OTC Markets vs. Centralized Exchange," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 18-19, Mar.
• Charles J. Thomas, 2017, "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 17-07.
• David P. Brown & Derek E. H. Olmstead, 2017, "Measuring market power and the efficiency of Alberta's restructured electricity market: An energy-only market design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 50, issue 3, pages 838-870, August, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12280.
• Kim Nguyen & Michael Peters & Michel Poitevin, 2017, "Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 50, issue 5, pages 1573-1594, December, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12308.
• Guillem Roig, 2017, "Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 15892, Dec.
• Ali Palali & Bas Straathof & Rinske Muntean, 2017, "The effect of geographical distance on online transactions: Evidence from the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, number 362, Oct.
• Matthew T. Cole & James Lake & Ben Zissimos, 2017, "Contesting an International Trade Agreement," Working Papers, California Polytechnic State University, Department of Economics, number 1703.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11782, Jan.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11783, Jan.
• Ifergane, Tomer & Sela, Aner, 2017, "Signaling in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11798, Jan.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2017, "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11904, Mar.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro'i, 2017, "Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11944, Mar.
• Condorelli, Daniele & Galeotti, Andrea & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2017, "Selling Through Referrals," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12048, May.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12240, Aug.
• Sela, Aner, 2017, "The Third Place Game," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12348, Oct.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2017, "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12385, Oct.
• Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner, 2017, "Contests with Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12456, Nov.
• Gentry, Matthew & Komarova, Tatiana & Schiraldi, Pasquale & Shin, Wiroy, 2017, "On Monotone Strategy Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12483, Dec.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2017, "Meetings and Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12542, Dec.
• Gugler, Klaus & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2017, "Effects of government spending on employment: Evidence from winners and runners-up in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12548, Dec.
• Aiche, A. & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Selay, A. & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2017, "Information in Tullock contest," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 25820, Nov.
• Breeden, Joseph L. & Liang, Sisi, 2017, "Auction-Price Dynamics for Fine Wines from Age-Period-Cohort Models," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 12, issue 2, pages 173-202, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2102, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2102R, Aug, revised Jun 2018.
• Caleb Stroup & Matthew L. Gentry, 2017, "Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions," Working Papers, Davidson College, Department of Economics, number 17-01, Jan.
• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1001, May.
• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1005, Jun.
• Ian Jewitt & Daniel Z. Li, 2017, "Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions: Horizontally vs Vertically Differentiated Products," Department of Economics Working Papers, Durham University, Department of Economics, number 2017_03, Apr.
• Daniel Z. Li & Minbo Xu, 2017, "Equilibrium Competition, Social Welfare and Corruption in Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers, Durham University, Department of Economics, number 2017_04, Apr.
• Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2014, "A Model of Trading in the Art Market," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1150, Mar, revised 22 Sep 2017.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2017, "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," IESE Research Papers, IESE Business School, number D/1162, Jan.
• Messer, Kent D. & Duke, Joshua M. & Lynch, Lori & Li, Tongzhe, 2017, "When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 212-226, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.004.
• Zhang, Yu Yvette, 2017, "A shape constrained estimator of bidding function of first-price sealed-bid auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 67-72, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.001.
• Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2017, "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 73-76, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012.
• Li, Daniel Z., 2017, "Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 47-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003.
• Mathews, Timothy & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2017, "A note on k-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 6-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.020.
• Leoni, Patrick & Lundtofte, Frederik, 2017, "Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: The case of Treasury auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 80-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.004.
• Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert & Lavi, Ron & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017, "Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 55-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024.
• Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 2017, "Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 6-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.006.
• Zhou, Yu, 2017, "A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 76-79, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012.
• Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2017, "No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 142-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.04.022.
• Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2017, "On the efficiency of the first price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 159-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003.
• Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017, "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 36-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.030.
• Khezr, Peyman & Menezes, Flavio M., 2017, "A new characterization of equilibrium in multiple-object uniform-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 53-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.031.
• Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017, "A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 177-179, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032.
• Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2017, "First-price auction implements efficient investments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 198-200, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.013.
• Shi, Yang & Xu, Hui & Wang, Mancang & Conroy, Paul, 2017, "Home bias in domestic art markets: Evidence from China," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 201-203, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.015.
• Mill, Wladislaw, 2017, "The spite motive in third price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 71-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.028.
• Hu, Yingyao, 2017, "The econometrics of unobservables: Applications of measurement error models in empirical industrial organization and labor economics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 200, issue 2, pages 154-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.002.
• An, Yonghong, 2017, "Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: A measurement error approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 200, issue 2, pages 326-343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.014.
• Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Ong, David & Segev, Ella, 2017, "Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 23-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.002.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017, "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 84-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.012.
• Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier, 2017, "Forestry auctions with interdependent values: Evidence from timber auctions," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 107-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2017.02.004.
• McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017, "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 34-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Choi, Syngjoo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2017, "An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 20-43, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.008.
• Wellman, Michael P. & Sodomka, Eric & Greenwald, Amy, 2017, "Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 339-372, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.007.
• Thompson, David R.M. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2017, "Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 583-623, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009.
• Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2017, "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 199-224, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.006.
• Li, Yunan, 2017, "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 225-253, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.006.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mukherjee, Conan, 2017, "Bidding rings: A bargaining approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 67-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007.
• Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017, "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 252-270, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.004.
• Gelder, Alan & Kovenock, Dan, 2017, "Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 444-455, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.008.
• Ben-Zwi, Oren, 2017, "Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 456-467, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.013.
• Bose, Subir & Daripa, Arup, 2017, "Shills and snipes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 507-516, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.010.
• Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2017, "Some further properties of the cumulative offer process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 656-665, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.006.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017, "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 78-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005.
• Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017, "Auctions with selective entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 104-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.016.
• Paes Leme, Renato, 2017, "Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 294-316, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.016.
• Wang, Hong, 2017, "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 48-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.12.003.
• Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob K., 2017, "Frontiers in spectrum auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 372-391, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.006.
• Janssen, Maarten & Karamychev, Vladimir, 2017, "Raising rivals’ cost in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 473-490, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.011.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 91-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.001.
• Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2017, "Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 165-187, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.005.
• Seres, Gyula, 2017, "Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 282-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.002.
• Koh, Youngwoo, 2017, "Incentive and sampling effects in procurement auctions with endogenous number of bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 393-426, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.006.
• Olimov, Jafar M. & Roe, Brian E., 2017, "Multidimensional quality sorting between online and offline auctions: The role of attribute transparency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 145-169, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.003.
• Marszalec, Daniel, 2017, "The impact of auction choice on revenue in treasury bill auctions – An empirical evaluation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 215-239, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.005.
• Daglish, Toby & Sağlam, Yiğit & Ho, Phuong, 2017, "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: A model for spectrum auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 63-98, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.04.004.
• Vadovič, Radovan, 2017, "Bidding behavior and price search in Internet auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 125-147, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.006.
• Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017, "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 148-174, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009.
• Platt, Brennan C., 2017, "Inferring ascending auction participation from observed bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 65-88, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.001.
• Sogo, Takeharu, 2017, "Effects of seller’s information disclosure in equity auctions requiring post-auction investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 166-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.005.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Auctions with bid credits and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 58-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.002.
• De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2017, "Subcontracting and the survival of plants in the road construction industry: A panel quantile regression analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 113-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.016.
• Bošković, Branko & Nøstbakken, Linda, 2017, "The cost of endangered species protection: Evidence from auctions for natural resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 174-192, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.08.003.
• Holzer, Jorge & DePiper, Geret & Lipton, Douglas, 2017, "Buybacks with costly participation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 130-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.05.001.
• Du, Songzi & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2017, "Bilateral trading in divisible double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 285-311, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.001.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2017, "Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 453-473, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.002.
• Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 629-640, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008.
• Troyan, Peter, 2017, "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 319-345, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.010.
• Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2017, "The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 385-416, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.009.
• Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2017, "Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 86-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.005.
• Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017, "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 35-63, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.001.
• Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam, 2017, "Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 313-347, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001.
• Acharya, Viral V. & Fleming, Michael J. & Hrung, Warren B. & Sarkar, Asani, 2017, "Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 123, issue 1, pages 81-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.12.004.
• Holmes, William B., 2017, "Environmental services auctions under regulatory threat," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 584-591, DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.06.004.
• Chira, Inga & Volkov, Nikanor, 2017, "The choice of sale method and its consequences in mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 170-184, DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2016.04.005.
• Denny, Eleanor & O'Mahoney, Amy & Lannoye, Eamonn, 2017, "Modelling the impact of wind generation on electricity market prices in Ireland: An econometric versus unit commitment approach," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 109-119, DOI: 10.1016/j.renene.2016.11.003.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Castro, Manuel, 2017, "Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 28-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.12.008.
• Kechagia, Varvara & Drichoutis, Andreas C., 2017, "The effect of olfactory sensory cues on willingness to pay and choice under risk," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, pages 33-46, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.07.005.
• Bichler, Martin & Gretschko, Vitali & Janssen, Maarten, 2017, "Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 5, pages 325-340, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2017.01.005.
• Kuroda, Toshifumi & Baquero Forero, Maria del Pilar, 2017, "The effects of spectrum allocation mechanisms on market outcomes: Auctions vs beauty contests," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 5, pages 341-354, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2017.01.006.
• Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Ong, David & Segev, Ella, 2017, "Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 70793, Jun.
• David M Newbery, 2017, "What future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative?," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1705, Mar.
• Juha Teirilä, 2017, "Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1712, Jul.
• Thomas Greve & Fei Teng & Michael Pollitt & Goran Strbac, 2017, "A system operator's utility function for the frequency response market," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1713, Jul.
• Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2017, "Signaling in auctions: experimental evidence," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven, number 585499, Jun.
• Charles N. Noussair & Gyula Seres, 2017, "The Effect of Collusion on Efficiency in Experimental Auctions," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, number 2017-09, Feb.
• Huagang Li & Guofu Tan, 2017, "Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders," Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities, Higher Education Press, volume 12, issue 3, pages 341-370, September.
• Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2017, "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.02, Jan.
• Ruben Juarez & Kohei Nitta, 2017, "Profit-Sharing and Implementation of Efficient Outcomes," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 201702, May.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti, & Paola Valbonesi, 2018, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number hal-01619040, Nov, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150240.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctons," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-01440891, Jan.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," CIRED Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01557657, Jul.
• Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01688261.
• Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2017, "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01688267.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctons," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01440891, Jan.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01557657, Jul.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01557657, Jul.
• Bernergård, Axel & Wärneryd, Karl, 2017, "Self-Allocation in Contests," SSE Working Paper Series in Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, number 2017:2, Aug.
• Blázquez De Paz, Mario, 2017, "Production or Transmission Investments? A Comparative Analysis," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1158, Mar.
• Lundin, Erik & Tangerås, Thomas, 2017, "Cournot Competition in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The Nordic Power Exchange, Nord Pool," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1191, Nov.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "All-pay auctions with affiliated values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 13/2017, Jun.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "War of attrition with affiliated values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 16/2017, Sep.
• Repetto, Luca & Solis, Alex, 2017, "The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 2017:10, Sep.
• Ivan Susin, 2017, "Auctions with Resale: A Survey," HSE Economic Journal, National Research University Higher School of Economics, volume 21, issue 2, pages 333-350.
• Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2017, "Round-Robin Tournaments with Limited Resources," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics, number WP BRP 171/EC/2017.
• MENG, Xin & GUNAY, Hikmet, 2017, "Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-43, Feb.
• GUNAY, Hikmet & MENG, Xin, 2017, "Which good to sell first in a sequential auction?," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-45, May.
• Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017, "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2017-069, Sep.
• Thomas Deckers & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse & Pia Pinger & Hannah Schildberg-Horisch, 2017, "Socio-Economic Status and Inequalities in Children's IQ and Economic Preferences," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2017-088, Dec.
• Seung Han Yoo, 2017, "Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1702.
• Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2017, "Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1705.
• Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2017, "Per Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalty Licensing," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1706.
• Hu, Yingyao, 2017, "The Econometrics of Unobservables -- Latent Variable and Measurement Error Models and Their Applications in Empirical Industrial Organization and Labor Economics
  [The Econometrics of Unobservables]," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, number 64578, revised 2021.
• Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2017, "On a spontaneous decentralized market process," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 2, issue 1, pages 1-37, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.001.
• Ola Andersson & Tommy Andersson, 2017, "Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 2, issue 1, pages 39-55, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.002.
• Akiyoshi Shioura, 2017, "On the Partnership formation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 2, issue 1, pages 105-140, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.004.
• Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2022, "Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 7, issue 1, pages 45-69, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.002.
• Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2017, "Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, number 2017-012, Oct.
• Karim Jamal & Michael Maier & Shyam Sunder, 2017, "Simple Agents, Intelligent Markets," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 49, issue 4, pages 653-675, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-016-9582-3.
• Luca Corazzini & Stefano Galavotti & Rupert Sausgruber & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Allotment in first-price auctions: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 20, issue 1, pages 70-99, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9476-1.
• Sotiris Georganas & Dan Levin & Peter McGee, 2017, "Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 20, issue 4, pages 772-792, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9510-y.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Justin E. Burkett & Emel Filiz-Ozbay, 2017, "An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 20, issue 4, pages 973-1006, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9520-9.
• Lars Hornuf & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2017, "Pricing shares in equity crowdfunding," Small Business Economics, Springer, volume 48, issue 4, pages 795-811, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11187-016-9807-9.
• Shinya Horie, 2017, "Procurement Auctions with Uncertainty in Corruption," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, number 1710, Mar.
• Martín Gonzalez-Eiras & Jesper Rüdiger, 2017, "Liquidity Shocks, Market Maker Turnover, and Bidding Behavior in Treasury Auctions," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 17-13, Aug.
• Ryuji Sano, 2017, "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 963, Feb.
• Dakshina Garfield De Silva & Marina Gertsberg & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Rachel Pownall, 2017, "Dealer Networks in the World of Art," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 198144199.
• Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2017, "The Economics of Vendor Bids," ERC Working Papers, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, number 1711, Oct, revised Oct 2017.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017, "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, number 1712, Oct, revised Oct 2017.
• Alia Gizatulina & Martin Hellwig, 2017, "The Generic Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Models with Large Type Spaces," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2017_02, Feb, revised 25 May 2017.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, number 17003, Jan, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150240.
• Shaho Heidari Gandoman & Navab Kiamehr & Mahmood Hemetfar, 2017, "Forecasting Initial Public Offering Pricing Using Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Algorithm and Support Vector Machine (SVM) In Iran," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, volume 7, issue 1, pages 336-349, June.
• Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W. Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2017, "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23473, Jun.
• Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2017, "Identification in Ascending Auctions, with an Application to Digital Rights Management," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23569, Jul.
• Aditya Bhave & Eric Budish, 2017, "Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of 'Bob the Broker'?," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23770, Sep.
• Eduardo M. Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2017, "Strategy-proofness in the Large," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23771, Sep.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2017, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23962, Oct.
• Francesco Decarolis & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2017, "Online Auctions and Digital Marketing Agencies," Working Papers, NET Institute, number 17-08, Sep.
• Duke, Joshua M. & Messer, Kent D. & Lynch, Lori & Li, Tongzhe, 2017, "The Effect of Information on Discriminatory-Price and Uniform-Price Reverse Auction Efficiency: An Experimental Economics Study of the Purchase of Ecosystem Services," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, volume 7, issue 1-2, pages 41-71, December, DOI: 10.1561/102.00000073.
• Perger, Orsolya & Rollins, Curtis & Weber, Marian & Adamowicz, Wiktor & Boxall, Peter, 2017, "Tradable Disturbance Permits for Old-growth Forest Conservation: Experimental Evaluation of Implementation Options," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, volume 7, issue 1-2, pages 73-107, December, DOI: 10.1561/102.00000074.
• Julien Gourdon & James Messent, 2017, "How government procurement measures can affect trade," OECD Trade Policy Papers, OECD Publishing, number 199, Apr, DOI: 10.1787/d1ab07b8-en.
• Marc N. Conte & Robert M. Griffin, 2017, "Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, volume 99, issue 3, pages 571-591.
• Steven Wallander & Paul Ferraro & Nathaniel Higgins, 2017, "Addressing Participant Inattention in Federal Programs: A Field Experiment with The Conservation Reserve Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, volume 99, issue 4, pages 914-931.
• Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017, "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 15, issue 6, pages 1258-1301.
• Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017, "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, volume 33, issue 4, pages 541-571.
• Alfredo di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2017, "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 1, pages 237-276.
• Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu, 2017, "What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 4, pages 1606-1651.
• Laura Rondi & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Pre- and post-award outsourcing: Temporary partnership versus subcontracting in public procurement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0211, Jun.
• Yunan Li, 2017, "Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 16-007, Jun, revised 23 Jun 2017.
• Audrey Hu & Steven Matthews & Liang Zou, 2017, "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 17-004, Mar, revised 13 Mar 2017.
• Harold L. Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordonez, 2017, "A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 17-015, May, revised 01 May 2017.
• Wittwer, Milena, 2017, "Centralizing Disconnected Markets? An Irrelevance Result," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76534, Feb.
• Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2017, "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 79181.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Valimaki, Juuso, 2017, "All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80799, Jun.