Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2021

• Hippel, Svenja & Hoeppner, Sven, 2021, "Contracts as reference points: A replication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105973.
• Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Onderstal, Sander & Parisi, Francesco, 2021, "Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105981.
• Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2021, "How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 189-205, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.015.
• Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021, "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, pages 328-343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.031.
• Harris, Edwyna & La Croix, Sumner, 2021, "Understanding the gains to capitalists from colonization: Lessons from Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Karl Marx and Edward Gibbon Wakefield," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, pages 348-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.030.
• Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, pages 448-469, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001.
• Lim, Wooyoung & Xiong, Siyang, 2021, "Does jump bidding increase sellers’ revenue? Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, pages 84-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.026.
• Duffy, John & Matros, Alexander, 2021, "All-pay auctions versus lotteries as provisional fixed-prize fundraising mechanisms: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, pages 434-464, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.10.010.
• Bernardino, Wilton & Ospina, Raydonal & Souza, Filipe Costa de & Rêgo, Leandro & Pereira, Felipe, 2021, "Risk curves: A methodology to evaluate the risk of fraud by stock price manipulation based on game theory and detection software," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2020.105953.
• Fu, Hu & Haghpanah, Nima & Hartline, Jason & Kleinberg, Robert, 2021, "Full surplus extraction from samples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105230.
• Milgrom, Paul & Mollner, Joshua, 2021, "Extended proper equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 194, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105258.
• Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John, 2021, "Allocating positions fairly: Auctions and Shapley value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105315.
• Ichihashi, Shota, 2021, "The economics of data externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105316.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2021, "Sequential auctions with ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105324.
• von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2021, "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105328.
• Long, Yan & Sethuraman, Jay & Xue, Jingyi, 2021, "Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105350.
• Menicucci, Domenico, 2021, "In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105371.
• von Hobe, Cord-Friedrich & Musshoff, Oliver, 2021, "On the effectiveness of restricted tendering as a form of policy intervention on agricultural land markets," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105343.
• Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2021, "Your failure is my opportunity—Effects of elimination in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102495.
• Agarwal, Sumit & Hauswald, Robert, 2021, "Information disclosure and the choice between arm’s-length and inside debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, pages 1008-1022, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.08.001.
• Koska, Onur A. & Stähler, Frank, 2021, "It ain’t over until it’s over: English auctions with subsequent negotiations," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, pages 121-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2020.11.010.
• Matteucci, Nicola, 2021, "Procuring NGA infrastructure: The performance of EMAT auctions in Italy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2020.102074.
• David Newbery, 2021, "Designing Efficient Renewable Electricity Support Schemes," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2107, Mar.
• Karim Anaya & Michael Pollitt, 2021, "An evaluation of a local reactive power market: the case of Power Potential," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2124, Oct.
• Bernardo David & Lorenzo Gentile & Mohsen Pourpouneh, 2021, "FAST: Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2021/02, Mar.
• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~21-21-16, Jul.
• Yann Raineau & Éric Giraud-Héraud & Sébastien Lecocq & Stéphanie Pérès & Alexandre Pons & Sophie Tempère, 2021, "When Undue Health Claims Supersede Genuine Environmental Efforts: Evidence from Experimental Auctions with Bordeaux Wine Consumers," Bordeaux Economics Working Papers, Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE), number 2021-21.
• Sven Heim & Georg Götz, 2021, "Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03519694, Aug, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308.
• Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Andrea Guido & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2021, "Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03520328, Oct, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12504.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021, "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03544026, Jan, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa092.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2021, "Organizing Competition for the Market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03551028, Oct, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvab044.
• Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04120443, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001.
• Tierney, Ryan, 2021, "Simple Social Choice Rules for Exchange," Discussion Papers on Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics, number 4/2021, Mar.
• Lindström, Hanna & Lundberg, Sofia & Marklund, Per-Olov, 2021, "Green Public Procurement: An empirical analysis of the uptake of organic food policy," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 997, Oct.
• Dmitriy Ivanov & Nikita Kalinin & Alexander Nesterov & Ivan Susin, 2021, "2019 Crab Quota Auction: History, Evaluation, and Alternative Scenarios," HSE Economic Journal, National Research University Higher School of Economics, volume 25, issue 4, pages 574-594.
• Alex Imas & Kristóf Madarász, 2021, "Mimetic Dominance and the Economics of Exclusion: Private Goods in Public Context," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2021-001, Jan.
• Siti Afni ANISAH & Lestari Rahayu WALUYATI & Agus Dwi NUGROHO, 2021, "Could A New Agricultural Auction Market Implement A Good Marketing Mix?," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, volume 0, issue 2, pages 181-191, June.
• Dirk Bethmann & Robert Rudolf, 2021, "The paradox of wealthy nations' unhappy adolescents," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 2101.
• Paolo Riccardo Morganti, 2021, "Extreme Value Theory and Auction Models," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, volume 16, issue 2, pages 1-15, Abril - J.
• Stjepan Srhojer & Melko Dragojevic, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2021-28.
• Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), number 14524, Jun.
• Pengfei Liu, 2021, "Balancing Cost Effectiveness and Incentive Properties in Conservation Auctions: Experimental Evidence from Three Multi-award Reverse Auction Mechanisms," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 78, issue 3, pages 417-451, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00538-0.
• Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2021, "An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 78, issue 4, pages 571-585, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00543-3.
• Daniel G. Stephenson & Alexander L. Brown, 2021, "Playing the field in all-pay auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 24, issue 2, pages 489-514, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09669-5.
• Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2021, "Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 24, issue 2, pages 536-557, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09671-x.
• Koki Arai, 2021, "The Characteristics of Low Bid Price Survey Standards and Their Impact," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, volume 21, issue 4, pages 593-608, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10842-021-00372-6.
• Anette Boom & Sebastian Schwenen, 2021, "Is real-time pricing smart for consumers?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 60, issue 2, pages 193-213, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09440-5.
• Marie BLUM & Régis BLAZY, 2021, "The three stages of an auction: how do the bid dynamics influence auction prices? Evidence from live art auctions," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg, number 2021-10.
• Erik Heilmann & Andreas Zeiselmair & Thomas Estermann, 2021, "Matching supply and demand of electricity network-supportive flexibility: A case study with three comprehensible matching algorithms," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung), number 202110.
• Tuvana Pastine & Ivan Pastine, 2021, "Equilibrium Existence and Expected Payoffs in All-Pay Auctions with Constraints," Economics Department Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth, number n311-21.pdf.
• Péter Biró & Gyula Magyarkuti, 2021, "The Work of Milgrom and Wilson in the Theory and Practical Application of Auctions," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), volume 20, issue 1, pages 127-151.
• John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021, "Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 28602, Mar.
• Baptiste Massenot & Maria Maraki & Christian Thöni, 2021, "Litigation Spending and Care under the English and American Rules: Experimental Evidence," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, volume 23, issue 1, pages 164-206.
• Amanda J Fuller & Jacob Ricker-Gilbert, 2021, "Estimating Demand for Third-party Quality Testing in Rural Grain Markets: Evidence from an Experimental Auction for Measuring Moisture Content in Kenya," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, volume 30, issue 5, pages 389-417.
• Xiaoyong Cao & Shao-Chieh Hsueh & Guoqiang Tian, 2021, "On the ratifiability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with participation costs and information leakage," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 73, issue 1, pages 446-459.
• Bradley J Larsen, 2021, "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 88, issue 2, pages 851-882.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021, "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation
  [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 88, issue 5, pages 2149-2178.
• Lu Han & Chandler Lutz & Benjamin Sand & Derek Stacey & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021, "The Effects of a Targeted Financial Constraint on the Housing Market
  [Lending implications of U.S. bank stress tests: Costs or benefits?]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 34, issue 8, pages 3742-3788.
• Renée B Adams & Roman Kräussl & Marco Navone & Patrick Verwijmeren & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021, "Gendered Prices
  [Can culture affect prices? A cross-cultural study of shopping and retail prices]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 34, issue 8, pages 3789-3839.
• Julien Pénasse & Luc Renneboog & José A Scheinkman & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021, "When a Master Dies: Speculation and Asset Float
  [Optimal financial crises]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 34, issue 8, pages 3840-3879.
• Banerjee, Shraman, 2021, "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105971, Jan.
• Colombo, Stefano & Ma, Siyu & Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2021, "Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108275, Jun.
• Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 109997, Oct.
• Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110018, Oct.
• Roy, Souvik & Kumar, Ujjwal, 2021, "Local incentive compatibility in non-convex type-spaces," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110872, Nov.
• Kumar, Ujjwal & Roy, Souvik, 2021, "Local incentive compatibility in ordinal type-spaces," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110994, Dec.
• Kasberger, Bernhard & Woodward, Kyle, 2021, "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 111185, Dec.
• Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021, "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 651, Dec.
• Karmeliuk, Maria & Kocher, Martin, 2021, "Teams and Individuals in Standard Auction Formats: Decisions and Emotions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 279, Feb.
• Robert Wilson, 2021, "Biographical," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-5, Oct.
• Paul Milgrom, 2021, "Biographical," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-6, Oct.
• Guillaume Pommey, 2021, "Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 514, Oct, revised 10 Oct 2021.
• Dariusz Grabara, 2021, "Influence of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Vignette Factors of Smartphone Auctions on the Allegro Auction Platform (Wplyw pandemii COVID-19 na prezentacje aukcji smartfonow na platformie aukcyjnej Alle," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, volume 19, issue 93, pages 33-52.
• Joanna Rachubik & Dorota Mirowska-Wierzbicka & Wojciech Zawadzki & Maciej Wilamowski & Krzysztof Fiok & Wojciech Maciejewski & Mateusz Szczurek, 2021, "Wspolczesne mechanizmy aukcyjne na potrzeby rynku mediowego (Modern Auction Mechanisms for the Media Market)," Research Reports, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, volume 2, issue 35, pages 61-75.
• Ricardo Carvalho Lima & Guilherme Mendes Resende, 2021, "Using the Moran’s I to detect bid rigging in Brazilian procurement auctions," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, volume 66, issue 2, pages 237-254, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00168-020-01018-x.
• Edward Oczkowski, 2021, "The catalogue raisonné and art auction prices: the case of Berthe Morisot," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 61, issue 3, pages 1669-1687, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00181-020-01920-5.
• Christopher Helm & Tim A. Herberger & Marcel Tyrell, 2021, "Demand dynamics across secondary German Book markets: an information aggregation and synthetization approach," Information Systems and e-Business Management, Springer, volume 19, issue 2, pages 567-596, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10257-021-00512-9.
• Thomas W. L. Norman, 2021, "Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 235-250, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01240-5.
• Jung S. You & Ruben Juarez, 2021, "Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 4, pages 1569-1589, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01342-z.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 4, pages 1527-1567, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01347-8.
• Maxim Ivanov, 2021, "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 955-1000, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01277-x.
• Hanzhe Zhang, 2021, "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1297-1337, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01313-w.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 1-32, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00240-5.
• Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021, "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 33-64, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00242-3.
• Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli & Quang Vuong, 2021, "Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 39, issue 2, pages 373-385, March, DOI: 10.1080/07350015.2019.1665530.
• Kaisa Kotakorpi & Satu Metsälampi & Topi Miettinen & Tuomas Nurminen, 2021, "The role of reporting institutions and image motivation in tax evasion and incidence," Working Papers, Tampere University, Faculty of Management and Business, Economics, number 2133, Jun.
• Fritz Helmedag, 2021, "Basic Bidding Formats: Characteristics and Differences," Chemnitz Economic Papers, Department of Economics, Chemnitz University of Technology, number 051, Oct, revised Oct 2021.
• Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021, "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Siga, Lucas & Mihm, Maximilian, 2021, "Information aggregation in competitive markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 1, January.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021, "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Maker," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-060/VI, Jul.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2021, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-695, May.
• Ivaldi, Marc & Petrova, Milena J & Urdanoz, Miguel, 2021, "Airline Cooperation Effects on Airfare Distribution: An Auction-model-based Approach," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1259, Nov.
• Florens, Jean-Pierre & Enache, Andreea & Sbaï, Erwann, 2021, "A Functional Estimation Approach to the First-Price Auction Models," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1264, Nov.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Goldmanis, Maris & Penta, Antonio & Shakhgildyan, Ksenia, 2021, "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1273, Dec.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2021, "A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 129, issue 4, pages 1011-1051, DOI: 10.1086/712735.
• Leandro Arozamena & Andres Fioriti & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "De teoría de subastas a diseño de mercados: las contribuciones de Paul Milgrom y Robert Wilson a la economía
  [From auction theory to market design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s contributions to," Estudios Economicos, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia, volume 38, issue 76, pages 279-296, january-j.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2021, "Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: Detection methodology and empirical analysis," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1782, May.
• Renée B Adams & Roman Kräussl & Marco Navone & Patrick Verwijmeren, 2021, "Gendered Prices," Published Paper Series, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2021-4, Jan.
• Fabio Michelucci, 2021, "On the use of reserve prices in the English auction," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", number 2021:31.
• Josheski Dushko & Karamazova Elena, 2021, "Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms," Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics, Sciendo, volume 7, issue 1, pages 43-59, May, DOI: 10.2478/crebss-2021-0004.
• Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2021, "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 89, issue 5, pages 2049-2079, September, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14935.
• Aldott, Zoltan, 2021, "Predicting Specialty Coffee Auction Prices Using Machine Learning," Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers, Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers, number 15.
• Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2021, "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 21/04, Jul.
• Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2021, "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints: A Revision," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 21/05, Aug.
• Inacio Bo & Jorgen Kratz & Makoto Shimoji, 2021, "Generalized Cumulative Offer Processes," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 21/07, Oct.
• Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion & Steinberg, Richard, 2021, "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Ahead of .
• Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2021, "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 111, issue 4, pages 1055-1091.
• Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," GLO Discussion Paper Series, Global Labor Organization (GLO), number 946.
• Hwang, Sundoo, 2021, "An Unsuccessful Reform on the Local Public Contracts Law in Korea," KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI), volume 43, issue 3, pages 55-77, DOI: 10.23895/kdijep.2021.43.3.55.
• Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 21-037.
• Clark, Robert & Coviello, Decio & de Leverano, Adriano, 2021, "Centralized procurement and delivery times: Evidence from a natural experiment in Italy," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 21-063.
• Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2021, "Procuring survival," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 21-093.
• Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021, "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 393, Jun.

2020

• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27325, Jun.
• Tobias Salz, 2020, "Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets: An Empirical Case Study," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27700, Aug.
• Michael Ostrovsky, 2020, "Choice Screen Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 28091, Nov.
• Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020, "Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, number 2020-01, Jan.
• Simon Finster, 2020, "Strategic Bidding in Product-Mix, Sequential, and Simultaneous Auctions," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2020-W03, Mar.
• Elizabeth Badlwin & Omer Edhan & Ravi Jagadeesan & Paul Klemperer & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2020-W08, Jul.
• Carsten Croonenbroeck & Martin Odening & Silke Hüttel, 2020, "Farmland values and bidder behaviour in first-price land auctions
  [Identification of standard auction models]," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, volume 47, issue 2, pages 558-590.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020, "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 18, issue 4, pages 1655-1696.
• Luca Repetto & Alex Solís, 2020, "The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 18, issue 6, pages 3261-3304.
• Francesco Decarolis & Leonardo M Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020, "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
  [“Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 36, issue 3, pages 537-597.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer & Alex Teytelboym & Omer Edhan Ravi Jagadeesan, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 912, Jun.
• Federica Alberti & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Kei Tsutsui, 2020, "Implementing stakeholder participation as “egalitarian bidding” – The test of the Kantian pudding is in the institutionalized eating," Working Papers in Economics & Finance, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group, number 2020-09, May.
• Gorecki, Paul, 2020, "The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry Merger: Three Into Two Won’t Go," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100477, May.
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• Zhang, nan & Qin, Botao, 2020, "Reference point adaptation and air quality – Experimental evidence with anti-PM 2.5 facemasks from China," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 102935, Jun.
• Tchoffo, Rodrigue & Ngouhouo, Ibrahim & Nkemgha, Guivis, 2020, "Trade Liberalization and Macroeconomic Performance in Cameroon: An Imperfect Competition Approach," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 98558, Feb, revised 09 Feb 2020.
• Vojtěch Klézl & Radoslav Delina & Lenka Senderáková & Michal Tkáč, 2020, "Vliv zvolených faktorů na výsledek elektronických reverzních aukcí
  [Impact of Selected Factors on the Results of Electronic Reverse Auctions]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, volume 2020, issue 1, pages 62-85, DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1268.
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• Engelmann, Dirk & Frank, Jeff & Koch, Alexander K. & Valente, Marieta, 2020, "Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 237, Apr.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "The quest for the perfect auction," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-1, Oct.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-2, Oct.
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• José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020, "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, number 20-1, Feb.
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• Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2020, "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 571, Jun.
• Henner Gimpel & Valerie Graf-Drasch & Alexander Kammerer & Maximilian Keller & Xinyi Zheng, 2020, "When does it pay off to integrate sustainability in the business model? – A game-theoretic analysis," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 30, issue 4, pages 699-716, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-019-00361-y.
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• Matt Essen & John Wooders, 2020, "Dissolving a partnership securely," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 69, issue 2, pages 415-434, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01177-9.
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• Ruben Juarez & Kohei Nitta & Miguel Vargas, 2020, "Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 3, pages 817-846, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01230-7.
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• Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2020, "The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, volume 23, issue 3, pages 379-396, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10951-019-00624-8.
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• Justus Haucap, 2020, "Nobelpreis für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom: Zwei Ökonomen, die echte Märkte schufen
  [Nobel Prize for Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom: Two Economists who Created Real Markets]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 100, issue 12, pages 969-975, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10273-020-2806-0.
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• Budish, Eric B. & Lee, Robin S. & Shim, John J., 2020, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Working Papers, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, number 301.
• Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes, 2020, "Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 119, pages 30-55.
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• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Hanke, Ann-Katrin & Ott, Marion, 2020, "A small volume reduction that melts down the market: Auctions with endogenous rationing," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-014.
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