Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2022

• Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordonez, 2022, "Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 22-017, Jun.
• Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka, 2022, "A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 115427.
• Sharma, Shashidharan, 2022, "Cheating in Second Price Auctions and Emotional Responses," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121492, Dec.
• Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2022, "Screening Adaptive Cartels," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 300, Jun.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2022, "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2022-12, Mar.
• Zachary Breig & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Declan Hunt, 2022, "Experimental Auctions with Securities," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 657, Aug.
• Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kocher, Martin G. & Schudy, Simeon, 2022, "Cross-game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 358, Dec.
• Sergey L. Alekseev & Sergey G. Gordeev, 2022, "The Potential of Public Procurement for Economic Growth and Social Activity," Economic Consultant, Scientific and Educational Initiative LLC, volume 4, issue 4, pages 4-13.
• Clarissa Lotti & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2022, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 532, Feb, revised 01 Feb 2022.
• Matteo Bizzarri, 2022, "Multilateral Market Power in Input-output Networks," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 648, Jun, revised 23 Mar 2026.
• Alexander Dentler & Enzo Rossi, 2022, "Public debt management announcements under "beat-the-market" opportunities," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2022-06.
• Satoshi Takahashi & Yoichi Izunaga & Naoki Watanabe, 2022, "An experimental study of VCG mechanism for multi-unit auctions: competing with machine bidders," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, volume 19, issue 1, pages 97-117, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40844-021-00198-1.
• Marc T. P. Adam & Jan Krämer, 2022, "Evaluating the emotional bidding framework: new evidence from a decade of neurophysiology," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 32, issue 3, pages 1529-1540, September, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-022-00555-x.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2022, "Auctions with resale and risk aversion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 117-128, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00221-7.
• Seewoo Lee & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2022, "Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 293-302, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00234-2.
• Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022, "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 8, issue 1, pages 45-55, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-022-00119-x.
• Christian Ewerhart, 2022, "A “fractal” solution to the chopstick auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1025-1041, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1052-1.
• Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022, "All-pay auctions with ties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1183-1231, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01195-7.
• Wojciech Olszewski & Ron Siegel, 2022, "Large contests without single crossing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1043-1055, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01244-1.
• Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2022, "Two-stage contests with preferences over style," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1141-1161, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01388-z.
• Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2022, "Introduction to the Special Issue on Contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1017-1023, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01470-0.
• Pranjal Chandrakar & Shubhabrata Das & Manaswini Bhalla, 2022, "Lease Auctions with Retention Options," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 20, issue 1, pages 97-136, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-021-00279-3.
• Benjamin Kang & James Unwin, 2022, "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, volume 15, issue 2, pages 145-160, August, DOI: 10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8.
• Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2022, "Round-robin tournaments with limited resources," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 59, issue 3, pages 525-583, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01402-w.
• Andrea Gallice & Giuseppe Sorrenti, 2022, "Curious about the price? Consumers’ behavior in price reveal auctions," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 29, issue 9, pages 831-834, May, DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1893263.
• Lauermann, Stephan & Wolinsky, Asher, 2022, "A common-value auction with state-dependent participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2022, "Progressive participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Ma, X. & Noussair, C.N. & Renneboog, Luc, 2022, "Colors, emotions, and the auction value of paintings," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6e02bd92-e90d-4b93-a066-4.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2022, "Meetings and Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-727, Jul.
• JoonHwan Cho & Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2022, "Deconvolution from Two Order Statistics," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-739, Oct.
• Motta, Massimo & Penta, Antonio, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 22-1370, Oct.
• Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2022, "Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints," Open Access publications, School of Economics, University College Dublin, number 10197/24982, May.
• Christopher S. Cotton & Brent R. Hickman & Joseph P. Price, 2022, "Affirmative Action and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 40, issue 1, pages 157-185, DOI: 10.1086/713743.
• Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022, "Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1824, Mar.
• Massimo Motta & Antonio Penta, 2022, "Market effects of sponsored search auctions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1844, Jun.
• Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2022, "Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, pages 505-543, May, DOI: 10.3982/QE1151.
• Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2022, "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, pages 787-823, May, DOI: 10.3982/QE1692.
• Sang-Hyun Kim & Chulyoung Kim & Jaeok Park & Jinhyuk Lee, 2022, "First-Price and Second-Price Auctions with Externalities: An Experimental Study," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2022rwp-199, Aug.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2022, "An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Item Ascending Auction under Financial Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 22/02, May.
• Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2022, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-016.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2022, "Congestion management games in electricity markets," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-060.
• Riehm, Tobias, 2022, "Motivated beliefs in auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-062.
• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022, "On market prices in double auctions," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 404, Feb.
• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022, "Markets and transaction costs," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 405, Feb, revised Sep 2022.

2021

• Erik Heilmann & Andreas Zeiselmair & Thomas Estermann, 2021, "Matching supply and demand of electricity network-supportive flexibility: A case study with three comprehensible matching algorithms," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung), number 202110.
• Tuvana Pastine & Ivan Pastine, 2021, "Equilibrium Existence and Expected Payoffs in All-Pay Auctions with Constraints," Economics Department Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth, number n311-21.pdf.
• Péter Biró & Gyula Magyarkuti, 2021, "The Work of Milgrom and Wilson in the Theory and Practical Application of Auctions," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), volume 20, issue 1, pages 127-151.
• John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021, "Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 28602, Mar.
• Baptiste Massenot & Maria Maraki & Christian Thöni, 2021, "Litigation Spending and Care under the English and American Rules: Experimental Evidence," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, volume 23, issue 1, pages 164-206.
• Amanda J Fuller & Jacob Ricker-Gilbert, 2021, "Estimating Demand for Third-party Quality Testing in Rural Grain Markets: Evidence from an Experimental Auction for Measuring Moisture Content in Kenya," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, volume 30, issue 5, pages 389-417.
• Xiaoyong Cao & Shao-Chieh Hsueh & Guoqiang Tian, 2021, "On the ratifiability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with participation costs and information leakage," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 73, issue 1, pages 446-459.
• Pasha Andreyanov & Tomasz Sadzik, 2021, "Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 88, issue 2, pages 521-573.
• Bradley J Larsen, 2021, "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 88, issue 2, pages 851-882.
• John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Westkamp, 2021, "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 88, issue 3, pages 1457-1502.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021, "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 88, issue 5, pages 2149-2178.
• Lu Han & Chandler Lutz & Benjamin Sand & Derek Stacey & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021, "The Effects of a Targeted Financial Constraint on the Housing Market
  [Lending implications of U.S. bank stress tests: Costs or benefits?]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 34, issue 8, pages 3742-3788.
• Renée B Adams & Roman Kräussl & Marco Navone & Patrick Verwijmeren & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021, "Gendered Prices
  [Can culture affect prices? A cross-cultural study of shopping and retail prices]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 34, issue 8, pages 3789-3839.
• Julien Pénasse & Luc Renneboog & José A Scheinkman & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021, "When a Master Dies: Speculation and Asset Float
  [Optimal financial crises]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 34, issue 8, pages 3840-3879.
• Banerjee, Shraman, 2021, "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105971, Jan.
• Colombo, Stefano & Ma, Siyu & Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2021, "Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108275, Jun.
• Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 109997, Oct.
• Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110018, Oct.
• Roy, Souvik & Kumar, Ujjwal, 2021, "Local incentive compatibility in non-convex type-spaces," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110872, Nov.
• Kumar, Ujjwal & Roy, Souvik, 2021, "Local incentive compatibility in ordinal type-spaces," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110994, Dec.
• Kasberger, Bernhard & Woodward, Kyle, 2021, "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 111185, Dec.
• Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021, "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 651, Dec.
• Karmeliuk, Maria & Kocher, Martin, 2021, "Teams and Individuals in Standard Auction Formats: Decisions and Emotions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 279, Feb.
• Robert Wilson, 2021, "Biographical," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-5, Oct.
• Paul Milgrom, 2021, "Biographical," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-6, Oct.
• Guillaume Pommey, 2021, "Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 514, Oct, revised 10 Oct 2021.
• Dariusz Grabara, 2021, "Influence of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Vignette Factors of Smartphone Auctions on the Allegro Auction Platform (Wplyw pandemii COVID-19 na prezentacje aukcji smartfonow na platformie aukcyjnej Allegro)," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, volume 19, issue 93, pages 33-52.
• Joanna Rachubik & Dorota Mirowska-Wierzbicka & Wojciech Zawadzki & Maciej Wilamowski & Krzysztof Fiok & Wojciech Maciejewski & Mateusz Szczurek, 2021, "Wspolczesne mechanizmy aukcyjne na potrzeby rynku mediowego (Modern Auction Mechanisms for the Media Market)," Research Reports, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, volume 2, issue 35, pages 61-75.
• Ricardo Carvalho Lima & Guilherme Mendes Resende, 2021, "Using the Moran’s I to detect bid rigging in Brazilian procurement auctions," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, volume 66, issue 2, pages 237-254, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00168-020-01018-x.
• Edward Oczkowski, 2021, "The catalogue raisonné and art auction prices: the case of Berthe Morisot," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 61, issue 3, pages 1669-1687, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00181-020-01920-5.
• Christopher Helm & Tim A. Herberger & Marcel Tyrell, 2021, "Demand dynamics across secondary German Book markets: an information aggregation and synthetization approach," Information Systems and e-Business Management, Springer, volume 19, issue 2, pages 567-596, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10257-021-00512-9.
• Thomas W. L. Norman, 2021, "Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 1, pages 235-250, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01240-5.
• Jung S. You & Ruben Juarez, 2021, "Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 4, pages 1569-1589, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01342-z.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 71, issue 4, pages 1527-1567, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01347-8.
• Maxim Ivanov, 2021, "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 3, pages 955-1000, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01277-x.
• Hanzhe Zhang, 2021, "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 72, issue 4, pages 1297-1337, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01313-w.
• Gino Loyola, 2021, "Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 1-32, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00240-5.
• Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021, "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 25, issue 1, pages 33-64, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00242-3.
• Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli & Quang Vuong, 2021, "Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 39, issue 2, pages 373-385, March, DOI: 10.1080/07350015.2019.1665530.
• Kaisa Kotakorpi & Satu Metsälampi & Topi Miettinen & Tuomas Nurminen, 2021, "The role of reporting institutions and image motivation in tax evasion and incidence," Working Papers, Tampere University, Faculty of Management and Business, Economics, number 2133, Jun.
• Fritz Helmedag, 2021, "Basic Bidding Formats: Characteristics and Differences," Chemnitz Economic Papers, Department of Economics, Chemnitz University of Technology, number 051, Oct, revised Oct 2021.
• Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021, "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• Siga, Lucas & Mihm, Maximilian, 2021, "Information aggregation in competitive markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 1, January.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021, "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 16, issue 3, July.
• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Maker," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 21-060/VI, Jul.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2021, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-695, May.
• Ivaldi, Marc & Petrova, Milena J & Urdanoz, Miguel, 2021, "Airline Cooperation Effects on Airfare Distribution: An Auction-model-based Approach," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1259, Nov.
• Enache, Andreea & Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbaï, Erwann, 2021, "A Functional Estimation Approach to the First-Price Auction Models," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1264, Nov.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Goldmanis, Maris & Penta, Antonio & Shakhgildyan, Ksenia, 2021, "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1273, Dec.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2021, "A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 129, issue 4, pages 1011-1051, DOI: 10.1086/712735.
• Leandro Arozamena & Andres Fioriti & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "De teoría de subastas a diseño de mercados: las contribuciones de Paul Milgrom y Robert Wilson a la economía
  [From auction theory to market design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s contributions to Economics]," Estudios Economicos, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia, volume 38, issue 76, pages 279-296, january-j.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2021, "Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: Detection methodology and empirical analysis," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1782, May.
• Renée B Adams & Roman Kräussl & Marco Navone & Patrick Verwijmeren, 2021, "Gendered Prices," Published Paper Series, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2021-4, Jan.
• Fabio Michelucci, 2021, "On the use of reserve prices in the English auction," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", number 2021:31.
• Josheski Dushko & Karamazova Elena, 2021, "Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms," Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics, Paradigm, volume 7, issue 1, pages 43-59, May, DOI: 10.2478/crebss-2021-0004.
• Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2021, "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 89, issue 5, pages 2049-2079, September, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14935.
• Aldott, Zoltan, 2021, "Predicting Specialty Coffee Auction Prices Using Machine Learning," Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers, Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers, number 15.
• Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2021, "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 21/04, Jul.
• Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2021, "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints: A Revision," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 21/05, Aug.
• Inacio Bo & Jorgen Kratz & Makoto Shimoji, 2021, "Generalized Cumulative Offer Processes," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 21/07, Oct.
• Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion & Steinberg, Richard, 2021, "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Ahead of .
• Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2021, "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 111, issue 4, pages 1055-1091.
• Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," GLO Discussion Paper Series, Global Labor Organization (GLO), number 946.
• Hwang, Sundoo, 2021, "An Unsuccessful Reform on the Local Public Contracts Law in Korea," KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI), volume 43, issue 3, pages 55-77, DOI: 10.23895/kdijep.2021.43.3.55.
• Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 21-037.
• Clark, Robert & Coviello, Decio & de Leverano, Adriano, 2021, "Centralized procurement and delivery times: Evidence from a natural experiment in Italy," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 21-063.
• Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2021, "Procuring survival," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 21-093.
• Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021, "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 393, Jun.
• Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021, "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 10, pages 3256-3298, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200988.
• Francesco Decarolis & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2021, "From Mad Men to Maths Men: Concentration and Buyer Power in Online Advertising," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 10, pages 3299-3327, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190811.
• Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021, "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 4, pages 1055-1091, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170297.
• Paul Milgrom, 2021, "Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 5, pages 1383-1405, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.111.5.1383.
• Milena Wittwer, 2021, "Connecting Disconnected Financial Markets?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 1, pages 252-282, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180314.
• M. Kathleen Ngangoué & Georg Weizsäcker, 2021, "Learning from Unrealized versus Realized Prices," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 2, pages 174-201, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180268.
• Jingfeng Lu & Lixin Ye & Xin Feng, 2021, "Orchestrating Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 420-465, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190114.
• Aaron Barkley, 2021, "Cost and Efficiency in Government Outsourcing: Evidence from the Dredging Industry," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 514-547, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190018.
• Maximilian Mihm & Lucas Siga, 2021, "A Behavioral Characterization of the Likelihood Ratio Order," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 3, issue 3, pages 353-366, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200408.
• David Dillenberger & Uzi Segal, 2021, "Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 3, issue 4, pages 455-470, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200728.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 83, Aug.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2021, "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2104.09942, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021, "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2105.09375, May.
• Maria Betto & Matthew W. Thomas, 2021, "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Spillovers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2106.08496, Jun, revised Feb 2023.
• Bernhard Kasberger & Kyle Woodward, 2021, "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2112.11320, Dec, revised Apr 2023.
• Bernardus Van Doornik & Armando Gomes & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2021, "Financial Access and Labor Market Outcomes: evidence from credit lotteries," Working Papers Series, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department, number 547, Apr.
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• Aner Sela, 2021, "Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2103.
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• Aner Sela, 2021, "Resource Allocations In Multi-Stage Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2105.
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• Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2021, "Universal High-Speed Broadband Provision: An Alternative Policy Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9014.
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• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9167.
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• Hernando Hernández Lasso, 2021, "Privatización de empresas del sector telecomunicaciones en Colombia 2006-2020. Un análisis desde la teoría de subastas," Econógrafos, Escuela de Economía, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, number 022819, Oct.
• Hernando Hernández Lasso, 2021, "Privatización de empresas de empresas del sector de telecomunicaciones en Colombia 2006-2020. Un análisis desde la teoría de subastas," Documentos de Trabajo, Escuela de Economía, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, number 19716, Oct.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan-Jos� Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA), number 19429, Jul.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan-Jos� Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA), number 19430, Jul.
• Asker, John & Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok, 2021, "Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15703, Jan.
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• Baránek, Bruno & Boffa, Federico & Kastl, Jakub, 2021, "Revisiting Cap-and-Trade in Presence of Publicly Owned Polluters: The Case of Italy 2006-2018," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15989, Mar.
• Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16342, Jul.
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• Sela, Aner, 2021, "Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16503, Sep.
• Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner, 2021, "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16504, Sep.
• Sela, Aner, 2021, "Resource Allocations in Multi-Stage Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16505, Sep.
• Cohen, Chen & Lagziel, David & Levi, Ofer & Sela, Aner, 2021, "All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogenous Prizes and Partially Asymmetric Players," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16506, Sep.
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• Bobkova, Nina, 2021, "Information Choice in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16832, Dec.
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• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2021, "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2291, Jul.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2021, "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2300, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2021, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2318, Dec.
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• Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021, "Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1116, Jan.
• Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021, "Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1116r, Jan, revised Nov 2022.
• Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2021, "Large Auctions," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3984.
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• Barbaro, Salvatore & Bracht, Bernd, 2021, "Shilling, Squeezing, Sniping. A further explanation for late bidding in online second-price auctions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 31, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100553.
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• Burchardi, Konrad B. & de Quidt, Jonathan & Gulesci, Selim & Lerva, Benedetta & Tripodi, Stefano, 2021, "Testing willingness to pay elicitation mechanisms in the field: Evidence from Uganda," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102701.
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• Kasuya, Yusuke, 2021, "Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110047.
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