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On the ratifiability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with participation costs and information leakage

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  • Xiaoyong Cao
  • Shao-Chieh Hsueh
  • Guoqiang Tian

Abstract

This paper addresses the ratifiability of an efficient cartel mechanism in a first-price auction. When a seller uses a first-price sealed-bid auction, the efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism will no longer be ratifiable in the presence of both participation costs and potential information leakage. A bidder whose value is higher than a cut-off in the cartel will have an incentive to leave the cartel, thereby sending a credible signal of his high value, which discourages other bidders from participating in the seller’s auction. However, the cartel mechanism is still ratifiable where either the participation cost or information leakage is absent.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaoyong Cao & Shao-Chieh Hsueh & Guoqiang Tian, 2021. "On the ratifiability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with participation costs and information leakage," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 446-459.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:73:y:2021:i:1:p:446-459.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpz070
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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