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Farmland values and bidder behaviour in first-price land auctions
[Identification of standard auction models]

Author

Listed:
  • Carsten Croonenbroeck
  • Martin Odening
  • Silke Hüttel

Abstract

We investigate potential asymmetries among bidders in land auctions that may entail market inefficiencies. Using representative data for eastern Germany including winning bids, bidder characteristics and land amenities, we pursue a structural approach to derive distributions of latent land values for different bidder groups. By applying non-parametric techniques, we cannot find evidence for distinct asymmetries while differentiating between legal entities, tenancy status and nationality of bidders. Our findings challenge the hypothesis that land privatisation via auctions discriminates against certain buyer groups – an argument that is often used to justify stricter regulation of agricultural land markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Croonenbroeck & Martin Odening & Silke Hüttel, 2020. "Farmland values and bidder behaviour in first-price land auctions [Identification of standard auction models]," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 47(2), pages 558-590.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:47:y:2020:i:2:p:558-590.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/erae/jbz025
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Is there a risk of a winner’s curse in farmland auctions?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(3), pages 1140-1177.
    2. Marlene Kionka & Martin Odening & Jana Plogmann & Matthias Ritter, 2021. "Measuring liquidity in agricultural land markets," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 82(4), pages 690-713, September.
    3. Natalya Presman & Tanya Suhoy, 2024. "How have government housing programs affected developers' bids in Israel Land Authority land tenders?," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2024.08, Bank of Israel.
    4. Lars Isenhardt & Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions: Competition and Price Effects," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(2), pages 302-324.
    5. von Hobe, Cord-Friedrich & Musshoff, Oliver, 2021. "On the effectiveness of restricted tendering as a form of policy intervention on agricultural land markets," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    6. Cord-Friedrich von Hobe & Marius Michels & Oliver Musshoff, 2021. "German Farmers’ Perspectives on Price Drivers in Agricultural Land Rental Markets—A Combination of a Systematic Literature Review and Survey Results," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-22, February.
    7. von Hobe, Cord-Friedrich & Mußhoff, Oliver, "undated". "On the effectiveness of restricted tenders as a form of policy intervention on agricultural land markets," 60th Annual Conference, Halle/ Saale, Germany, September 23-25, 2020 305592, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    8. Plogmann, Jana & Mußhoff, Oliver & Odening, Martin & Ritter, Matthias, 2022. "Farmland sales under returns and price uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    9. Ritter, Matthias & Huttel, Silke & Odening, Martin & Seifert, Stefan, 2019. "Revisiting The Relationship Between Land Price And Parcel Size," 2019 Conference (63rd), February 12-15, 2019, Melbourne, Australia 285062, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society (AARES).
    10. Kionka, Marlene & Kuethe, Todd H. & Musshoff, Oliver & Odening, Martin & Ritter, Matthias, 2022. "Bargaining Power in the Agricultural Land Rental Market," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322186, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Myrna, Olena, 2023. "Competition in online land lease auctions in Ukraine: Reduced-form estimation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    12. Plogmann, Jana & Mußhoff, Oliver & Odening, Martin & Ritter, Matthias, 2020. "What Moves the German Land Market? A Decomposition of the Land Rent-Price Ratio," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 69(01).
    13. Isenhardt, Lars & Seifert, Stefan & Hüttel, Silke, "undated". "On the price effect of a right of first refusal in farmland auctions," 61st Annual Conference, Berlin, Germany, September 22-24, 2021 317062, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    14. Deininger, Klaus W. & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Neyter, Roman, 2023. "Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 432-450.
    15. von Hobe, Cord-Friedrich & Mußhoff, Oliver, 2020. "On the effectiveness of restricted tenders as a form of policy intervention on agricultural land markets," 60th Annual Conference, Halle/ Saale, Germany, September 23-25, 2020 305592, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    16. Carsten Croonenbroeck & Martin Odening & Silke Hüttel, 2020. "Farmland values and bidder behaviour in first-price land auctions [Identification of standard auction models]," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 47(2), pages 558-590.
    17. Balmann, Alfons, "undated". "Agrarstrukturgesetzentwurf Sachsen-Anhalt: Faktencheck und Einordnung," FORLand Project Publications 308576, University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna, Department of Economics and Social Sciences.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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