Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2020

• Lundberg, Johan & Lundberg, Sofia, 2020, "Att utvärdera mot pris och kvalitet. Om utvärderingsmodeller, delaktighet & tillgänglighet," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 976, May.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2020, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 66, issue 10, pages 4433-4454, October, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457.
• Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2020, "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 66, issue 5, pages 2194-2212, May, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3290.
• Orrenius, Pia M. & Zavodny, Madeline, 2020, "An Auctions Approach to Immigration Policy," IZA Policy Papers, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), number 151, Feb.
• Chukwudi Henry Dike, 2020, "Strategic Interactions in Financial Networks," 2020 Papers, Job Market Papers, number pdi579, Dec.
• Eric M. Aldrich & Kristian López Vargas, 2020, "Experiments in high-frequency trading: comparing two market institutions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 23, issue 2, pages 322-352, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-019-09605-2.
• M. W. Luke Chan & Dan Sabrina Gong & Terry A. Yip, 2020, "Return on violin and macroeconomic fluctuation," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 44, issue 2, pages 339-346, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-019-09356-1.
• William E. Gryc, 2020, "Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 129, issue 2, pages 103-142, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-019-00674-8.
• Mats A. Bergman & Johan Lundberg & Sofia Lundberg & Johan Y. Stake, 2020, "Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, volume 56, issue 1, pages 107-130, February, DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-09676-0.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Fumihiro Yonekura, 2020, "Implementation in Iterative Elimination of Obviously Dominated Strategies: An Experiment on King Solomon's Dilemma," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2020-17, Apr.
• Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2020, "Bond Losses and Systemic Risk," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 288072615.
• Donna, Javier D. & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory F., 2020, "Networks, frictions, and price dispersion," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 84735.
• Karine Brisset & François Cochard & François Maréchal, 2020, "The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 176, issue 3, pages 526-548, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0034.
• Bo Chen & Marco Serena, 2020, "Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2020-08, Jun.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27325, Jun.
• Tobias Salz, 2020, "Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets: An Empirical Case Study," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27700, Aug.
• Michael Ostrovsky, 2020, "Choice Screen Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 28091, Nov.
• Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020, "Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, number 2020-01, Jan.
• Simon Finster, 2020, "Strategic Bidding in Product-Mix, Sequential, and Simultaneous Auctions," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2020-W03, Mar.
• Elizabeth Badlwin & Omer Edhan & Ravi Jagadeesan & Paul Klemperer & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2020-W08, Jul.
• Carsten Croonenbroeck & Martin Odening & Silke Hüttel, 2020, "Farmland values and bidder behaviour in first-price land auctions
  [Identification of standard auction models]," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, volume 47, issue 2, pages 558-590.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020, "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 18, issue 4, pages 1655-1696.
• Luca Repetto & Alex Solís, 2020, "The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 18, issue 6, pages 3261-3304.
• Francesco Decarolis & Leonardo M Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020, "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
  [“Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 36, issue 3, pages 537-597.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer & Alex Teytelboym & Omer Edhan Ravi Jagadeesan, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 912, Jun.
• Federica Alberti & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Kei Tsutsui, 2020, "Implementing stakeholder participation as “egalitarian bidding” – The test of the Kantian pudding is in the institutionalized eating," Working Papers in Economics & Finance, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group, number 2020-09, May.
• Gorecki, Paul, 2020, "The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry Merger: Three Into Two Won’t Go," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100477, May.
• Cumpston, Anne & Khezr, Peyman, 2020, "Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 101336, Jun.
• Zhang, nan & Qin, Botao, 2020, "Reference point adaptation and air quality – Experimental evidence with anti-PM 2.5 facemasks from China," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 102935, Jun.
• Tchoffo, Rodrigue & Ngouhouo, Ibrahim & Nkemgha, Guivis, 2020, "Trade Liberalization and Macroeconomic Performance in Cameroon: An Imperfect Competition Approach," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 98558, Feb, revised 09 Feb 2020.
• Vojtěch Klézl & Radoslav Delina & Lenka Senderáková & Michal Tkáč, 2020, "Vliv zvolených faktorů na výsledek elektronických reverzních aukcí
  [Impact of Selected Factors on the Results of Electronic Reverse Auctions]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, volume 2020, issue 1, pages 62-85, DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1268.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2020, "Primary Dealers and the Demand for Government Debt," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2020-27, Jul.
• Faruk Gul & Paulo Natenzon & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2020, "Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2020-71, Oct.
• Terry Moon & David Schoenherr, 2020, "The Rise of a Network: Spillover of Political Patronage and Cronyism to the Private Sector," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2020-72, Dec.
• Brant Abbott & Robin Brace, 2020, "Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Wealth Inequality in the Survey of Consumer Finances?," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1427, Mar.
• Christopher Cotton & Brent R. Hickman & Joseph P. Price, 2020, "Affirmative Action, Shifting Competition, and Human Capital Accumulation: A Comparative Static Analysis of Investment Contests," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1433, Jun.
• Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2020, "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1446, Jul.
• Engelmann, Dirk & Frank, Jeff & Koch, Alexander K. & Valente, Marieta, 2020, "Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 237, Apr.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "The quest for the perfect auction," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-1, Oct.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-2, Oct.
• Paul R. Milgrom, 2020, "Auction Theory Evolving: Theorems and Applications," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-3, Dec.
• Robert B. Wilson, 2020, "Strategic Analysis of Auction Markets," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-4, Dec.
• José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020, "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, number 20-1, Feb.
• Netanel Nissim & Aner Sela, 2020, "The Third Place Game," Journal of Sports Economics, , volume 21, issue 1, pages 64-86, January, DOI: 10.1177/1527002519859415.
• Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2020, "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 571, Jun.
• Henner Gimpel & Valerie Graf-Drasch & Alexander Kammerer & Maximilian Keller & Xinyi Zheng, 2020, "When does it pay off to integrate sustainability in the business model? – A game-theoretic analysis," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 30, issue 4, pages 699-716, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-019-00361-y.
• Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020, "Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 333-345, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00187-4.
• Joyce Delnoij & Kris Jaegher, 2020, "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 69, issue 1, pages 183-216, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1161-5.
• Matt Essen & John Wooders, 2020, "Dissolving a partnership securely," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 69, issue 2, pages 415-434, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01177-9.
• Yan Long, 2020, "Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 2, pages 467-502, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01216-5.
• Sérgio O. Parreiras & Anna Rubinchik, 2020, "Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 3, pages 765-783, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01227-2.
• Ruben Juarez & Kohei Nitta & Miguel Vargas, 2020, "Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 3, pages 817-846, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01230-7.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Oleg Baranov, 2020, "Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 1, pages 251-273, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00691-3.
• Helmuts Āzacis, 2020, "Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 2, pages 411-444, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00710-8.
• Aner Sela, 2020, "Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 3, pages 749-771, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00726-0.
• Miguel A. Fonseca & Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2020, "Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 4, pages 1003-1043, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1.
• Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2020, "The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, volume 23, issue 3, pages 379-396, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10951-019-00624-8.
• Sander Onderstal, 2020, "Premium auctions in the field," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 24, issue 1, pages 39-63, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00228-1.
• Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2020, "Contests with insurance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 24, issue 1, pages 1-22, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5.
• Takumi Kongo, 2020, "Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 24, issue 3, pages 199-213, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00233-4.
• Justus Haucap, 2020, "Nobelpreis für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom: Zwei Ökonomen, die echte Märkte schufen
  [Nobel Prize for Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom: Two Economists who Created Real Markets]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 100, issue 12, pages 969-975, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10273-020-2806-0.
• Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2020, "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 20-071/I, Oct.
• Penasse, Julien & Renneboog, Luc & Scheinkman, Jose, 2020, "When a Master Dies : Speculation and Asset Float," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2020-010.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-666, Jun.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2020, "Collusive Market Allocations," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 20-1084, Mar.
• Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2020, "Dutch versus First-Price Auctions with Dynamic Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences," Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2020/05, Jun.
• Xue-Zhong He & Junqing Kang & Xuan Zhou, 2020, "The Fast and the Furious: Exchange Latency and Ever-fast Trading," Research Paper Series, Quantitative Finance Research Centre, University of Technology, Sydney, number 419, Dec.
• Maria Marchenko, 2020, "Peer effects in art prices," Department of Economics Working Papers, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, number wuwp298, May.
• Marchenko, Maria, 2020, "Peer effects in art prices," Department of Economics Working Paper Series, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, number 298, May.
• Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020, "A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1249.
• Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020, "Manipulative Disclosure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1250.
• Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2020, "A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types: An Efficient Auction Design for Various Kinds of Indivisible Commodities," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 20/08, Jul.
• Budish, Eric B. & Lee, Robin S. & Shim, John J., 2020, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Working Papers, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, number 301.
• Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes, 2020, "Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 119, pages 30-55.
• Richstein, Jörn C. & Lorenz, Casimir & Neuhoff, Karsten, 2020, "An auction story: How simple bids struggle with uncertainty," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 89, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104784.
• Seifert, Stefan & Hüttel, Silke, 2020, "Common values and unobserved heterogeneity in farmland auctions in Germany," FORLand Working Papers, Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation", number 21 (2020), DOI: 10.18452/21172.
• Qin, Botao, 2020, "Does a promise script work to reduce the hypothetical bias? Evidence from an induced value experiment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy, volume 14, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2020-.
• Dilger, Alexander, 2020, "Stellungnahme zur Änderung des Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetzes," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 9/2020.
• Engelmann, Dirk & Koch, Alexander K. & Frank, Jeff & Valente, Marieta, 2020, "Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 224641.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Hanke, Ann-Katrin & Ott, Marion, 2020, "A small volume reduction that melts down the market: Auctions with endogenous rationing," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-014.
• Clark, Robert & Coviello, Decio & de Leverano, Adriano, 2020, "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-052.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2020, "Split-award auctions and supply disruptions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-082.
• Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin, 2020, "Optimal auctions with signaling bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-091.

2019

• Edwyna Harris & Sumner La Croix, 2019, "Prices, Wages, and Welfare in Early Colonial South Australia, 1836-1850," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 07-19, Jun.
• Nicholas Ryan, 2019, "Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25547, Feb.
• Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019, "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25654, Mar.
• Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2019, "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25712, Mar.
• Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2019, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25855, May.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul W. Goldberg & Paul Klemperer & Edwin Lock, 2019, "Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2019-W08, Oct.
• Audrey Hu & Steven A Matthews & Liang Zou, 2019, "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 129, issue 622, pages 2563-2580.
• Gabriel Carroll & Ilya Segal, 2019, "Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 86, issue 4, pages 1527-1555.
• Andrey Tkachenko & Paola Valbonesi & Elena Shadrina & Gegam Shagbazian, 2019, "Efficient design of set-aside auctions for small businesses: an empirical analysis," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0240, Oct.
• Riccardo Camboni & Paola Valbonesi, 2019, "Incumbent and entrant bidding in scoring rule auctions: A study on Italian canteen services," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0242, Nov.
• Riccardo Camboni & Luca Corazzini & Stefano Galavotti & Paola Valbonesi, 2019, "Bidding on price and quality: An experiment on the complexity of scoring auctions," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0243, Dec.
• Markos Epitropou & Rakesh Vohra, 2019, "Dynamic Mechanisms with Verification," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 19-002, Feb.
• Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2019, "Information revelation in procurement auctions: an equivalence result," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2019/248, Nov.
• Federico Zincenko, 2019, "Testing for Risk Aversion in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, number 6641, Jan.
• Rosa, Benjamin, 2019, "Affirmative Action Subcontracting Regulations in Dynamic Procurement Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 93065, Apr.
• Gorecki, Paul, 2019, "Reforming the Regulation of Household Waste Collection Services in Ireland: the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Study," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95000, Jul.
• Wu, Hanxiao & Qin, Botao, 2019, "An experimental test of the solemn oath in eliciting sincere preferences," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95913, Jul.
• Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019, "Can auctions select people by their level-k types?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95987, Sep.
• Shachat, Jason & Tan, Lijia, 2019, "How Auctioneers Set Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Reserve Prices in English Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 96225, Sep.
• Rosa, Benjamin, 2019, "Bid Credits in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 96895, Nov.
• Michael, Friedrich & Ignatov, Dmitry I., 2019, "General Game Playing B-to-B Price Negotiations," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 97313, Sep, revised 23 Sep 2019.
• Andreas, Drichoutis & Rodolfo, Nayga, 2019, "Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities and cognitive load," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 97980, Nov, revised 06 Jan 2020.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019, "Obviousness Around the Clock," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 151, Apr.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2019, "Are Strategies Anchored?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 211, Dec.
• Siamak Shyekhha & Frieder Borggrefe & Reinhard Madlener, 2019, "A Counterfactual Analysis of Regional Renewable Energy Auctions Taking the Spatial Dimension into Account," FCN Working Papers, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN), number 22/2019, Dec.
• Yan Long & Jay Sethuraman & Jingyi Xue, 2019, "Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 11-2019, May.
• Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019, "Bunching Below Thresholds to Manipulate Public Procurement," RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute, number 2019/17, Feb.
• Juha Teirilä & Robert A. Ritz, 2019, "Strategic Behaviour in a Capacity Market? The New Irish Electricity Market Design," The Energy Journal, , volume 40, issue 1_suppl, pages 105-126, June, DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.SI1.jtei.
• Hyeon Park, 2019, "Multi-bidder First Price Auction with Beliefs," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 7, issue 1, pages 140-160, June, DOI: 10.1177/2321022219850256.
• Dejan Trifunovic, 2019, "Heuristic and Equilibrium Strategies in Premium Auctions," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, number 9411761, Oct.
• Robert Oleschak, 2019, "Central Counterparty Auctions and Loss Allocation," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2019-06.
• José Manuel Corcuera & Giulia Nunno & José Fajardo, 2019, "Kyle equilibrium under random price pressure," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 42, issue 1, pages 77-101, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-019-00231-4.
• Satoshi Takahashi & Yoichi Izunaga & Naoki Watanabe, 2019, "VCG mechanism for multi-unit auctions and appearance of information: a subject experiment," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, volume 16, issue 2, pages 357-374, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40844-019-00129-1.
• Jack Hopkins & Özgür Kafali & Bedour Alrayes & Kostas Stathis, 2019, "Pirasa: strategic protocol selection for e-commerce agents," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 29, issue 2, pages 239-252, June, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-018-0307-4.
• Roland Eisenhuth, 2019, "Reference-dependent mechanism design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 1, pages 77-103, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0144-9.
• Isa Hafalir & Musab Kurnaz, 2019, "Discriminatory auctions with resale," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 2, pages 173-189, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0152-9.
• Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2019, "Mix-and-Match Divestitures and Merger Harm," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 70, issue 3, pages 346-366, September, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12237.
• Abdul Quadir, 2019, "Single Object Auctions with Externalities: A Tractable Model," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 70, issue 4, pages 479-496, December, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12193.
• Francisco Alvarez & Cristina Mazón & Francisco Javier André, 2019, "Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 67, issue 1, pages 211-248, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1.
• Tomoya Tajika & Tomoya Kazumura, 2019, "Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 48, issue 2, pages 543-569, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0641-y.
• Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2019, "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 48, issue 4, pages 1001-1031, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00678-0.
• Minbo Xu & Daniel Z. Li, 2019, "Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 53, issue 3, pages 443-465, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01192-8.
• Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen & Sander (A.M.) Onderstal & Leonard Treuren, 2019, "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 19-009/VII, Jan, revised 31 Jun 2020.
• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2019, "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 19-054/VI, Aug.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2019-019.
• Ma, Marshall (Xiaoyin) & Noussair, Charles & Renneboog, Luc, 2019, "Colors, Emotions, and the Auction Value of Paintings," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2019-006.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center, number 2019-009.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 3314c398-ea79-4f74-96f4-8.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 78e45bf6-3a0a-46a0-9abd-7.
• Ma, Marshall (Xiaoyin) & Noussair, Charles & Renneboog, Luc, 2019, "Colors, Emotions, and the Auction Value of Paintings," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b628fa65-83cf-41c8-b321-d.
• Kaisa Kotakorpi & Satu Metsälampi & Topi Miettinen & Tuomas Nurminen, 2019, "The effect of reporting institutions on tax evasion:Evidence from the lab," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 127, May.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1121, Jul.
• Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2019, "Identification of Auction Models Using Order Statistics," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-630, Mar.
• Joseph Kuehn, 2019, "Estimating Auctions with Externalities: The Case of USFS Timber Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 101, issue 5, pages 791-807, December.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Goldmanis, Maris & Penta, Antonio, 2019, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1011, Apr.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick & Waterson, Michael, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-984, Jan.
• Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2019, "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 127, issue 5, pages 2269-2300, DOI: 10.1086/701812.
• Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019, "Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes: An Auction-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-03.
• Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2019, "Your Failure is My Opportunity - Eff ects of Elimination in Contests," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 016, Jun, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2019016.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2019, "Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1657, Apr.
• Andrew Mackenzie & Christian Trudeau, 2021, "On Groves Mechanisms for Costly Inclusion," Working Papers, University of Windsor, Department of Economics, number 1901, Jul.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer, 2019, "Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 87, issue 3, pages 867-932, May, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13693.
• Ellington, Michael & Martin, Chris & Wang, Bingsong, 2019, "Search Frictions and Evolving Labour Market Dynamics," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1195.
• Waterson, Michael & Xie, Jian, 2019, "Testing for collusion in bus contracting in London," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1196.
• Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2019, "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1200.
• Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout & Yun Wang, 2019, "The Market Allocation of Property Rights and the Destruction of Trust," Working Papers, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University, number 2019-07-11, Jul.
• Jeongwoo Lee & Jaeok Park, 2019, "Preemptive Entry in Sequential Auctions with Participation Cost," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2019rwp-141, Feb.
• Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2019, "A Conic Approach to the Implementation of Reduced-Form Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 19/12, Sep.
• Aubry, Mathieu & Kräussl, Roman & Manso, Gustavo & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2019, "Machine learning, human experts, and the valuation of real assets," CFS Working Paper Series, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), number 635.
• von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019, "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss averse bidders," Discussion Papers, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, number 2019/1.
• Qin, Botao, 2019, "Does a promise script work to reduce the hypothetical bias? Evidence from an induced value experiment," Economics Discussion Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 2019-38.
• Kostmann, Michael & Härdle, Wolfgang Karl, 2019, "Forecasting in Blockchain-based Local Energy Markets," IRTG 1792 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, International Research Training Group 1792 "High Dimensional Nonstationary Time Series", number 2019-014.
• Choo, Lawrence & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019, "Can market competition reduce anomalous behaviours," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics, number 08/2019.
• Requate, Tilman & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Ch'ng, Kean Siang & Waichman, Israel, 2019, "Tell the truth or not? The Montero mechanism for emissions control at work," KCG Working Papers, Kiel Centre for Globalization (KCG), number 18.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Grebe, Tim & Kröger, Sabine, 2019, "How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 203606.
• Ott, Marion, 2019, "Simple Bayesian and Ex-Post Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 203616.
• Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes, 2019, "Games played through agents in the laboratory: A test of Prat & Rustichini's model," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, number SP II 2016-305r2, revised 2019.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019, "Obviousness around the clock," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, number SP II 2019-203.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019, "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-040.
• de Leverano, Adriano, 2019, "Collusion through market sharing agreements: Evidence from Quebec's road paving market," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-053.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Giuffrida, Leonardo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019, "Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-057.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Riehm, Tobias, 2019, "Procurement design with loss averse bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-060.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2019, "How the auction design influences procurement prices: An experiment," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-061.
• Gillen, Philippe, 2019, "Commitment in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 19-062.
• Andreas Hefti & Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz, 2019, "Market power and information effects in a multi-unit auction," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 320, Mar.
• Chenghuan Sean Chu & Marc Rysman, 2019, "Competition and Strategic Incentives in the Market for Credit Ratings: Empirics of the Financial Crisis of 2007," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 10, pages 3514-3555, October.
• Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2019, "Auctions with Limited Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 3, pages 876-910, March.
• Andrey Malenko & Anton Tsoy, 2019, "Selling to Advised Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 4, pages 1323-1348, April.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 5, pages 1911-1929, May.
• Helmut Elsinger & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler & Christine Zulehner, 2019, "Competition in Treasury Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 1, pages 157-184, February.
• David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2019, "A Bias of Screening," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 1, issue 3, pages 343-356, December.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 57, issue 2, pages 235-274, June.
• Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2019, "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1912.03607, Dec, revised May 2021.
• Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Brent Hickman & Eric Richert, 2019, "Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 19-30, Aug, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2019-30.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," GREEN Working Papers, GREEN, Centre for Research on Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy & Networks, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, number 03.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," IEFE Working Papers, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, number 109.
• Dejan Trifunović, 2019, "Hibridne Aukcije I Aukcije Sa Premijom (Hybrid Auctions And Premium Auctions)," Ekonomske ideje i praksa, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, issue 33, pages 7-24, June.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2019, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1088, Apr.
• Minbo Xu & Sanxi Li & Jianye Yan, 2019, "All‐Pay Auctions With A Buy‐Price Option," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 57, issue 1, pages 617-630, January, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12585.
• Sascha Füllbrunn & Dirk‐Jan Janssen & Utz Weitzel, 2019, "Risk Aversion And Overbidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: New Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 57, issue 1, pages 631-647, January, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12716.
• Indranil Chakraborty, 2019, "Reserve Price Versus Entry Fee In Standard Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 57, issue 1, pages 648-653, January, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12715.
• Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2019, "Mix‐and‐match divestitures and merger harm," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 70, issue 3, pages 346-366, September, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12237.
• Anouar El Haji & Sander Onderstal, 2019, "Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 28, issue 4, pages 670-686, November, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12314.
• Benjamin V. Rosa, 2019, "Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 67, issue 2, pages 161-208, June, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12202.
• Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019, "The bidder exclusion effect," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 50, issue 1, pages 93-120, March, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12263.
• Stephan Lauermann & Andre Speit, 2019, "Bidding in Common-Value Auctions With an Uncertain Number of Competitors," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_136, Nov.
• Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner, 2019, "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics, number WP2019-04, Mar.