Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2019

• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2019, "The Economics of Social Data," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2203R, Sep, revised Mar 2020.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2019, "The Economics of Social Data," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2203R2, Sep, revised Jul 2020.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2019, "The Economics of Social Data," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2203R3, Sep, revised Jan 2021.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2019, "The Economics of Social Data," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2203R4, Sep, revised Oct 2021.
• Aubry, Mathieu & Kräussl, Roman & Manso, Gustavo & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2019, "Machines and Masterpieces: Predicting Prices in the Art Auction Market," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1332, Mar, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3347175.
• Kotowski, Maciej, 2019, "First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, number rwp19-021, Jun.
• Lluis Bru & Daniel Cardona & Jozsef Sakovics, 2019, "Beating Coase at Monopoly," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 291, Jun.
• Chapkovski, Philipp & Kujansuu, Essi, 2019, "Real-time interactions in oTree using Django Channels: Auctions and real effort tasks," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 23, issue C, pages 114-123, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2019.05.008.
• Kazumori, Eiichiro & Belch, Yaakov, 2019, "t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 24, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2019.100235.
• Whiting, Alix & Kecinski, Maik & Li, Tongzhe & r, Kent D. Messer & Parker, Julia, 2019, "The importance of selecting the right messenger: A framed field experiment on recycled water products," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 1-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.03.004.
• Levi-Tsedek, Netanel & Sela, Aner, 2019, "Sequential (one-against-all) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 9-11, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.008.
• Salant, David J. & Cabral, Luís, 2019, "Sequential auctions and auction revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 1-4, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.022.
• Chen, Bo, 2019, "On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 60-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.01.027.
• Hefti, Andreas & Shen, Peiyao, 2019, "Supply function competition with asymmetric costs: Theory and experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 24-27, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.008.
• Liu, Enmeng & Liu, Jiapeng & Qiu, Hong & Wang, Jia, 2019, "Treasury bill auctions: Do bidders’ cost of funds and winning probability matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, pages 101-104, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.014.
• Lee, Joosung & Li, Daniel Z., 2019, "Participation and welfare in auctions with default," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108620.
• Hattori, Takahiro, 2019, "Do liquidity enhancement auctions improve the market liquidity in the JGB market?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.07.001.
• Hagen, Martin, 2019, "Collusion-proof and fair auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108682.
• Liu, Yong & Liu, Shulin, 2019, "Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108751.
• Grundl, Serafin & Zhu, Yu, 2019, "Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 210, issue 2, pages 363-378, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.02.004.
• Huang, Yangguang & Xia, Jijun, 2019, "Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 380-399, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.001.
• Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Fioriti, Andres, 2019, "Bidding securities in projects with negative externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, pages 14-36, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.003.
• Huang, Yangguang, 2019, "An empirical study of scoring auctions and quality manipulation corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103322.
• Daraeepour, Ali & Patino-Echeverri, Dalia & Conejo, Antonio J., 2019, "Economic and environmental implications of different approaches to hedge against wind production uncertainty in two-settlement electricity markets: A PJM case study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 336-354, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.01.015.
• Knaut, Andreas & Paschmann, Martin, 2019, "Price volatility in commodity markets with restricted participation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 37-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.03.004.
• Goutte, Stéphane & Vassilopoulos, Philippe, 2019, "The value of flexibility in power markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, pages 347-357, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.10.024.
• Zarnikau, J. & Woo, C.K. & Zhu, S. & Tsai, C.H., 2019, "Market price behavior of wholesale electricity products: Texas," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, pages 418-428, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.10.043.
• Newbery, David & Gissey, Giorgio Castagneto & Guo, Bowei & Dodds, Paul E., 2019, "The private and social value of British electrical interconnectors," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.110896.
• Chakraborty, Indranil, 2019, "Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 209-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.014.
• Vöcking, Berthold, 2019, "A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 4-16, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.007.
• Lagziel, David, 2019, "Credit auctions and bid caps," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 416-422, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.010.
• Breitmoser, Yves, 2019, "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 423-447, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.004.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019, "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 611-632, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.005.
• Chawla, Shuchi & Hartline, Jason D. & Sivan, Balasubramanian, 2019, "Optimal crowdsourcing contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 80-96, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.001.
• Kleinberg, Robert & Weinberg, S. Matthew, 2019, "Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 97-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.002.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2019, "Bid caps in large contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, pages 101-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.012.
• Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka A., 2019, "Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: Money ain't no good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, pages 188-208, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.014.
• Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2019, "Dual sourcing with price discovery," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, pages 225-246, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.007.
• Richter, Michael, 2019, "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, pages 30-47, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009.
• Elskamp, Rebecca & Kirkegaard, René, 2019, "Scale effects in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, pages 116-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.009.
• Munro, David R. & Rassenti, Stephen J., 2019, "Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, pages 195-217, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.001.
• Choi, Syngjoo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Kim, Jinwoo, 2019, "Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, pages 218-237, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.007.
• Corazzini, Luca & Galavotti, Stefano & Valbonesi, Paola, 2019, "An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, pages 289-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.005.
• Balkenborg, Dieter & Vermeulen, Dries, 2019, "On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, pages 1-6, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.008.
• Alaei, Saeed & Hartline, Jason & Niazadeh, Rad & Pountourakis, Emmanouil & Yuan, Yang, 2019, "Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, pages 494-510, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.003.
• Dobzinski, Shahar & Nisan, Noam & Oren, Sigal, 2019, "Economic efficiency requires interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, pages 589-608, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.010.
• Casalin, Fabrizio & Dia, Enzo, 2019, "Information and reputation mechanisms in auctions of remanufactured goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 185-212, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.11.001.
• Bae, Jinsoo & Kagel, John H., 2019, "An experimental study of the generalized second price auction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 44-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.10.006.
• Ganuza, Juan-José & Penalva, Jose, 2019, "Information disclosure in optimal auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 460-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.11.004.
• Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2019, "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, pages 137-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.04.005.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2019, "Merger review with intermediate buyer power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102531.
• Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2019, "Efficiency in auctions with (failed) resale," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 254-273, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.017.
• McGee, Peter & Levin, Dan, 2019, "How obvious is the dominant strategy in an English Auction? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 355-365, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.003.
• Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2019, "Auctions with limited liability through default or resale," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 51-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.011.
• Brünner, Tobias & Reiner, Jochen & Natter, Martin & Skiera, Bernd, 2019, "Prospect theory in a dynamic game: Theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 164, issue C, pages 215-234, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.032.
• Requate, Till & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Kean Siang, Ch'ng & Waichman, Israel, 2019, "Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 133-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2019.02.004.
• Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom, 2019, "Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 416-454, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.004.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2019, "All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 99-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.010.
• He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng, 2019, "Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 11-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.007.
• Zheng, Charles Z., 2019, "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 135-166, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.006.
• Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny & Szech, Nora, 2019, "The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, pages 106-142, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.002.
• Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019, "Efficient investments in the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, pages 247-278, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.009.
• Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam, 2019, "Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 991-1029, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.006.
• Laohakunakorn, Krittanai & Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2019, "Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.08.002.
• Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019, "Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.009.
• Heumann, Tibor, 2019, "An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104938.
• Gorbenko, Alexander S., 2019, "How do valuations impact outcomes of asset sales with heterogeneous bidders?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 131, issue 1, pages 88-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.001.
• Gentry, Matthew & Stroup, Caleb, 2019, "Entry and competition in takeover auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 132, issue 2, pages 298-324, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.007.
• Dormady, Noah & Healy, Paul J., 2019, "The consignment mechanism in carbon markets: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Commodity Markets, Elsevier, volume 14, issue C, pages 51-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcomm.2018.07.003.
• Gentry, Matthew & Komarova, Tatiana & Schiraldi, Pasquale & Shin, Wiroy, 2019, "On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 109-128, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.08.006.
• Cohen, Chen & Levi, Ofer & Sela, Aner, 2019, "All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 18-23, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.10.003.
• Inaba, Kei-Ichiro, 2019, "The behaviour of bidders in quantitative-easing auctions of sovereign bonds in Japan: Determinants of the popularity of the 9 to 10-year maturity segment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, pages 206-214, DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2018.12.008.
• Haji, Anouar El & Krawczyk, Michał & Sylwestrzak, Marta & Zawojska, Ewa, 2019, "Time pressure and risk taking in auctions: A field experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 68-79, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.12.001.
• Chang, Wei-Shiun, 2019, "The adverse effects of renegotiation in procurement auctions with endogenous liability," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 91-101, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.05.008.
• Link, Heike, 2019, "The impact of including service quality into efficiency analysis: The case of franchising regional rail passenger serves in Germany," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 284-300, DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2018.11.019.
• Laohakunakorn, Krittanai & Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2019, "Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 101410, Nov.
• Victor Ahlqvist & Pär Holmberg & Thomas Tangerås, 2019, "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1902, Jan.
• David Newbery & Giorgio Castagneto Gissey & Bowei Guo & Paul E Dodds, 2019, "The private and social value of British electrical interconnectors," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG1913, Apr.
• Lapointe, Simon & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2019, "Subsidy Bidding Wars and the Structure of Multi-Plant Firms," Working Papers, VATT Institute for Economic Research, number 115.
• Jääskeläinen, Jan & Tukiainen, Janne, 2019, "Anatomy of public procurement," Working Papers, VATT Institute for Economic Research, number 118.
• Serafin J. Grundl & Yu Zhu, 2019, "Robust Inference in First-Price Auctions : Experimental Findings as Identifying Restrictions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 2019-006, Feb, DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2019.006.
• Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2019, "On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2019_18.rdf.
• Michael Kostmann & Wolfgang K. Härdle, 2019, "Forecasting in Blockchain-Based Local Energy Markets," Energies, MDPI, volume 12, issue 14, pages 1-27, July.
• Sumner La Croix & Edwyna Harris, 2019, "Prices, Wages, and Welfare in Early Colonial South Australia, 1836-1850," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 201910, Jul.
• Fabrizio Casalin & Enzo Dia, 2019, "Information and reputation mechanisms in auctions of remanufactured goods," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02108121, Mar, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.11.001.
• Benoit Faye & Eric Le Fur, 2019, "On the Constancy of Hedonic Wine Price Coefficients over Time," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03897365, Oct, DOI: 10.1017/jwe.2019.24.
• Marco Pagnozzi & Krista Saral, 2019, "Auctions with limited liability through default or resale," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-02010914, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.011.
• Laetitia Tuffery, 2019, "Preferences for forest recreational services using the random bidding model," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-02139114, DOI: 10.1016/j.landurbplan.2019.04.022.
• Gabrielle Demange, 2019, "Mechanisms in a digitalized world," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-01715951.
• Marleen Marra, 2024, "Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number hal-03393068, Jun.
• Stéphane Goutte & Philippe Vassilopoulos, 2019, "The Value of Flexibility in Power Markets," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01968081, Jan.
• Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019, "Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes : An Auction-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01973660, Jan.
• Simon Lapointe & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019, "Subsidy Bidding Wars and the Structure of Multi-Plant Firms," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01989433, Jan.
• Marleen Marra, 2024, "Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03393068, Jun.
• Marleen Marra, 2024, "Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers, HAL, number hal-03393068, Jun.
• Melissa Boyle & Justin Svec, 2019, "The Roundness of Antiquity Valuations from Auction Houses and Sales," Working Papers, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, number 1908, Sep.
• Blomgren-Hansen, Niels, 2019, "Bid Costs and the (In)efficiency of Public Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, number 1-2019, Feb.
• Le Coq, Chloe & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2019, "Financial Contracts as Coordination Device," SITE Working Paper Series, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, number 47, Apr.
• Blázquez de Paz, Mario, 2019, "Redispatch in Zonal Pricing Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1278, May.
• Adam Pigoñ & Gyula Seres, 2019, "On the competitive effects of screening in procurement," IBS Working Papers, Instytut Badan Strukturalnych, number 08/2019, Aug.
• Nicolas Fugger & Elena Katok & Achim Wambach, 2019, "Trust in Procurement Interactions," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 65, issue 11, pages 5110-5127, November, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3196.
• Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan, 2019, "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), number 12512, Jul.
• Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2019, "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-38, November, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2019.11.001.
• Jianxin Rong & Ning Sun & Dazhong Wang, 2019, "A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 4, issue 1, pages 39-86, November, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2019.11.002.
• Marc N. Conte & Robert Griffin, 2019, "Private Benefits of Conservation and Procurement Auction Performance," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 73, issue 3, pages 759-790, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-019-00333-y.
• Koji Kotani & Kenta Tanaka & Shunsuke Managi, 2019, "Which performs better under trader settings, double auction or uniform price auction?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 22, issue 1, pages 247-267, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9585-0.
• Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2019, "Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 22, issue 2, pages 477-505, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5.
• Ilke Onur & Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019, "Optimal bidder participation in public procurement auctions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, volume 26, issue 3, pages 595-617, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10797-018-9515-2.
• Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2019, "Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, volume 179, issue 3, pages 195-208, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0568-7.
• Hung-po Chao, 2019, "Incentives for efficient pricing mechanism in markets with non-convexities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 56, issue 1, pages 33-58, August, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09385-w.
• A. Aiche & E. Einy & O. Haimanko & D. Moreno & A. Sela & B. Shitovitz, 2019, "Information in Tullock contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 86, issue 3, pages 303-323, May, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-018-9682-8.
• Kyungmin Kim & Youngwoo Koh, 2019, "Efficiency and Revenue in Asymmetric Auctions," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 35, pages 371-391.
• Антон Шмігель & Дарина Пустовойт & Костянтин Загорулько & Олександра Чмель, 2019, "Визначення Рівня Аномально Низької Ціни: Приклад України," Suchasni ekonomichni doslidzhennja, Kyiv School of Economics, volume 2, issue 1, pages 48-85.
• Катерина Марущак & Адам Гащишин & Олександр Сухомлин & Андрій Тарасенко, 2019, "Ефект масштабу в системі публічних закупівель Prozorro: очікуваний ефект від централізації," Suchasni ekonomichni doslidzhennja, Kyiv School of Economics, volume 2, issue 1, pages 86-95.
• Anton Shmihel & Daryna Pustovoit & Kostiantyn Zahorulko & Oleksandra Chmel, 2019, "Determining abnormally lDetermining abnormally low price in procurement: the case of Ukraine," Modern Economic Studies, Kyiv School of Economics, volume 2, issue 1, pages 45-80.
• Kateryna Marushchak & Adam Hashchyshyn & Oleksandr Sukhomlyn & Andreii Tarasenko, 2019, "Scale effect at ProZorro public procurement system: the expected effect of centralization," Modern Economic Studies, Kyiv School of Economics, volume 2, issue 1, pages 81-89.
• Zhonghao Shui, 2019, "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 1008, Apr.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 1017, May.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 1018, Jul.
• Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2019, "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 267027285.
• Renaud Foucart & Jana Friedrichsen, 2019, "All-pay competition with captive consumers," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 277451127.
• Edwyna Harris & Sumner La Croix, 2019, "Prices, Wages, and Welfare in Early Colonial South Australia, 1836-1850," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 07-19, Jun.
• Nicholas Ryan, 2019, "Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25547, Feb.
• Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019, "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25654, Mar.
• Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2019, "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25712, Mar.
• Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2019, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25855, May.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul W. Goldberg & Paul Klemperer & Edwin Lock, 2019, "Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2019-W08, Oct.
• Audrey Hu & Steven A Matthews & Liang Zou, 2019, "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 129, issue 622, pages 2563-2580.
• Gabriel Carroll & Ilya Segal, 2019, "Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 86, issue 4, pages 1527-1555.
• Andrey Tkachenko & Paola Valbonesi & Elena Shadrina & Gegam Shagbazian, 2019, "Efficient design of set-aside auctions for small businesses: an empirical analysis," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0240, Oct.
• Riccardo Camboni & Paola Valbonesi, 2019, "Incumbent and entrant bidding in scoring rule auctions: A study on Italian canteen services," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0242, Nov.
• Riccardo Camboni & Luca Corazzini & Stefano Galavotti & Paola Valbonesi, 2019, "Bidding on price and quality: An experiment on the complexity of scoring auctions," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0243, Dec.
• Markos Epitropou & Rakesh Vohra, 2019, "Dynamic Mechanisms with Verification," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 19-002, Feb.
• Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2019, "Information revelation in procurement auctions: an equivalence result," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2019/248, Nov.
• Federico Zincenko, 2019, "Testing for Risk Aversion in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, number 6641, Jan.
• Rosa, Benjamin, 2019, "Affirmative Action Subcontracting Regulations in Dynamic Procurement Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 93065, Apr.
• Gorecki, Paul, 2019, "Reforming the Regulation of Household Waste Collection Services in Ireland: the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Study," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95000, Jul.
• Wu, Hanxiao & Qin, Botao, 2019, "An experimental test of the solemn oath in eliciting sincere preferences," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95913, Jul.
• Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019, "Can auctions select people by their level-k types?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95987, Sep.
• Shachat, Jason & Tan, Lijia, 2019, "How Auctioneers Set Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Reserve Prices in English Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 96225, Sep.
• Rosa, Benjamin, 2019, "Bid Credits in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 96895, Nov.
• Michael, Friedrich & Ignatov, Dmitry I., 2019, "General Game Playing B-to-B Price Negotiations," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 97313, Sep, revised 23 Sep 2019.
• Andreas, Drichoutis & Rodolfo, Nayga, 2019, "Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities and cognitive load," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 97980, Nov, revised 06 Jan 2020.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019, "Obviousness Around the Clock," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 151, Apr.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2019, "Are Strategies Anchored?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 211, Dec.
• Siamak Shyekhha & Frieder Borggrefe & Reinhard Madlener, 2019, "A Counterfactual Analysis of Regional Renewable Energy Auctions Taking the Spatial Dimension into Account," FCN Working Papers, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN), number 22/2019, Dec.
• Yan Long & Jay Sethuraman & Jingyi Xue, 2019, "Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 11-2019, May.
• Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019, "Bunching Below Thresholds to Manipulate Public Procurement," RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute, number 2019/17, Feb.
• Juha Teirilä & Robert A. Ritz, 2019, "Strategic Behaviour in a Capacity Market? The New Irish Electricity Market Design," The Energy Journal, , volume 40, issue 1_suppl, pages 105-126, June, DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.SI1.jtei.
• Hyeon Park, 2019, "Multi-bidder First Price Auction with Beliefs," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 7, issue 1, pages 140-160, June, DOI: 10.1177/2321022219850256.
• Dejan Trifunovic, 2019, "Heuristic and Equilibrium Strategies in Premium Auctions," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, number 9411761, Oct.
• Robert Oleschak, 2019, "Central Counterparty Auctions and Loss Allocation," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2019-06.
• José Manuel Corcuera & Giulia Nunno & José Fajardo, 2019, "Kyle equilibrium under random price pressure," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 42, issue 1, pages 77-101, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-019-00231-4.
• Satoshi Takahashi & Yoichi Izunaga & Naoki Watanabe, 2019, "VCG mechanism for multi-unit auctions and appearance of information: a subject experiment," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, volume 16, issue 2, pages 357-374, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40844-019-00129-1.
• Jack Hopkins & Özgür Kafali & Bedour Alrayes & Kostas Stathis, 2019, "Pirasa: strategic protocol selection for e-commerce agents," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 29, issue 2, pages 239-252, June, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-018-0307-4.
• Roland Eisenhuth, 2019, "Reference-dependent mechanism design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 1, pages 77-103, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0144-9.
• Isa Hafalir & Musab Kurnaz, 2019, "Discriminatory auctions with resale," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 2, pages 173-189, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0152-9.
• Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2019, "Mix-and-Match Divestitures and Merger Harm," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 70, issue 3, pages 346-366, September, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12237.
• Abdul Quadir, 2019, "Single Object Auctions with Externalities: A Tractable Model," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 70, issue 4, pages 479-496, December, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12193.
• Francisco Alvarez & Cristina Mazón & Francisco Javier André, 2019, "Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 67, issue 1, pages 211-248, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1.
• Tomoya Tajika & Tomoya Kazumura, 2019, "Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 48, issue 2, pages 543-569, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0641-y.
• Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2019, "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 48, issue 4, pages 1001-1031, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00678-0.
• Minbo Xu & Daniel Z. Li, 2019, "Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 53, issue 3, pages 443-465, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01192-8.
• Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen & Sander (A.M.) Onderstal & Leonard Treuren, 2019, "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 19-009/VII, Jan, revised 31 Jun 2020.
• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2019, "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 19-054/VI, Aug.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2019-019.
• Ma, Marshall (Xiaoyin) & Noussair, Charles & Renneboog, Luc, 2019, "Colors, Emotions, and the Auction Value of Paintings," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2019-006.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center, number 2019-009.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 3314c398-ea79-4f74-96f4-8.
• Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019, "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 78e45bf6-3a0a-46a0-9abd-7.
• Ma, Marshall (Xiaoyin) & Noussair, Charles & Renneboog, Luc, 2019, "Colors, Emotions, and the Auction Value of Paintings," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b628fa65-83cf-41c8-b321-d.
• Kaisa Kotakorpi & Satu Metsälampi & Topi Miettinen & Tuomas Nurminen, 2019, "The effect of reporting institutions on tax evasion:Evidence from the lab," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 127, May.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1121, Jul.
• Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2019, "Identification of Auction Models Using Order Statistics," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-630, Mar.
• Joseph Kuehn, 2019, "Estimating Auctions with Externalities: The Case of USFS Timber Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 101, issue 5, pages 791-807, December.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Goldmanis, Maris & Penta, Antonio, 2019, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1011, Apr.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick & Waterson, Michael, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-984, Jan.
• Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2019, "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 127, issue 5, pages 2269-2300, DOI: 10.1086/701812.
• Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019, "Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes: An Auction-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-03.
• Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2019, "Your Failure is My Opportunity - Eff ects of Elimination in Contests," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 016, Jun, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2019016.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2019, "Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1657, Apr.
• Andrew Mackenzie & Christian Trudeau, 2021, "On Groves Mechanisms for Costly Inclusion," Working Papers, University of Windsor, Department of Economics, number 1901, Jul.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer, 2019, "Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 87, issue 3, pages 867-932, May, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13693.
• Ellington, Michael & Martin, Chris & Wang, Bingsong, 2019, "Search Frictions and Evolving Labour Market Dynamics," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1195.
• Waterson, Michael & Xie, Jian, 2019, "Testing for collusion in bus contracting in London," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1196.
• Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2019, "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1200.
• Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout & Yun Wang, 2019, "The Market Allocation of Property Rights and the Destruction of Trust," Working Papers, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University, number 2019-07-11, Jul.
• Jeongwoo Lee & Jaeok Park, 2019, "Preemptive Entry in Sequential Auctions with Participation Cost," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2019rwp-141, Feb.
• Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2019, "A Conic Approach to the Implementation of Reduced-Form Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 19/12, Sep.
• Aubry, Mathieu & Kräussl, Roman & Manso, Gustavo & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2019, "Machine learning, human experts, and the valuation of real assets," CFS Working Paper Series, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), number 635.
• von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019, "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss averse bidders," Discussion Papers, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, number 2019/1.
• Qin, Botao, 2019, "Does a promise script work to reduce the hypothetical bias? Evidence from an induced value experiment," Economics Discussion Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), number 2019-38.
• Kostmann, Michael & Härdle, Wolfgang Karl, 2019, "Forecasting in Blockchain-based Local Energy Markets," IRTG 1792 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, International Research Training Group 1792 "High Dimensional Nonstationary Time Series", number 2019-014.
• Choo, Lawrence & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019, "Can market competition reduce anomalous behaviours," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics, number 08/2019.