Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," KIER Working Papers 1018, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1121, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2019-07-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PAY-2019-07-29 (Payment Systems and Financial Technology)
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