Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2025

• Matteo Bizzarri, 2025, "General equilibrium with competition in schedules and input-output networks: an existence result," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 765, Oct.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Marco Gortan & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2025, "Swiss treasury bond auctions: An update," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2025-13.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2025, "The demand for safe assets," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2025-03.
• Mauricio Bugarin & Odilon Camara & Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado, 2025, "Advantage for Sale: Endogenous Asymmetry in Sequential Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2025_12, Sep.
• Chikako Ozu & Minoru Kunizaki, 2025, "How Can We Create a Public Platform for Art Prices?," Contributions to Economics, Springer, in: Calogero Guccio & Isidoro Mazza & Giacomo Pignataro, "New Perspectives in the Public and Cultural Sectors", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-81892-9_10.
• Takaaki Abe & Tsuyoshi Onda & Takehiko Yamato, 2025, "Second-price auctions with information acquisition costs," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 21-36, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00277-7.
• Gagan Ghosh & Bingchao Huangfu & Heng Liu, 2025, "Reserve prices in second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 69-77, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00281-x.
• Ottorino Chillemi & Stefano Galavotti, 2025, "Optimal procurement auctions with audit," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 79, issue 3, pages 993-1054, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01609-1.
• Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2025, "Mimic martingales in sequential auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 79, issue 4, pages 1283-1310, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01630-4.
• Hiroki Shinozaki, 2025, "Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 54, issue 2, pages 1-35, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00967-x.
• Heinz Herrmann & M. J. Cobo Martín, 2025, "Bidding for B2B or B2G tenders: toward the adoption of pricing models in practice," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 1495-1533, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11301-024-00424-1.
• Yangwei Song, 2025, "Robust auctions with affiliated private values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 2, pages 245-279, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0.
• Gregory Pavlov, 2025, "Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 3, pages 479-511, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00333-x.
• Doron Klunover, 2025, "First-price auction with a stochastic head start," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 4, pages 717-725, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00371-z.
• Johan Fourie & Tessa Hubble & Jonathan Schoots, 2025, "The price of status: Findings from Cape auctions," Working Papers, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics, number 03/2025.
• Sander Onderstal & Ruben van Oosten, 2025, "Vertical Integration in Auction Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 25-046/VII, Aug.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2025, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-799, Apr.
• Gagnepain, Philippe & Martimort, David, 2025, "Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1631, Mar.
• Rey, Patrick & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie, 2025, "All-receive procurement auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1637, Apr.
• Holmberg, Pär & Ruddell, Keith & Willems, Bert, 2025, "Multi-Product Supply Function Equilibria," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1669, Sep.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2025, "Corruption and renegotiation in procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1906, May.
• Atayev Atabek & Caspari Gian & Hillenbrand Adrian & Klein Thilo, 2025, "Mit Ungeduld zu besseren Subventionen für umweltfreundliche Produkte," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, volume 105, issue 6, pages 466-470, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2025-0117.
• Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2025, "Auctioning Control and Cash‐Flow Rights Separately," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 93, issue 3, pages 859-889, May, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21343.
• Harold Glenn A. Valera & Takashi Yamano & Ranjitha Puskur & Ronald Jeremy Antonio & Muhammad Ashraful Habib & M. D. Khairul Bashar & Valerien O. Pede, 2025, "The Impact of Micronutrient Training on High-Zinc Rice Demand Among Mothers: A Randomized Control Trial Study in Bangladesh," Asian Development Review (ADR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 42, issue 01, pages 209-232, DOI: 10.1142/S0116110525500088.
• Linnenbrink, Daniel, 2025, "Pay-as-bid Auctions with Private Information," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 325443, revised 2025.
• Bos, Olivier & Fugger, Nicolas & Onderstal, Sander, 2025, "Profit-share auctions in procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-038.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Gretschko, Vitali & Kokott, Gian-Marco & Riehm, Tobias, 2025, "Auctions vs. negotiations: The role of communication in an experiment with procurement managers," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-039.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2025, "Congestion management games in electricity markets," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-044.

2024

• Meg Snyder & Daniel Bragen & Matthew Rousu & Christopher M. Snyder, 2024, "Money Isn’t Everything: Estimating the Prestige Value of Winning Cutthroat Kitchen from Overbidding in Sabotage Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32070, Jan.
• Kristian Blickle & Zhiguo He & Jing Huang & Cecilia Parlatore, 2024, "Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32155, Feb.
• Jackson Dorsey & Derek C. Wolfson, 2024, "Unequal Uptake: Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32814, Aug.
• Marleen R. Marra & Nathan H. Miller & Gretchen Sileo, 2024, "Phoning Home: The Procurement of Telecommunications for Incarcerated Individuals in the United States," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33292, Dec.
• Dakshina G. De Silva & Benjamin Rosa, 2024, "Highway Procurement During the Great Recession and Stimulus," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33299, Dec.
• Stjepan Srhoj & Melko Dragojević, 2024, "Public Procurement and Supplier Job Creation: Insights from Auctions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 2, pages 470-527.
• Pablo Montagnes & Richard Van Weelden, 2024, "On the incentives to exacerbate polarization," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 3, pages 854-890.
• Daniel G Garrett, 2024, "Conflicts of Interest in Municipal Bond Advising and Underwriting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 37, issue 12, pages 3835-3876.
• Hikmet Gunay & Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar, 2024, "Experiments on the Different Numbers of Bidders in Sequential Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, number 2024-530, DOI: 10.18800/2079-8474.0530.
• Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024, "Information Requirements for Mechanism Design," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 24-035, Oct.
• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Cerjak, Marija & Kovačić, Damir & Juračak, Josip, 2024, "To be(tween) or not to be(tween)? Combining between- and within-subjects design characteristics in preference elicitation for organic and local apples," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120880, May.
• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Palma, Marco & Feldman, Paul, 2024, "Incentives and Payment Mechanisms in Preference Elicitation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120898, May.
• Enzo Rossi, 2024, "Swiss treasury bill auctions: a review," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2024-12.
• Mauricio Bugarin & Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado, 2024, "Endogenous Asymmetry in Sequential Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2024_21, Jul.
• Mario Blazquez Paz, 2024, "Production or transmission investments? A comparative analysis," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 51, issue 4, pages 957-1000, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-024-00318-z.
• Arijit Mukherjee & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2024, "Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 17-24, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1.
• Daniel Marszalec, 2024, "Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 215-242, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z.
• Jeongwoo Lee & Jaeok Park, 2024, "Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 4, pages 1085-1126, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01518-9.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Auctions with resale at a later date," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 843-875, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6.
• Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2024, "Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 4, pages 1233-1273, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01580-x.
• Dmitriy Knyazev, 2024, "Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 3, pages 1073-1075, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4.
• Rajesh Kumar Acha & Sumit Sarkar, 2024, "A Note on Bankruptcy Auction with a Fair Bidder," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 1, pages 211-221, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-023-00372-9.
• Ceesay Muhammed, 2024, "Collusion with Not-So-Secret Rings," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 2, pages 563-570, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-024-00387-w.
• Swaminathan Rammohan & Rahul R. Marathe & Nandan Sudarsanam, 2024, "Recent advancements in revenue management of taxi services: a systematic review and research agenda," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, volume 74, issue 2, pages 1029-1055, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11301-023-00326-8.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Fumihiro Yonekura, 2024, "King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 1-19, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8.
• Ricardo Gonçalves & Indrajit Ray, 2024, "Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 125-150, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7.
• Steven R. Williams & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, 2024, "The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 151-187, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6.
• Jianxin Yi, 2024, "A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 331-345, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 455-483, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5.
• Inácio Bó & Jörgen Kratz & Makoto Shimoji, 2024, "Generalized cumulative offer processes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 3, pages 573-591, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4.
• Romans Pancs, 2024, "A vaccine auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 4, pages 763-780, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9.
• Eberhard Feess & Arthur Grimes & Yigit Saglam & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2024, "Simultaneous Versus Sequential Learning of Valuations: Theory and Evidence From House Sales," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2024-06, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2024, "Spatial Search," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 24-015/VIII, Feb.
• Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2024, "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-776, May.
• Jackson Dorsey & Derek Wolfson, 2024, "Unequal Uptake: Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, volume 11, issue S1, pages 71-109, DOI: 10.1086/732840.
• Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2024, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 132, issue 4, pages 1209-1246, DOI: 10.1086/727284.
• Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024, "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics, University of Cyprus Department of Economics, number 04-2024, Jun.
• Gretschko Vitali & Ockenfels Axel & Wambach Achim, 2024, "Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, volume 104, issue 11, pages 794-799, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2024-0202.
• Waterson, Michael & Wojciechowska , Olga, 2024, "Individual bidder behaviour in repeated auctions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1498.
• Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024, "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1516.
• Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2024, "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA, number 83.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2024, "Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-025.
• Chiappinelli, Olga & Dalò, Ambrogio & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2024, "The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-060.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Simon, Jasmina, 2024, "An efficient dynamic mechanism with covert information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-081.
• Ryan Oprea, 2024, "Decisions under Risk Are Decisions under Complexity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 12, pages 3789-3811, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221227.
• Bernardus Van Doornik & Armando Gomes & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2024, "Financial Access and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Credit Lotteries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 6, pages 1854-1881, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230585.
• Nina Bobkova, 2024, "Information Choice in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 7, pages 1883-1915, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221297.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 8, pages 2553-2595, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230478.
• Nima Haghpanah & Aditya Kuvalekar & Elliot Lipnowski, 2024, "Buying from a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 8, pages 2596-2632, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230914.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Patrick Rey, 2024, "Coordination in the Fight against Collusion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 224-261, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220194.
• Marzena Rostek & Ji Hee Yoon, 2024, "Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Technology versus Synthetic Products," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 63-109, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220138.
• Shengmao Cao & Lisa Xuejie Yi & Chuan Yu, 2024, "Competitive Bidding in Drug Procurement: Evidence from China," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 3, pages 481-513, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220505.
• Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & David C. Parkes & Richard Steinberg, 2024, "Combinatorial Auctions in Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 62, issue 2, pages 517-553, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20221679.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Kareen Rozen, 2024, "Bounded Rationality in Choice Theory: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 62, issue 3, pages 995-1039, September, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20231592.
• Shengwu Li, 2024, "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 38, issue 4, pages 175-192, Fall, DOI: 10.1257/jep.38.4.175.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024, "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 288, Mar.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2024, "Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 334, Aug.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2024, "The Benefits from Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2402.07277, Feb, revised Sep 2025.
• Shengwu Li, 2024, "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2403.18694, Mar, revised Jul 2024.
• Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024, "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2412.12676, Dec, revised Dec 2025.
• Dongwoo Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2024, "Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impact of Ad quality on search revenue," CeMMAP working papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number 16/24, Aug, DOI: 10.47004/wp.cem.2024.1624.
• Jason Allen & Ali Hortaçsu & Eric Richert & Milena Wittwer, 2024, "Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 24-29, Jul, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2024-29.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo Maria Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2024, "Procuring survival," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 1439, Feb.
• Audrey Guo & Rodrigo Carril, 2024, "The Impact of Preference Programs in Public Procurement: Evidence from Veteran Set-Asides," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1417, Jan.
• Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2024, "Carrots and sticks: collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2407.
• Aner Sela & Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi, 2024, "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2408.
• Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024, "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2409.
• Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2024, "Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 72, issue 1, pages 253-283, March, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12354.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2024, "Procuring Survival," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 72, issue 4, pages 1451-1506, December, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12395.
• Benjamin V Rosa, 2024, "Subcontracting requirements and the cost of government procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 55, issue 1, pages 3-32, March, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12456.
• Charlotte Grace, 2024, "Competing models of the Bank of England’s liquidity auctions: truthful bidding is a good approximation," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 1061, Feb.
• Natalya Presman & Tanya Suhoy, 2024, "How have government housing programs affected developers' bids in Israel Land Authority land tenders?," Bank of Israel Working Papers, Bank of Israel, number 2024.08, Sep.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024, "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_519, Mar.
• Vitali Gretschko & Jasmina Simon, 2024, "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_616, Dec.
• Jeong Seungwon (Eugene), 2024, "A Note on a Moment Inequality," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 1, pages 435-440, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2023-0045.
• Kim Sanghoon, 2024, "Information Disclosure by Informed Intermediary in Double Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 2, pages 691-728, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0026.
• Morita Rubens & Psaradakis Zacharias & Sola Martin & Yunis Patricio, 2024, "On testing for bubbles during hyperinflations," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, volume 28, issue 1, pages 25-37, February, DOI: 10.1515/snde-2022-0014.
• Wladimir Andreff, 2024, "Le sport aux enchères : la malédiction du vainqueur," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, volume 0, issue 2, pages 17-27.
• Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024, "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Working Papers, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics, number 365, Dec.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2024, "Optimal (Non-) Disclosure Defaults," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 346, Apr.
• Sudhir A. Shah, 2024, "A dual formulation of bidding behaviour in sealed bid auctions," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 349, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff & Pieter A. Gautier, 2024, "Spatial Search," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10978.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2024, "Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11035.
• Kris De Jaegher & Michal Šoltés & Vitezslav Titl, 2024, "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11603.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2024, "The Demand for Safe Assets," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 24-110, Dec.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Smeers, Yves & Papavasiliou, Anthony, 2024, "Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3281, Mar, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Papavasiliou, Anthony & Smeers, Yves, 2024, "On some advantages of convex hull pricing for the European electricity auction," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3288, Apr, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.202.
• Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Rovigatti, Gabriele, 2024, "Procuring Survival," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18796, Jan.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2024, "Spatial Search," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18858, Feb.
• Barkley, Aaron & Genesove, David & Hansen, James, 2024, "Haggle or Hammer? Dual-Mechanism Housing Search," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19262, Jul.
• Marra, Marleen, 2024, "A Market for Airport Slots," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19442, Sep.
• Baldwin, Elizabeth & Klemperer, Paul & Lock, Edwin, 2024, "Implementing Walrasian Equilibrium: the Languages of Product-Mix Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19457, Sep.
• Breckenfelder, Johannes & Collin-Dufresne, Pierre & Corradin, Stefano, 2024, "Is the Bond Market Competitive? Evidence from the ECB's Asset Purchase Program," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19582, Oct.
• Mats Kröger, 2024, "Cream-skimming through PPAs – Interactions between Private and Public Long-term Contracts for Renewable Energy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2092.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024, "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2024-10, May.
• Wossen, Tesfamicheal & Spielman, David J. & Alene, Arega D. & Abdoulaye, Tahirou, 2024, "Estimating seed demand in the presence of market frictions: Evidence from an auction experiment in Nigeria," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103242.
• Dentler, Alexander & Rossi, Enzo, 2024, "Public debt management announcements: A welfare-theoretic analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106561.
• Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco & Wang, Zijia, 2024, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with affiliated values," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106870.
• Shannon, Darren & Dowling, Michael & Zhaf, Marjan & Sheehan, Barry, 2024, "Dutch auction dynamics in non-fungible token (NFT) markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106882.
• Grundl, Serafin & Zhu, Yu, 2024, "Two results on auctions with endogenous entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111500.
• Burguet, Roberto & Sákovics, József, 2024, "Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111656.
• Chiappinelli, Olga & Seres, Gyula, 2024, "Optimal discounts in green public procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 238, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705.
• Faye, Benoit & Le Fur, Eric, 2024, "Heterogeneous buyer preferences behind rejecting the law of one price in the fine wines market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 239, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111744.
• De Stefano, Martino & Moresi, Serge, 2024, "Merger simulation in second-score auctions: A nested logit model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111787.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2024, "Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111827.
• Zincenko, Federico, 2024, "Estimation and inference of seller’s expected revenue in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 241, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2024.105734.
• Levine, David K. & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore, 2024, "The tripartite auction folk theorem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104656.
• Bajoori, Elnaz & Peeters, Ronald & Wolk, Leonard, 2024, "Security auctions with cash- and equity-bids: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104702.
• Pierre, Erwan & Schneider, Lorenz, 2024, "Intermittently coupled electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107327.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Papavasiliou, Anthony & Smeers, Yves, 2024, "On some advantages of convex hull pricing for the European electricity auction," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107542.
• Puiu, Ioan Alexandru & Hauser, Raphael Andreas, 2024, "On market clearing of day ahead auctions for European power markets: Consumer payment minimisation versus social welfare maximisation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107880.
• Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) & Lee, Joosung, 2024, "The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 191-203, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012.
• Chen, Bo & Chen, Bo, 2024, "Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 204-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.010.
• Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024, "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 54-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.003.
• Haimanko, Ori, 2024, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, pages 222-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007.
• Dharanan, G.V.A. & Ellis, Alex, 2024, "Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 1-18, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.003.
• Weichselbaumer, Michael, 2024, "Competition after mergers near review thresholds," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103066.
• Marra, Marleen & Oswald, Florian, 2024, "Ownership frictions in a procurement market: Evidence from London buses," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103080.
• Allende, Claudia & Atal, Juan Pablo & Carril, Rodrigo & Cuesta, José Ignacio & González-Lira, Andrés, 2024, "Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103086.
• Adelowo, Jacqueline & Bohland, Moritz, 2024, "Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108.
• Huang, Shaoqing & Xie, Weisi & Xu, Xiaoshu, 2024, "Bureaucracy-business relationship, corruption and the implications for marketization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 52, issue 3, pages 634-644, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2024.06.004.
• Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024, "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, pages 63-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.038.
• Kotakorpi, Kaisa & Nurminen, Tuomas & Miettinen, Topi & Metsälampi, Satu, 2024, "Bearing the burden — Implications of tax reporting institutions on evasion and incidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, pages 81-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.021.
• Landi, Massimiliano & Menicucci, Domenico, 2024, "Allocating vehicle registration permits," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 221, issue C, pages 327-349, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.020.
• Jamal, Karim & Maier, Michael & Sunder, Shyam, 2024, "Emergence of information aggregation to rational expectations equilibria in markets populated by biased heuristic traders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 228, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106700.
• Severinov, Sergei & Virag, Gabor, 2024, "Who wants to be an auctioneer?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105820.
• Huang, Wenqian & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2024, "CCP auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105826.
• Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024, "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105837.
• Auster, Sarah & Gottardi, Piero, 2024, "Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105883.
• Bayona, Anna & Manzano, Carolina, 2024, "Competition in schedules with cursed traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 222, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105935.
• Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2024, "The role of information in auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 114, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027.
• Shinozaki, Hiroki, 2024, "Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103066.
• Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2024, "Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 1-5, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004.
• Zhang, Xieji, 2024, "The ascending auction with flexible reporting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 28-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003.
• Burguet, Roberto & Iossa, Elisabetta & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2024, "Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506.
• Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka A., 2024, "A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102221.
• Tabaqchali, Ahmed, 2024, "A fistful of Dinars: demystifying Iraq’s dollar auction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 122652, Apr.
• Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio & Parkes, David C. & Steinberg, Richard, 2024, "Combinatorial auctions in practice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 124108, Jun.
• Olga Chiappinelli & Ambrogio Dalò & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024, "The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2024/474.
• Francisco Robles & Marina Núñez & Laura Robles, 2024, "Monotonic transformation of preferences and Walrasian equilibrium in allocation problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2024/478.
• Roberto Pinheiro, 2024, "Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Costless Communication," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, number 24-21, Oct, DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202421.
• Muhammed Ceesay & Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2024, "Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2024_20.rdf.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Patrick Rey, 2024, "Coordination in the fight against collusion," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04459042, Feb, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220194.
• Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-04928908, Nov, DOI: 10.3982/te5655.
• Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-04928908, Nov, DOI: 10.3982/te5655.
• Alain Jean-Marie & Mabel Tidball, 2024, "Equilibrium bids for reverse auctions when the budget is announced - Some preliminary results
  [Équilibres pour les enchères inversées quand le budget est annoncé – Quelques résultats préliminaires]," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04520388, Mar.
• Meens-Eriksson, Sef, 2024, "The Economics of Residual Waste: Policies, Price discrimination, and Welfare," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1022, Feb.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024, "Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-137, Feb.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024, "Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-138, Feb.
• Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2024, "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 70, issue 7, pages 4219-4235, July, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4899.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2024, "Spatial Search," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 16824, Feb.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2024, "An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 9, issue 1, pages 105-130, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006.
• Olivier Armantier & Charles A. Holt, 2024, "Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 9-35, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.
• Thomas Giebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy, 2024, "Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 80-108, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8.
• Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2024, "Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 58-79, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0.
• James W. Boudreau & Haikady N. Nagaraja & Lucas Rentschler & Shane D. Sanders, 2024, "The role of luck in political and economic competition: noisy all-pay auctions," Public Choice, Springer, volume 199, issue 1, pages 137-157, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01023-y.
• Guillermo Marshall, 2024, "Identification in english auctions with shill bidding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, volume 22, issue 2, pages 193-222, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9.
• Nicolas Stevens & Yves Smeers & Anthony Papavasiliou, 2024, "Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 238-272, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09473-6.
• Aner Sela, 2024, "Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 97, issue 4, pages 721-743, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09992-w.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024, "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 413554011.

2023

• Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2023, "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 3, pages 628-663, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191594.
• Giuseppe Lopomo & Nicola Persico & Alessandro T. Villa, 2023, "Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1505-1529, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211437.
• M. Kathleen Ngangoue & Andrew Schotter, 2023, "The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1572-1599, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191927.
• Benjamin Enke & Thomas Graeber & Ryan Oprea, 2023, "Confidence, Self-Selection, and Bias in the Aggregate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 7, pages 1933-1966, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220915.
• Michael Ostrovsky, 2023, "Choice Screen Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 9, pages 2486-2505, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220699.
• Eric Budish & Aditya Bhave, 2023, "Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 142-170, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180230.
• Dan Levin & James Peck, 2023, "Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 171-200, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200447.
• René Kirkegaard, 2023, "Contest Design with Stochastic Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 201-238, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200422.
• Greg Kubitz, 2023, "Two-Stage Contests with Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 239-287, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200071.
• Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu & Yuxuan Zhu, 2023, "Bid Caps in Noisy Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 426-473, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220046.
• Daniel Quint & Marek Weretka, 2023, "Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 306-318, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220078.