Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2024

• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Palma, Marco & Feldman, Paul, 2024, "Incentives and Payment Mechanisms in Preference Elicitation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120898, May.
• Enzo Rossi, 2024, "Swiss treasury bill auctions: a review," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2024-12.
• Mauricio Bugarin & Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado, 2024, "Endogenous Asymmetry in Sequential Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2024_21, Jul.
• Mario Blazquez Paz, 2024, "Production or transmission investments? A comparative analysis," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 51, issue 4, pages 957-1000, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-024-00318-z.
• Arijit Mukherjee & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2024, "Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 17-24, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1.
• Daniel Marszalec, 2024, "Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 215-242, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z.
• Jeongwoo Lee & Jaeok Park, 2024, "Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 4, pages 1085-1126, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01518-9.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Auctions with resale at a later date," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 843-875, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6.
• Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2024, "Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 4, pages 1233-1273, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01580-x.
• Dmitriy Knyazev, 2024, "Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 3, pages 1073-1075, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4.
• Rajesh Kumar Acha & Sumit Sarkar, 2024, "A Note on Bankruptcy Auction with a Fair Bidder," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 1, pages 211-221, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-023-00372-9.
• Ceesay Muhammed, 2024, "Collusion with Not-So-Secret Rings," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 2, pages 563-570, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-024-00387-w.
• Swaminathan Rammohan & Rahul R. Marathe & Nandan Sudarsanam, 2024, "Recent advancements in revenue management of taxi services: a systematic review and research agenda," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, volume 74, issue 2, pages 1029-1055, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11301-023-00326-8.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Fumihiro Yonekura, 2024, "King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 1-19, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8.
• Ricardo Gonçalves & Indrajit Ray, 2024, "Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 125-150, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7.
• Steven R. Williams & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, 2024, "The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 151-187, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6.
• Jianxin Yi, 2024, "A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 331-345, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 455-483, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5.
• Inácio Bó & Jörgen Kratz & Makoto Shimoji, 2024, "Generalized cumulative offer processes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 3, pages 573-591, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4.
• Romans Pancs, 2024, "A vaccine auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 4, pages 763-780, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9.
• Eberhard Feess & Arthur Grimes & Yigit Saglam & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2024, "Simultaneous Versus Sequential Learning of Valuations: Theory and Evidence From House Sales," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2024-06, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2024, "Spatial Search," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 24-015/VIII, Feb.
• Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2024, "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-776, May.
• Jackson Dorsey & Derek Wolfson, 2024, "Unequal Uptake: Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, volume 11, issue S1, pages 71-109, DOI: 10.1086/732840.
• Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2024, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 132, issue 4, pages 1209-1246, DOI: 10.1086/727284.
• Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024, "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics, University of Cyprus Department of Economics, number 04-2024, Jun.
• Gretschko Vitali & Ockenfels Axel & Wambach Achim, 2024, "Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, volume 104, issue 11, pages 794-799, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2024-0202.
• Waterson, Michael & Wojciechowska , Olga, 2024, "Individual bidder behaviour in repeated auctions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1498.
• Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024, "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1516.
• Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2024, "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA, number 83.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2024, "Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-025.
• Chiappinelli, Olga & Dalò, Ambrogio & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2024, "The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-060.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Simon, Jasmina, 2024, "An efficient dynamic mechanism with covert information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-081.
• Ryan Oprea, 2024, "Decisions under Risk Are Decisions under Complexity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 12, pages 3789-3811, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221227.
• Bernardus Van Doornik & Armando Gomes & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2024, "Financial Access and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Credit Lotteries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 6, pages 1854-1881, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230585.
• Nina Bobkova, 2024, "Information Choice in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 7, pages 1883-1915, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221297.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 8, pages 2553-2595, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230478.
• Nima Haghpanah & Aditya Kuvalekar & Elliot Lipnowski, 2024, "Buying from a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 8, pages 2596-2632, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230914.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Patrick Rey, 2024, "Coordination in the Fight against Collusion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 224-261, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220194.
• Marzena Rostek & Ji Hee Yoon, 2024, "Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Technology versus Synthetic Products," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 63-109, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220138.
• Shengmao Cao & Lisa Xuejie Yi & Chuan Yu, 2024, "Competitive Bidding in Drug Procurement: Evidence from China," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 3, pages 481-513, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220505.
• Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & David C. Parkes & Richard Steinberg, 2024, "Combinatorial Auctions in Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 62, issue 2, pages 517-553, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20221679.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Kareen Rozen, 2024, "Bounded Rationality in Choice Theory: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 62, issue 3, pages 995-1039, September, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20231592.
• Shengwu Li, 2024, "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 38, issue 4, pages 175-192, Fall, DOI: 10.1257/jep.38.4.175.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024, "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 288, Mar.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2024, "Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 334, Aug.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2024, "The Benefits from Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2402.07277, Feb, revised Sep 2025.
• Shengwu Li, 2024, "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2403.18694, Mar, revised Jul 2024.
• Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024, "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2412.12676, Dec, revised Dec 2025.
• Dongwoo Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2024, "Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impact of Ad quality on search revenue," CeMMAP working papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number 16/24, Aug, DOI: 10.47004/wp.cem.2024.1624.
• Jason Allen & Ali Hortaçsu & Eric Richert & Milena Wittwer, 2024, "Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 24-29, Jul, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2024-29.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo Maria Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2024, "Procuring survival," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 1439, Feb.
• Audrey Guo & Rodrigo Carril, 2024, "The Impact of Preference Programs in Public Procurement: Evidence from Veteran Set-Asides," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1417, Jan.
• Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2024, "Carrots and sticks: collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2407.
• Aner Sela & Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi, 2024, "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2408.
• Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024, "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2409.
• Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2024, "Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 72, issue 1, pages 253-283, March, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12354.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2024, "Procuring Survival," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 72, issue 4, pages 1451-1506, December, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12395.
• Benjamin V Rosa, 2024, "Subcontracting requirements and the cost of government procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 55, issue 1, pages 3-32, March, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12456.
• Charlotte Grace, 2024, "Competing models of the Bank of England’s liquidity auctions: truthful bidding is a good approximation," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 1061, Feb.
• Natalya Presman & Tanya Suhoy, 2024, "How have government housing programs affected developers' bids in Israel Land Authority land tenders?," Bank of Israel Working Papers, Bank of Israel, number 2024.08, Sep.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024, "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_519, Mar.
• Vitali Gretschko & Jasmina Simon, 2024, "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_616, Dec.
• Jeong Seungwon (Eugene), 2024, "A Note on a Moment Inequality," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 1, pages 435-440, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2023-0045.
• Kim Sanghoon, 2024, "Information Disclosure by Informed Intermediary in Double Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 2, pages 691-728, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0026.
• Morita Rubens & Psaradakis Zacharias & Sola Martin & Yunis Patricio, 2024, "On testing for bubbles during hyperinflations," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, volume 28, issue 1, pages 25-37, February, DOI: 10.1515/snde-2022-0014.
• Wladimir Andreff, 2024, "Le sport aux enchères : la malédiction du vainqueur," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, volume 0, issue 2, pages 17-27.
• Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024, "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Working Papers, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics, number 365, Dec.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2024, "Optimal (Non-) Disclosure Defaults," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 346, Apr.
• Sudhir A. Shah, 2024, "A dual formulation of bidding behaviour in sealed bid auctions," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 349, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff & Pieter A. Gautier, 2024, "Spatial Search," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10978.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2024, "Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11035.
• Kris De Jaegher & Michal Šoltés & Vitezslav Titl, 2024, "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11603.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2024, "The Demand for Safe Assets," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 24-110, Dec.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Smeers, Yves & Papavasiliou, Anthony, 2024, "Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3281, Mar, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Papavasiliou, Anthony & Smeers, Yves, 2024, "On some advantages of convex hull pricing for the European electricity auction," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3288, Apr, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.202.
• Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Rovigatti, Gabriele, 2024, "Procuring Survival," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 18796, Jan.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2024, "Spatial Search," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 18858, Feb.
• Barkley, Aaron & Genesove, David & Hansen, James, 2024, "Haggle or Hammer? Dual-Mechanism Housing Search," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 19262, Jul.
• Marra, Marleen, 2024, "A Market for Airport Slots," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 19442, Sep.
• Mats Kröger, 2024, "Cream-skimming through PPAs – Interactions between Private and Public Long-term Contracts for Renewable Energy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2092.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024, "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2024-10, May.
• Wossen, Tesfamicheal & Spielman, David J. & Alene, Arega D. & Abdoulaye, Tahirou, 2024, "Estimating seed demand in the presence of market frictions: Evidence from an auction experiment in Nigeria," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103242.
• Dentler, Alexander & Rossi, Enzo, 2024, "Public debt management announcements: A welfare-theoretic analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106561.
• Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco & Wang, Zijia, 2024, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with affiliated values," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106870.
• Shannon, Darren & Dowling, Michael & Zhaf, Marjan & Sheehan, Barry, 2024, "Dutch auction dynamics in non-fungible token (NFT) markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106882.
• Grundl, Serafin & Zhu, Yu, 2024, "Two results on auctions with endogenous entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111500.
• Burguet, Roberto & Sákovics, József, 2024, "Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111656.
• Chiappinelli, Olga & Seres, Gyula, 2024, "Optimal discounts in green public procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 238, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705.
• Faye, Benoit & Le Fur, Eric, 2024, "Heterogeneous buyer preferences behind rejecting the law of one price in the fine wines market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 239, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111744.
• De Stefano, Martino & Moresi, Serge, 2024, "Merger simulation in second-score auctions: A nested logit model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111787.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2024, "Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111827.
• Zincenko, Federico, 2024, "Estimation and inference of seller’s expected revenue in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 241, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2024.105734.
• Levine, David K. & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore, 2024, "The tripartite auction folk theorem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104656.
• Bajoori, Elnaz & Peeters, Ronald & Wolk, Leonard, 2024, "Security auctions with cash- and equity-bids: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104702.
• Pierre, Erwan & Schneider, Lorenz, 2024, "Intermittently coupled electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107327.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Papavasiliou, Anthony & Smeers, Yves, 2024, "On some advantages of convex hull pricing for the European electricity auction," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107542.
• Puiu, Ioan Alexandru & Hauser, Raphael Andreas, 2024, "On market clearing of day ahead auctions for European power markets: Consumer payment minimisation versus social welfare maximisation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107880.
• Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) & Lee, Joosung, 2024, "The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 191-203, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012.
• Chen, Bo & Chen, Bo, 2024, "Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 204-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.010.
• Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024, "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 54-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.003.
• Haimanko, Ori, 2024, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, pages 222-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007.
• Dharanan, G.V.A. & Ellis, Alex, 2024, "Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 1-18, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.003.
• Weichselbaumer, Michael, 2024, "Competition after mergers near review thresholds," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103066.
• Marra, Marleen & Oswald, Florian, 2024, "Ownership frictions in a procurement market: Evidence from London buses," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103080.
• Allende, Claudia & Atal, Juan Pablo & Carril, Rodrigo & Cuesta, José Ignacio & González-Lira, Andrés, 2024, "Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103086.
• Adelowo, Jacqueline & Bohland, Moritz, 2024, "Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108.
• Huang, Shaoqing & Xie, Weisi & Xu, Xiaoshu, 2024, "Bureaucracy-business relationship, corruption and the implications for marketization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 52, issue 3, pages 634-644, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2024.06.004.
• Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024, "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, pages 63-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.038.
• Kotakorpi, Kaisa & Nurminen, Tuomas & Miettinen, Topi & Metsälampi, Satu, 2024, "Bearing the burden — Implications of tax reporting institutions on evasion and incidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, pages 81-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.021.
• Landi, Massimiliano & Menicucci, Domenico, 2024, "Allocating vehicle registration permits," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 221, issue C, pages 327-349, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.020.
• Jamal, Karim & Maier, Michael & Sunder, Shyam, 2024, "Emergence of information aggregation to rational expectations equilibria in markets populated by biased heuristic traders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 228, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106700.
• Severinov, Sergei & Virag, Gabor, 2024, "Who wants to be an auctioneer?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105820.
• Huang, Wenqian & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2024, "CCP auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105826.
• Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024, "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105837.
• Auster, Sarah & Gottardi, Piero, 2024, "Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105883.
• Bayona, Anna & Manzano, Carolina, 2024, "Competition in schedules with cursed traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 222, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105935.
• Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2024, "The role of information in auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 114, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027.
• Shinozaki, Hiroki, 2024, "Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103066.
• Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2024, "Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 1-5, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004.
• Zhang, Xieji, 2024, "The ascending auction with flexible reporting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 28-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003.
• Burguet, Roberto & Iossa, Elisabetta & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2024, "Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506.
• Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka A., 2024, "A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102221.
• Tabaqchali, Ahmed, 2024, "A fistful of Dinars: demystifying Iraq’s dollar auction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 122652, Apr.
• Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio & Parkes, David C. & Steinberg, Richard, 2024, "Combinatorial auctions in practice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 124108, Jun.
• Olga Chiappinelli & Ambrogio Dalò & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024, "The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2024/474.
• Francisco Robles & Marina Núñez & Laura Robles, 2024, "Monotonic transformation of preferences and Walrasian equilibrium in allocation problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2024/478.
• Roberto Pinheiro, 2024, "Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Costless Communication," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, number 24-21, Oct, DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202421.
• Muhammed Ceesay & Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2024, "Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2024_20.rdf.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Patrick Rey, 2024, "Coordination in the fight against collusion," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04459042, Feb, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220194.
• Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-04928908, Nov, DOI: 10.3982/te5655.
• Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-04928908, Nov, DOI: 10.3982/te5655.
• Alain Jean-Marie & Mabel Tidball, 2024, "Equilibrium bids for reverse auctions when the budget is announced - Some preliminary results
  [Équilibres pour les enchères inversées quand le budget est annoncé – Quelques résultats préliminaires]," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04520388, Mar.
• Meens-Eriksson, Sef, 2024, "The Economics of Residual Waste: Policies, Price discrimination, and Welfare," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1022, Feb.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024, "Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-137, Feb.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024, "Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-138, Feb.
• Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2024, "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 70, issue 7, pages 4219-4235, July, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4899.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2024, "Spatial Search," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 16824, Feb.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2024, "An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 9, issue 1, pages 105-130, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006.
• Olivier Armantier & Charles A. Holt, 2024, "Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 9-35, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.
• Thomas Giebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy, 2024, "Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 80-108, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8.
• Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2024, "Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 58-79, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0.
• James W. Boudreau & Haikady N. Nagaraja & Lucas Rentschler & Shane D. Sanders, 2024, "The role of luck in political and economic competition: noisy all-pay auctions," Public Choice, Springer, volume 199, issue 1, pages 137-157, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01023-y.
• Guillermo Marshall, 2024, "Identification in english auctions with shill bidding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, volume 22, issue 2, pages 193-222, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9.
• Nicolas Stevens & Yves Smeers & Anthony Papavasiliou, 2024, "Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 238-272, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09473-6.
• Aner Sela, 2024, "Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 97, issue 4, pages 721-743, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09992-w.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024, "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 413554011.

2023

• Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2023, "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 3, pages 628-663, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191594.
• Giuseppe Lopomo & Nicola Persico & Alessandro T. Villa, 2023, "Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1505-1529, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211437.
• M. Kathleen Ngangoue & Andrew Schotter, 2023, "The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1572-1599, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191927.
• Benjamin Enke & Thomas Graeber & Ryan Oprea, 2023, "Confidence, Self-Selection, and Bias in the Aggregate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 7, pages 1933-1966, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220915.
• Michael Ostrovsky, 2023, "Choice Screen Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 9, pages 2486-2505, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220699.
• Eric Budish & Aditya Bhave, 2023, "Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 142-170, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180230.
• Dan Levin & James Peck, 2023, "Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 171-200, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200447.
• René Kirkegaard, 2023, "Contest Design with Stochastic Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 201-238, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200422.
• Greg Kubitz, 2023, "Two-Stage Contests with Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 239-287, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200071.
• Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu & Yuxuan Zhu, 2023, "Bid Caps in Noisy Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 426-473, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220046.
• Daniel Quint & Marek Weretka, 2023, "Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 306-318, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220078.
• Nils A. Breitmar & Matthew Harding & Carlos Lamarche, 2023, "Using Grouped Data to Estimate Revenue Heterogeneity in Online Advertising Auctions," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 161-165, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231095.
• Robert M. Townsend & Nicolas X. Zhang, 2023, "Technologies That Replace a "Central Planner"," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 257-262, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231031.
• Andrea Canidio, 2023, "Financial Bubbles in Infinitely Repeated Auctions with Tokens," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 263-267, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231032.
• Shraman Banerjee & Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2023, "Virtue of Simplicity in Asymmetric Auctions," Working Papers, Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics, number 2023-01, Feb.
• Gaurab Aryal & Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023, "Is Collusion-proof Procurement Expensive?," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 248, Jun.
• Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023, "Econometrics of first Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 252, Jun.
• Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023, "Detecting Collusion on Highway Procurement," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 263, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023, "The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2301.13827, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.07653, Apr.
• Dongwoo Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2023, "Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impacts of ad quality on search revenue," CeMMAP working papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number 05/23, Mar, DOI: 10.47004/wp.cem.2023.0523.
• Bo Young Chang, 2023, "Estimating the Slope of the Demand Function at Auctions for Government of Canada Bonds," Discussion Papers, Bank of Canada, number 2023-12, Jun, DOI: 10.34989/sdp-2023-12.
• Jason Allen & Milena Wittwer, 2023, "Intermediary Market Power and Capital Constraints," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 23-51, Oct, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2023-51.
• Dejan Trifunović, 2023, "Aukcije Sa Višedimenzionalnim Signalima (Auctions With Multidimensional Signals)," Ekonomske ideje i praksa, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, issue 50, pages 1-20, September.
• José Ignacio Cuesta & Juan Pablo Atal & Claudia Allende & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Rodrigo Carril, 2023, "Drivers of Public Procurement Prices: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1413, Nov.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Elimination Games," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2312.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "All-Pay Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2313.
• Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023, "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2317.
• Ori Haimanko, 2023, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2318.
• Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023, "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 32, issue 2, pages 377-399, April, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12509.
• Mathieu Aubry & Roman Kräussl & Gustavo Manso & Christophe Spaenjers, 2023, "Biased Auctioneers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, volume 78, issue 2, pages 795-833, April, DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13203.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2023, "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 71, issue 2, pages 570-592, June, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12331.
• Julia Giese & Charlotte Grace, 2023, "An evaluation of the Bank of England’s ILTR operations: comparing the product-mix auction to alternatives," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 1044, Oct.
• Daniil Larionov, 2023, "Full Surplus Extraction From Colluding Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_392, Feb.
• Marco Reuter, 2023, "Revenue Maximization With Partially Verifiable Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_395, Feb.
• Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023, "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_434, Jun.
• Lorenzon Emmanuel, 2023, "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 155-179, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0009.
• Gangopadhyay Shubhashis & Mallios Aineas & Sjögren Stefan, 2023, "Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 19, issue 2, pages 213-231, July, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0042.
• Newbery, D., 2023, "Regulation of access, fees, and investment planning of transmission in Great Britain," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 2335, Dec.
• Anderson, E. & Holmberg, P., 2023, "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 2339, Dec.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2023, "Information-Forcing Effects of Non-Disclosure Rules," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 338, Aug.
• Kris De Jaegher & Michal Soltes & Vitezslav Titl, 2023, "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, number wp757, Jul.
• Clarissa Lotti & Arieda Muço & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Tommaso Valletti & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2023, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10274.
• Dongwoo Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2023, "Nonparametric Estimation of Sponsored Search Auctions and Impacts of AD Quality on Search Revenue," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10312.
• Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2023, "Discrete Rule Learning in First Price Auctions," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 23-07.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023, "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 2023s-13, Jun.
• David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2023, "The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 786969000000001811, Feb.
• Willems, Bert & Yu, Yueting, 2023, "Bidding and Investment in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Discriminatory versus Uniform-Price Auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2023023, Aug.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2023, "The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17897, Feb.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2023, "Screening with Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17898, Feb.
• Levine, David & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore, 2023, "The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17936, Feb.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Goldmanis, Maris & Penta, Antonio & Shakhgildyan, Ksenia, 2023, "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17942, Feb.