Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2025

• Wu, Shuping & Stevenson, Simon & Young, James & Yang, Zan, 2025, "Auction Structure, Bidding Behavior and Urban Land Price: New Evidence from Two-Stage Land Auctions," Working Paper Series, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance, number 25/5, Jun.
• Kolasa, Marcin & Laséen, Stefan & Lindé, Jesper, 2025, "Unconventional Monetary Policies in Small Open Economies," Working Paper Series, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), number 450, Apr.
• Drake, Samielle, 2025, "Bidder participation following public procurement litigation," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1033, Mar.
• Drake, Samielle, 2025, "Small fish in a big (local) pond: EU directives, market concentration, and SME success in public procurement," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1034, Mar.
• Jesper Lindé & Marcin Kolasa & Stefan Laseen, 2025, "Unconventional Monetary Policies in Small Open Economies," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund, number 2025/066, Apr.
• Ceyhun Elgin, 2025, "Auction structure and court-ordered real estate sale outcomes: evidence from co-ownership dissolution cases in Turkey," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, volume 60, issue 1, pages 55-80, August, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-025-09847-x.
• Erica Coslor & Tim R. L. Fry, 2025, "Misattribution stigma and contagion: How did the art auction market react to Australian “Black art scandals”?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 49, issue 3, pages 547-578, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-024-09526-w.
• Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2025, "To discriminate or not to discriminate: how to enforce unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 146, issue 2, pages 237-262, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-025-00917-x.
• Niels Frank & Mitja Kleczka & Erion Shtjefanaku, 2025, "Mandated MVNO access and MNO investment in mobile network markets: evidence from Germany and Spain," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 67, issue 1, pages 29-60, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09485-2.
• Jaeok Park & Jinhyuk Lee & Chulyoung Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2025, "An Experimental Study of Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 181, issue 4, pages 656-696, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2025-0027.
• Paulo Santos & Benjamin Chipperfield & Shipra Shah, 2025, "Understanding the potential adoption of agroforestry in Fiji using procurement auctions," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 2025-07, May.
• Roberto Ercegovac & Tea Šestanović & Mario Pečarić, 2025, "ECB quantitative tightening: Euribor-Overnight Index Swap spread and transmission mechanism efficiency," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, volume 56, issue 2, pages 163-184.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2025, "The Benefits from Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33498, Feb.
• Justin Marion & Benjamin Rosa, 2025, "A Bid Strategy for Earlier Payment: Evidence and Implications of Front-End Loading in Procurement," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33606, Mar.
• Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2025, "Scoring and Cartel Discipline in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33668, Apr.
• Mark van Oldeniel & Christopher M. Snyder & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2025, "Round Bidding in Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34564, Dec.
• Bo Cowgill & Zikai Xu, 2025, "Network Formation through Mechanism Design," Working Papers, NET Institute, number 25-01, Aug.
• Harold L Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2025, "Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 92, issue 1, pages 197-237.
• Kohnert, Dirk, 2025, "Seeding Growth: Unlocking the Potential of Agricultural Commodity Exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 125200, Jul.
• Kohnert, Dirk, 2025, "Semer la croissance: Libérer le potentiel des bourses de produits agricoles en Afrique subsaharienne
  [Seeding Growth: Unlocking the Potential of Agricultural Commodity Exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 125237, Jul.
• Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2025, "Scoring and Cartel Discipline in Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 342, May.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Michel Tolksdorf, 2025, "Delegating in the Age of AI: Preferences for Decision Autonomy," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 558, Dec.
• José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2025, "Refugee Resettlement and Solidarity," QM&ET Working Papers, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, number 25-01, Sep.
• Clara Calini & Alessandra Catenazzo & Elisabetta Iossa, 2025, "Using Multiple Tools to Enhance Competition in Public Procurement," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 594, Feb, revised 25 Feb 2025.
• Tomás Peruchín, 2025, "Shifting the Bidding Game: Reform of Auction Design for Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights in Argentina," Young Researchers Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, number 20, Nov, revised Nov 2025.
• Matthew O’Keefe, 2025, "Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions," The Energy Journal, , volume 46, issue 3, pages 103-122, May, DOI: 10.1177/01956574241303737.
• Karsten Neuhoff & Fernanda Ballesteros & Mats Kröger & Jörn C. Richstein, 2025, "Contracting Matters: Hedging Producers and Consumers With a Renewable Energy Pool," The Energy Journal, , volume 46, issue 4, pages 203-225, July, DOI: 10.1177/01956574251325486.
• Matteo Bizzarri, 2025, "General equilibrium with competition in schedules and input-output networks: an existence result," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 765, Oct.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Marco Gortan & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2025, "Swiss treasury bond auctions: An update," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2025-13.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2025, "The demand for safe assets," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2025-03.
• Mauricio Bugarin & Odilon Camara & Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado, 2025, "Advantage for Sale: Endogenous Asymmetry in Sequential Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2025_12, Sep.
• Chikako Ozu & Minoru Kunizaki, 2025, "How Can We Create a Public Platform for Art Prices?," Contributions to Economics, Springer, in: Calogero Guccio & Isidoro Mazza & Giacomo Pignataro, "New Perspectives in the Public and Cultural Sectors", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-81892-9_10.
• Takaaki Abe & Tsuyoshi Onda & Takehiko Yamato, 2025, "Second-price auctions with information acquisition costs," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 21-36, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00277-7.
• Gagan Ghosh & Bingchao Huangfu & Heng Liu, 2025, "Reserve prices in second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 69-77, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00281-x.
• Ottorino Chillemi & Stefano Galavotti, 2025, "Optimal procurement auctions with audit," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 79, issue 3, pages 993-1054, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01609-1.
• Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2025, "Mimic martingales in sequential auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 79, issue 4, pages 1283-1310, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01630-4.
• Hiroki Shinozaki, 2025, "Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 54, issue 2, pages 1-35, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00967-x.
• Heinz Herrmann & M. J. Cobo Martín, 2025, "Bidding for B2B or B2G tenders: toward the adoption of pricing models in practice," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 1495-1533, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11301-024-00424-1.
• Yangwei Song, 2025, "Robust auctions with affiliated private values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 2, pages 245-279, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0.
• Gregory Pavlov, 2025, "Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 3, pages 479-511, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00333-x.
• Doron Klunover, 2025, "First-price auction with a stochastic head start," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 29, issue 4, pages 717-725, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00371-z.
• Johan Fourie & Tessa Hubble & Jonathan Schoots, 2025, "The price of status: Findings from Cape auctions," Working Papers, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics, number 03/2025.
• Sander Onderstal & Ruben van Oosten, 2025, "Vertical Integration in Auction Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 25-046/VII, Aug.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2025, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-799, Apr.
• Gagnepain, Philippe & Martimort, David, 2025, "Collusion in Bidding Markets: The Case of the French Public Transport Industry," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1631, Mar.
• Rey, Patrick & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie, 2025, "All-receive procurement auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1637, Apr.
• Holmberg, Pär & Ruddell, Keith & Willems, Bert, 2025, "Multi-Product Supply Function Equilibria," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1669, Sep.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2025, "Corruption and renegotiation in procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1906, May.
• Atayev Atabek & Caspari Gian & Hillenbrand Adrian & Klein Thilo, 2025, "Mit Ungeduld zu besseren Subventionen für umweltfreundliche Produkte," Wirtschaftsdienst, Paradigm, volume 105, issue 6, pages 466-470, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2025-0117.
• Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2025, "Auctioning Control and Cash‐Flow Rights Separately," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 93, issue 3, pages 859-889, May, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21343.
• Harold Glenn A. Valera & Takashi Yamano & Ranjitha Puskur & Ronald Jeremy Antonio & Muhammad Ashraful Habib & M. D. Khairul Bashar & Valerien O. Pede, 2025, "The Impact of Micronutrient Training on High-Zinc Rice Demand Among Mothers: A Randomized Control Trial Study in Bangladesh," Asian Development Review (ADR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 42, issue 01, pages 209-232, DOI: 10.1142/S0116110525500088.
• Linnenbrink, Daniel, 2025, "Pay-as-bid Auctions with Private Information," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 325443, revised 2025.
• Bos, Olivier & Fugger, Nicolas & Onderstal, Sander, 2025, "Profit-share auctions in procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-038.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Gretschko, Vitali & Kokott, Gian-Marco & Riehm, Tobias, 2025, "Auctions vs. negotiations: The role of communication in an experiment with procurement managers," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-039.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2025, "Congestion management games in electricity markets," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-044.

2024

• Meg Snyder & Daniel Bragen & Matthew Rousu & Christopher M. Snyder, 2024, "Money Isn’t Everything: Estimating the Prestige Value of Winning Cutthroat Kitchen from Overbidding in Sabotage Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32070, Jan.
• Kristian Blickle & Zhiguo He & Jing Huang & Cecilia Parlatore, 2024, "Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32155, Feb.
• Jackson Dorsey & Derek C. Wolfson, 2024, "Unequal Uptake: Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32814, Aug.
• Marleen R. Marra & Nathan H. Miller & Gretchen Sileo, 2024, "Phoning Home: The Procurement of Telecommunications for Incarcerated Individuals in the United States," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33292, Dec.
• Dakshina G. De Silva & Benjamin Rosa, 2024, "Highway Procurement During the Great Recession and Stimulus," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33299, Dec.
• Stjepan Srhoj & Melko Dragojević, 2024, "Public Procurement and Supplier Job Creation: Insights from Auctions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 2, pages 470-527.
• Pablo Montagnes & Richard Van Weelden, 2024, "On the incentives to exacerbate polarization," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 3, pages 854-890.
• Daniel G Garrett, 2024, "Conflicts of Interest in Municipal Bond Advising and Underwriting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 37, issue 12, pages 3835-3876.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer & Edwin Lock, 2024, "Implementing Walrasian Equilibrium: The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 1060, Dec.
• Hikmet Gunay & Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar, 2024, "Experiments on the Different Numbers of Bidders in Sequential Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, number 2024-530, DOI: 10.18800/2079-8474.0530.
• Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024, "Information Requirements for Mechanism Design," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 24-035, Oct.
• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Cerjak, Marija & Kovačić, Damir & Juračak, Josip, 2024, "To be(tween) or not to be(tween)? Combining between- and within-subjects design characteristics in preference elicitation for organic and local apples," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120880, May.
• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Palma, Marco & Feldman, Paul, 2024, "Incentives and Payment Mechanisms in Preference Elicitation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120898, May.
• Enzo Rossi, 2024, "Swiss treasury bill auctions: a review," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2024-12.
• Mauricio Bugarin & Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado, 2024, "Endogenous Asymmetry in Sequential Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2024_21, Jul.
• Mario Blazquez Paz, 2024, "Production or transmission investments? A comparative analysis," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 51, issue 4, pages 957-1000, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-024-00318-z.
• Arijit Mukherjee & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2024, "Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 17-24, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1.
• Daniel Marszalec, 2024, "Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 215-242, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z.
• Jeongwoo Lee & Jaeok Park, 2024, "Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 4, pages 1085-1126, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01518-9.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Auctions with resale at a later date," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 843-875, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6.
• Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2024, "Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 4, pages 1233-1273, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01580-x.
• Dmitriy Knyazev, 2024, "Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 3, pages 1073-1075, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4.
• Rajesh Kumar Acha & Sumit Sarkar, 2024, "A Note on Bankruptcy Auction with a Fair Bidder," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 1, pages 211-221, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-023-00372-9.
• Ceesay Muhammed, 2024, "Collusion with Not-So-Secret Rings," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 2, pages 563-570, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-024-00387-w.
• Swaminathan Rammohan & Rahul R. Marathe & Nandan Sudarsanam, 2024, "Recent advancements in revenue management of taxi services: a systematic review and research agenda," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, volume 74, issue 2, pages 1029-1055, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11301-023-00326-8.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Fumihiro Yonekura, 2024, "King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 1-19, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8.
• Ricardo Gonçalves & Indrajit Ray, 2024, "Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 125-150, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7.
• Steven R. Williams & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, 2024, "The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 151-187, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6.
• Jianxin Yi, 2024, "A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 331-345, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 455-483, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5.
• Inácio Bó & Jörgen Kratz & Makoto Shimoji, 2024, "Generalized cumulative offer processes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 3, pages 573-591, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4.
• Romans Pancs, 2024, "A vaccine auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 4, pages 763-780, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9.
• Eberhard Feess & Arthur Grimes & Yigit Saglam & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2024, "Simultaneous Versus Sequential Learning of Valuations: Theory and Evidence From House Sales," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2024-06, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2024, "Spatial Search," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 24-015/VIII, Feb.
• Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2024, "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-776, May.
• Jackson Dorsey & Derek Wolfson, 2024, "Unequal Uptake: Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, volume 11, issue S1, pages 71-109, DOI: 10.1086/732840.
• Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2024, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 132, issue 4, pages 1209-1246, DOI: 10.1086/727284.
• Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024, "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics, University of Cyprus Department of Economics, number 04-2024, Jun.
• Gretschko Vitali & Ockenfels Axel & Wambach Achim, 2024, "Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt," Wirtschaftsdienst, Paradigm, volume 104, issue 11, pages 794-799, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2024-0202.
• Waterson, Michael & Wojciechowska , Olga, 2024, "Individual bidder behaviour in repeated auctions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1498.
• Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024, "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1516.
• Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2024, "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA, number 83.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2024, "Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-025.
• Chiappinelli, Olga & Dalò, Ambrogio & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2024, "The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-060.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Simon, Jasmina, 2024, "An efficient dynamic mechanism with covert information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-081.
• Ryan Oprea, 2024, "Decisions under Risk Are Decisions under Complexity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 12, pages 3789-3811, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221227.
• Bernardus Van Doornik & Armando Gomes & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2024, "Financial Access and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Credit Lotteries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 6, pages 1854-1881, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230585.
• Nina Bobkova, 2024, "Information Choice in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 7, pages 1883-1915, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221297.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 8, pages 2553-2595, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230478.
• Nima Haghpanah & Aditya Kuvalekar & Elliot Lipnowski, 2024, "Buying from a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 8, pages 2596-2632, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230914.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Patrick Rey, 2024, "Coordination in the Fight against Collusion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 224-261, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220194.
• Marzena Rostek & Ji Hee Yoon, 2024, "Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Technology versus Synthetic Products," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 63-109, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220138.
• Shengmao Cao & Lisa Xuejie Yi & Chuan Yu, 2024, "Competitive Bidding in Drug Procurement: Evidence from China," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 3, pages 481-513, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220505.
• Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & David C. Parkes & Richard Steinberg, 2024, "Combinatorial Auctions in Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 62, issue 2, pages 517-553, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20221679.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Kareen Rozen, 2024, "Bounded Rationality in Choice Theory: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 62, issue 3, pages 995-1039, September, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20231592.
• Shengwu Li, 2024, "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 38, issue 4, pages 175-192, Fall, DOI: 10.1257/jep.38.4.175.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024, "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 288, Mar.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2024, "Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 334, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Michael C. Wang, 2024, "Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2401.12366, Jan, revised Jun 2026.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2024, "The Benefits from Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2402.07277, Feb, revised Sep 2025.
• Shengwu Li, 2024, "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2403.18694, Mar, revised Jul 2024.
• Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024, "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2412.12676, Dec, revised Dec 2025.
• Dongwoo Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2024, "Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impact of Ad quality on search revenue," CeMMAP working papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number 16/24, Aug, DOI: 10.47004/wp.cem.2024.1624.
• Jason Allen & Ali Hortaçsu & Eric Richert & Milena Wittwer, 2024, "Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 24-29, Jul, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2024-29.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo Maria Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2024, "Procuring survival," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 1439, Feb.
• Audrey Guo & Rodrigo Carril, 2024, "The Impact of Preference Programs in Public Procurement: Evidence from Veteran Set-Asides," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1417, Jan.
• Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2024, "Carrots and sticks: collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2407.
• Aner Sela & Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi, 2024, "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2408.
• Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024, "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2409.
• Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2024, "Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 72, issue 1, pages 253-283, March, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12354.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2024, "Procuring Survival," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 72, issue 4, pages 1451-1506, December, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12395.
• Benjamin V Rosa, 2024, "Subcontracting requirements and the cost of government procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 55, issue 1, pages 3-32, March, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12456.
• Charlotte Grace, 2024, "Competing models of the Bank of England’s liquidity auctions: truthful bidding is a good approximation," Bank of England Staff Working Paper series, Bank of England, number 1061, Feb.
• Natalya Presman & Tanya Suhoy, 2024, "How have government housing programs affected developers' bids in Israel Land Authority land tenders?," Bank of Israel Working Papers, Bank of Israel, number 2024.08, Sep.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024, "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_519, Mar.
• Vitali Gretschko & Jasmina Simon, 2024, "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_616, Dec.
• Jeong Seungwon (Eugene), 2024, "A Note on a Moment Inequality," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 1, pages 435-440, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2023-0045.
• Kim Sanghoon, 2024, "Information Disclosure by Informed Intermediary in Double Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 2, pages 691-728, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0026.
• Morita Rubens & Psaradakis Zacharias & Sola Martin & Yunis Patricio, 2024, "On testing for bubbles during hyperinflations," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, volume 28, issue 1, pages 25-37, February, DOI: 10.1515/snde-2022-0014.
• Wladimir Andreff, 2024, "Le sport aux enchères : la malédiction du vainqueur," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, volume 0, issue 2, pages 17-27.
• Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024, "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Working Papers, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics, number 365, Dec.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2024, "Optimal (Non-) Disclosure Defaults," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 346, Apr.
• Sudhir A. Shah, 2024, "A dual formulation of bidding behaviour in sealed bid auctions," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 349, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff & Pieter A. Gautier, 2024, "Spatial Search," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10978.
• Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Pallavi Pal & Arnab Palit, 2024, "Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11035.
• Kris De Jaegher & Michal Šoltés & Vitezslav Titl, 2024, "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11603.
• Filippo Cavaleri & Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2024, "The Demand for Safe Assets," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 24-110, Dec.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Smeers, Yves & Papavasiliou, Anthony, 2024, "Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3281, Mar, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Papavasiliou, Anthony & Smeers, Yves, 2024, "On some advantages of convex hull pricing for the European electricity auction," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3288, Apr, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.202.
• Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Rovigatti, Gabriele, 2024, "Procuring Survival," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18796, Jan.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2024, "Spatial Search," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18858, Feb.
• Barkley, Aaron & Genesove, David & Hansen, James, 2024, "Haggle or Hammer? Dual-Mechanism Housing Search," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19262, Jul.
• Marra, Marleen, 2024, "A Market for Airport Slots," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19442, Sep.
• Baldwin, Elizabeth & Klemperer, Paul & Lock, Edwin, 2024, "Implementing Walrasian Equilibrium: the Languages of Product-Mix Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19457, Sep.
• Breckenfelder, Johannes & Collin-Dufresne, Pierre & Corradin, Stefano, 2024, "Is the Bond Market Competitive? Evidence from the ECB's Asset Purchase Program," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19582, Oct.
• Mats Kröger, 2024, "Cream-skimming through PPAs – Interactions between Private and Public Long-term Contracts for Renewable Energy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2092.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024, "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2024-10, May.
• Wossen, Tesfamicheal & Spielman, David J. & Alene, Arega D. & Abdoulaye, Tahirou, 2024, "Estimating seed demand in the presence of market frictions: Evidence from an auction experiment in Nigeria," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103242.
• Dentler, Alexander & Rossi, Enzo, 2024, "Public debt management announcements: A welfare-theoretic analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106561.
• Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco & Wang, Zijia, 2024, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with affiliated values," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106870.
• Shannon, Darren & Dowling, Michael & Zhaf, Marjan & Sheehan, Barry, 2024, "Dutch auction dynamics in non-fungible token (NFT) markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106882.
• Grundl, Serafin & Zhu, Yu, 2024, "Two results on auctions with endogenous entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111500.
• Burguet, Roberto & Sákovics, József, 2024, "Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111656.
• Chiappinelli, Olga & Seres, Gyula, 2024, "Optimal discounts in green public procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 238, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705.
• Faye, Benoit & Le Fur, Eric, 2024, "Heterogeneous buyer preferences behind rejecting the law of one price in the fine wines market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 239, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111744.
• De Stefano, Martino & Moresi, Serge, 2024, "Merger simulation in second-score auctions: A nested logit model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111787.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2024, "Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111827.
• Zincenko, Federico, 2024, "Estimation and inference of seller’s expected revenue in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 241, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2024.105734.
• Levine, David K. & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore, 2024, "The tripartite auction folk theorem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104656.
• Bajoori, Elnaz & Peeters, Ronald & Wolk, Leonard, 2024, "Security auctions with cash- and equity-bids: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104702.
• Pierre, Erwan & Schneider, Lorenz, 2024, "Intermittently coupled electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107327.
• Stevens, Nicolas & Papavasiliou, Anthony & Smeers, Yves, 2024, "On some advantages of convex hull pricing for the European electricity auction," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107542.
• Puiu, Ioan Alexandru & Hauser, Raphael Andreas, 2024, "On market clearing of day ahead auctions for European power markets: Consumer payment minimisation versus social welfare maximisation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107880.
• Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) & Lee, Joosung, 2024, "The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 191-203, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012.
• Chen, Bo & Chen, Bo, 2024, "Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 204-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.010.
• Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024, "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 54-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.003.
• Haimanko, Ori, 2024, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, pages 222-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007.
• Dharanan, G.V.A. & Ellis, Alex, 2024, "Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 1-18, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.003.
• Weichselbaumer, Michael, 2024, "Competition after mergers near review thresholds," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103066.
• Marra, Marleen & Oswald, Florian, 2024, "Ownership frictions in a procurement market: Evidence from London buses," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103080.
• Allende, Claudia & Atal, Juan Pablo & Carril, Rodrigo & Cuesta, José Ignacio & González-Lira, Andrés, 2024, "Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103086.
• Adelowo, Jacqueline & Bohland, Moritz, 2024, "Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108.
• Huang, Shaoqing & Xie, Weisi & Xu, Xiaoshu, 2024, "Bureaucracy-business relationship, corruption and the implications for marketization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 52, issue 3, pages 634-644, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2024.06.004.
• Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024, "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, pages 63-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.038.
• Kotakorpi, Kaisa & Nurminen, Tuomas & Miettinen, Topi & Metsälampi, Satu, 2024, "Bearing the burden — Implications of tax reporting institutions on evasion and incidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, pages 81-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.021.
• Landi, Massimiliano & Menicucci, Domenico, 2024, "Allocating vehicle registration permits," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 221, issue C, pages 327-349, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.020.
• Jamal, Karim & Maier, Michael & Sunder, Shyam, 2024, "Emergence of information aggregation to rational expectations equilibria in markets populated by biased heuristic traders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 228, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106700.
• Severinov, Sergei & Virag, Gabor, 2024, "Who wants to be an auctioneer?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105820.
• Huang, Wenqian & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2024, "CCP auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105826.
• Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024, "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105837.
• Auster, Sarah & Gottardi, Piero, 2024, "Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105883.
• Bayona, Anna & Manzano, Carolina, 2024, "Competition in schedules with cursed traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 222, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105935.
• Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2024, "The role of information in auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 114, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027.
• Shinozaki, Hiroki, 2024, "Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103066.
• Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2024, "Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 1-5, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004.
• Zhang, Xieji, 2024, "The ascending auction with flexible reporting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 28-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003.
• Burguet, Roberto & Iossa, Elisabetta & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2024, "Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506.
• Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka A., 2024, "A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102221.
• Tabaqchali, Ahmed, 2024, "A fistful of Dinars: demystifying Iraq’s dollar auction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 122652, Apr.
• Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio & Parkes, David C. & Steinberg, Richard, 2024, "Combinatorial auctions in practice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 124108, Jun.
• Olga Chiappinelli & Ambrogio Dalò & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024, "The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2024/474.
• Francisco Robles & Marina Núñez & Laura Robles, 2024, "Monotonic transformation of preferences and Walrasian equilibrium in allocation problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2024/478.
• Roberto Pinheiro, 2024, "Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Costless Communication," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, number 24-21, Oct, DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202421.
• Muhammed Ceesay & Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2024, "Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2024_20.rdf.