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Identification in english auctions with shill bidding

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  • Guillermo Marshall

    (University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business)

Abstract

What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillermo Marshall, 2024. "Identification in english auctions with shill bidding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 193-222, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:22:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s11129-023-09274-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Partial identification; Shill bidding; eBay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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