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Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing

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  • Thomas R. Covert
  • Richard L. Sweeney

Abstract

This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 55 percent larger up-front payments and 40 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2023. "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(3), pages 628-663, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:113:y:2023:i:3:p:628-63
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191594
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
    2. V. Chernozhukov & I. Fernández-Val & A. Galichon, 2009. "Improving point and interval estimators of monotone functions by rearrangement," Biometrika, Biometrika Trust, vol. 96(3), pages 559-575.
    3. James W. Roberts, 2013. "Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 712-732, December.
    4. Yunmi Kong, 2020. "Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 840-867, September.
    5. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-883, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Evan Herrnstadt & Ryan Kellogg & Eric Lewis, 2024. "Drilling Deadlines and Oil and Gas Development," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(1), pages 29-60, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
    • Q35 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Hydrocarbon Resources

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