Do Farmers Value The Environment? Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program Auctions
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25233
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- Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Xiaoyong & Marra, Michele & Levy, Armando, 2008. "Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1323-1332, November.
References listed on IDEAS
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