Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions
This paper analyzes the role of private information in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. In these auctions, firms bid a per unit price for each timber species. Total bids are computed by multiplying these prices by Forest Service volume estimates, but payments depend on actual volumes harvested. We develop an equilibrium theory for these auctions. We then relate (ex post) data about volume to (ex ante) bids. We show that bidders have private information about volumes of species and use it as predicted by theory. Differences in bidder estimates appear to affect the allocation of tracts, but competition limits information rents.
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|Date of creation:||Jun 1999|
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- Che, Y.K., 1991.
"Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions,"
9123, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
- Harstad, Ronald M. & Michael H. Rothkopf, 1995.
"An "Alternating Recognition" Model of English Auctions,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
348, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf, 2000. "An "Alternating Recognition" Model of English Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(1), pages 1-12, January.
- Haile,P.A., 1999. "Auctions with resale," Working papers 33, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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