Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2022

• Clarissa Lotti & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2022, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 532, Feb, revised 01 Feb 2022.
• Matteo Bizzarri, 2022, "Multilateral Market Power in Input-output Networks," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 648, Jun, revised 23 Mar 2026.
• Alexander Dentler & Enzo Rossi, 2022, "Public debt management announcements under "beat-the-market" opportunities," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2022-06.
• Satoshi Takahashi & Yoichi Izunaga & Naoki Watanabe, 2022, "An experimental study of VCG mechanism for multi-unit auctions: competing with machine bidders," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, volume 19, issue 1, pages 97-117, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40844-021-00198-1.
• Marc T. P. Adam & Jan Krämer, 2022, "Evaluating the emotional bidding framework: new evidence from a decade of neurophysiology," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 32, issue 3, pages 1529-1540, September, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-022-00555-x.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2022, "Auctions with resale and risk aversion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 117-128, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00221-7.
• Seewoo Lee & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2022, "Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 293-302, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00234-2.
• Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022, "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 8, issue 1, pages 45-55, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-022-00119-x.
• Christian Ewerhart, 2022, "A “fractal” solution to the chopstick auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1025-1041, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1052-1.
• Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022, "All-pay auctions with ties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1183-1231, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01195-7.
• Wojciech Olszewski & Ron Siegel, 2022, "Large contests without single crossing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1043-1055, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01244-1.
• Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2022, "Two-stage contests with preferences over style," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1141-1161, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01388-z.
• Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2022, "Introduction to the Special Issue on Contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1017-1023, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01470-0.
• Pranjal Chandrakar & Shubhabrata Das & Manaswini Bhalla, 2022, "Lease Auctions with Retention Options," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 20, issue 1, pages 97-136, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-021-00279-3.
• Benjamin Kang & James Unwin, 2022, "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, volume 15, issue 2, pages 145-160, August, DOI: 10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8.
• Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2022, "Round-robin tournaments with limited resources," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 59, issue 3, pages 525-583, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01402-w.
• Andrea Gallice & Giuseppe Sorrenti, 2022, "Curious about the price? Consumers’ behavior in price reveal auctions," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 29, issue 9, pages 831-834, May, DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1893263.
• Lauermann, Stephan & Wolinsky, Asher, 2022, "A common-value auction with state-dependent participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2022, "Progressive participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Ma, X. & Noussair, C.N. & Renneboog, Luc, 2022, "Colors, emotions, and the auction value of paintings," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6e02bd92-e90d-4b93-a066-4.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2022, "Meetings and Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-727, Jul.
• JoonHwan Cho & Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2022, "Deconvolution from Two Order Statistics," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-739, Oct.
• Motta, Massimo & Penta, Antonio, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 22-1370, Oct.
• Christopher S. Cotton & Brent R. Hickman & Joseph P. Price, 2022, "Affirmative Action and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 40, issue 1, pages 157-185, DOI: 10.1086/713743.
• Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022, "Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1824, Mar.
• Massimo Motta & Antonio Penta, 2022, "Market effects of sponsored search auctions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1844, Jun.
• Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2022, "Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, pages 505-543, May, DOI: 10.3982/QE1151.
• Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2022, "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, pages 787-823, May, DOI: 10.3982/QE1692.
• Sang-Hyun Kim & Chulyoung Kim & Jaeok Park & Jinhyuk Lee, 2022, "First-Price and Second-Price Auctions with Externalities: An Experimental Study," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2022rwp-199, Aug.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2022, "An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Item Ascending Auction under Financial Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 22/02, May.
• Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2022, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-016.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2022, "Congestion management games in electricity markets," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-060.
• Riehm, Tobias, 2022, "Motivated beliefs in auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-062.
• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022, "On market prices in double auctions," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 404, Feb.
• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022, "Markets and transaction costs," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 405, Feb, revised Sep 2022.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 343-368, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210496.
• Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022, "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1703-1736, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864.
• Kirby Nielsen & John Rehbeck, 2022, "When Choices Are Mistakes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 7, pages 2237-2268, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201550.
• Pavlo Blavatskyy & Andreas Ortmann & Valentyn Panchenko, 2022, "On the Experimental Robustness of the Allais Paradox," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 143-163, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190153.
• Alexander MacKay, 2022, "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 164-212, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200128.
• Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser, 2022, "Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 622-664, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200027.
• Bin Liu & Jingfeng Lu, 2022, "Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 25-57, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200171.
• Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina G. De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2022, "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 394-419, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200216.
• Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2022, "License Complementarity and Package Bidding: US Spectrum Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 420-464, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210091.
• Xiaogang Che & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2022, "Deposit Requirements in Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 465-493, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200206.
• E. Glen Weyl & Anthony Lee Zhang, 2022, "Depreciating Licenses," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 422-448, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200426.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 3, pages 371-388, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504.
• B. Douglas Bernheim & Rebecca Royer & Charles Sprenger, 2022, "Robustness of Rank Independence in Risky Choice," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 415-420, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221090.
• Drew Fudenberg & Indira Puri, 2022, "Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 421-425, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221091.
• Marina Agranov & Pietro Ortoleva, 2022, "Revealed Preferences for Randomization: An Overview," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 426-430, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221093.
• Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2022, "Sovereign Debt Auctions in Turbulent Times," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 526-530, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221001.
• Olesea SPEIAN, 2022, "The Role Of The Primary Dealers In The Government Securities Market," Eastern European Journal for Regional Studies (EEJRS), Center for Studies in European Integration (CSEI), Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova (ASEM), volume 8, issue 2, pages 68-81, December, DOI: https://doi.org/10.53486/2537-6179..
• Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2022, "Flow Trading," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 146, Feb.
• Sarah Auster & Piero Gottardi, 2022, "Sorting versus Screening in Decentralized Markets with Adverse Selection," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 180, Jul.
• Shraman Banerjee, 2022, "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," Working Papers, Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics, number 2022-02, Mar.
• Shanglyu Deng, 2022, "Speculation in Procurement Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2203.03044, Mar, revised May 2022.
• Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2022, "Identification of Auction Models Using Order Statistics," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2205.12917, May, revised Apr 2023.
• Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2022, "Never Say Never: Optimal Exclusion and Reserve Prices with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Buyers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.10938, Oct, revised Jun 2023.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2212.03360, Dec, revised Mar 2025.
• Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker & Rodrigo Carril, 2022, "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1327, Mar.
• Antonio Penta & Massimo Motta, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1356, Jun.
• Aner Sela & Amit Yeshayahu, 2022, "Contests with identity-dependent externalities," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2203.
• Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2022, "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2204.
• Aner Sela, 2022, "Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2205.
• Aner Sela, 2022, "Status Classification By Lottery Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2206.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2022, "The economics of social data," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 53, issue 2, pages 263-296, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12407.
• Sarah Auster & Piero Gottardi, 2022, "Sorting Versus Screening in Decentralized Markets With Adverse Selection," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_362, Aug.
• Hongbin Li & Lei Li & Hong Ma, 2022, "China’s Skill-Biased Imports," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_363, Aug.
• Ju Biung-Ghi & Yoo Seung Han, 2022, "Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 22, issue 1, pages 199-231, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0143.
• Gupta Neha, 2022, "Effectiveness of Auctions in Securing Price Support for Farmers: The Case of a Grain Market in India," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, volume 20, issue 2, pages 99-117, December, DOI: 10.1515/jafio-2021-0005.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Optimal Reserve Prices," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 22/07, Mar.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Reserve Prices as Signals," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 22/10, Feb.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022, "Procuring Survival," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10124.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Reserve Prices as Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9581.
• Kaisa Kotakorpiⓡ & Tuomas Nurminenⓡ & Topi Miettinen ⓡ & Satu Metsälampiⓡ & Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2022, "Bearing the Burden - Implications of Tax Reporting Institutions and Image Concerns on Evasion and Incidence," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9791.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2022, "Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9900.
• Jacqueline Adelowo & Moritz Bohland, 2022, "Redesigning Automated Market Power Mitigation in Electricity Markets," ifo Working Paper Series, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 387.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen & Sorokin, Constantine & Winter, Eyal, 2022, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16858, Jan.
• Lotti, Clarissa & Muco, Arieda & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2022, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17019, Feb.
• Motta, Massimo & Penta, Antonio, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17401, Jun.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17502, Jul.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro, 2022, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17544, Sep.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2338, Jul.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2338R, Dec.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2022, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2343, Aug.
• Mats Kröger & Karsten Neuhoff & Jörn C. Richstein, 2022, "Contracts for Difference Support the Expansion of Renewable Energy Sources while Reducing Electricity Price Risks," DIW Weekly Report, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 12, issue 35/36, pages 205-213.
• Mats Kröger & Karsten Neuhoff & Jörn C. Richstein, 2022, "Differenzverträge fördern den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien und mindern Strompreisrisiken," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 89, issue 35, pages 439-447.
• Mats Kröger & Karsten Neuhoff & Jörn C. Richstein, 2022, "Discriminatory Auction Design for Renewable Energy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2013.
• Eric Darmon, 2022, "Bids for Speed: An empirical Study of Investment Strategy Automation in a Peer-to-Business Lending Platform," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2022-2.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Tomas Serebrisky, 2022, "When can Lotteries improve Public Procurement Processes?," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2022-22, Jun.
• Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2022, "Strategic Foundations of Rational Expectations," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4042, Aug.
• Shahi Md. Tanvir Alam, 2022, "Renewable Energy (Solar and Wind) Generation and its Effect on some Variables for Selected EU Countries with Panel VAR Model," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, volume 12, issue 5, pages 303-310, September.
• Anufriev, Mikhail & Arifovic, Jasmina & Ledyard, John & Panchenko, Valentyn, 2022, "The role of information in a continuous double auction: An experiment and learning model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104387.
• Bao, Te, 2022, "Comments on “the role of information in a continuous double auction: An experiment and learning model” by Mikhail Anufriev, Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard and Valentyn Panchenko," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104388.
• Cho, Myeonghwan & Song, Joon, 2022, "Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110176.
• Sela, Aner, 2022, "Effort allocations in elimination tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110261.
• Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi & Zeng, Xianjie, 2022, "Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110526.
• Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Press, Robert, 2022, "Supply side effects of infrastructure spending," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110642.
• Vikram, Aditya, 2022, "A top-only mechanism with reserve price for single-good allocation problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110646.
• Maslov, Alexander & Noiset, Luc & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022, "A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110728.
• Foster, Joshua, 2022, "Semi-nonparametric estimation of secret reserve prices in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110843.
• Jun, Sung Jae & Zincenko, Federico, 2022, "Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 226, issue 2, pages 295-320, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.11.015.
• Choo, Lawrence & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2022, "Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103958.
• Ma, Marshall Xiaoyin & Noussair, Charles N. & Renneboog, Luc, 2022, "Colors, Emotions, and the Auction Value of Paintings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.104004.
• De Silva, Dakshina G. & Gertsberg, Marina & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pownall, Rachel A.J., 2022, "Evolution of a dealer trading network and its effects on art auction prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104083.
• Mill, Wladislaw & Morgan, John, 2022, "Competition between friends and foes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104171.
• Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Ratan, Anmol, 2022, "Disentangling risk aversion and loss aversion in first-price auctions: An empirical approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104284.
• Álvarez, Francisco & del Río, Pablo, 2022, "Is small always beautiful? Analyzing the efficiency effects of size heterogeneity in renewable electricity auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105698.
• Csercsik, Dávid, 2022, "Convex combinatorial auction of pipeline network capacities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106084.
• Wang, Baixue & Duan, Maosheng, 2022, "Consignment auctions of emissions trading systems: An agent-based approach based on China’s practice," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106187.
• Yiakoumi, Despina & Rouaix, Agathe & Phimister, Euan, 2022, "Evaluating capacity auction design for electricity: An experimental analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106370.
• Wrede, Matthias, 2022, "The influence of state politics on solar energy auction results," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 168, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113130.
• Kammoun, Manel & Power, Gabriel J. & Tandja M, Djerry C., 2022, "Capital market reactions to project finance loans," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 45, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102115.
• Park, Seongkyu “Gilbert” & Suen, Wing & Wan, Kam-Ming, 2022, "Call auction design and closing price manipulation: Evidence from the Hong Kong stock exchange," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2021.100700.
• Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2022, "Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, pages 1-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008.
• Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022, "Price discovery using a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, pages 57-83, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.001.
• Rosa, Benjamin V., 2022, "Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 189-203, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.009.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2022, "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 234-239, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.007.
• Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022, "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 256-281, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.005.
• Chawla, Shuchi & Teng, Yifeng & Tzamos, Christos, 2022, "Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 104-116, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.003.
• Chawla, Shuchi & Devanur, Nikhil R. & Karlin, Anna R. & Sivan, Balasubramanian, 2022, "Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 344-360, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.012.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022, "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 79-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.013.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2022, "Universal high-speed broadband provision: A simple auction approach," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100994.
• Bohland, Moritz & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2022, "Renewable support and strategic pricing in electricity markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102792.
• Nakanishi, Yoshinobu, 2022, "Determinants of the number of bidders and win-reserve ratio in open competitive tendering: Relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2022.101147.
• Fecht, Falko & Weber, Patrick, 2022, "Private value of central bank liquidity and Banks’ bidding behavior in variable rate tender auctions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106221.
• Garay, Urbi & Puggioni, Gavino & Molina, German & ter Horst, Enrique, 2022, "A Bayesian dynamic hedonic regression model for art prices," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 310-323, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.06.055.
• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo M., 2022, "Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities, and cognitive load," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, pages 49-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.006.
• Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim & Wu, Tingting, 2022, "Shill bidding and information in eBay auctions: A Laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, pages 341-360, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.08.010.
• Auster, Sarah & Kellner, Christian, 2022, "Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105072.
• Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022, "The limits of meritocracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105414.
• Balzer, Benjamin & Rosato, Antonio & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2022, "Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105545.
• Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022, "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105555.
• Zhang, Anthony Lee, 2022, "Competition and manipulation in derivative contract markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 144, issue 2, pages 396-413, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.02.001.
• Shi, Song & Zhang, Hong & Zhang, Jun, 2022, "The impact of a home purchase restrictions (HPR) policy on the distressed property market in Beijing," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, volume 58, issue PB, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2022.101877.
• Chui, Peter M.W. & Fong, Lawrence Hoc Nang & Ren, Jinjuan & Tam, Lewis H.K., 2022, "Anchoring effects in repeated auctions of homogeneous objects: Evidence from Macao," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102514.
• Maréchal, François & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2022, "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 73, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102140.
• Foster, Joshua & Haley, M. Ryan, 2022, "Charity auctions as assets: Theory and simulations of fundraising risk management in mean-variance space," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2022.101319.
• Bahia, Kalvin & Castells, Pau, 2022, "The impact of spectrum assignment policies on consumer welfare," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 46, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2021.102228.
• Ivaldi, Marc & Petrova, Milena & Urdanoz, Miguel, 2022, "Airline cooperation effects on airfare distribution: An auction-model-based approach," Transport Policy, Elsevier, volume 115, issue C, pages 239-250, DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2021.11.006.
• Gentry, Matthew & Komarova, Tatiana & Schiraldi, Pasquale, 2023, "Preferences and performance in simultaneous first-price auctions: a structural analysis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 115627, Mar.
• Gian Luigi Albano & Maria Grazia Santocchia, 2022, "A case study on bid rigging in centralized procurement of audit consulting services in Italy," Journal of Public Procurement, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 22, issue 2, pages 145-163, March, DOI: 10.1108/JOPP-08-2021-0050.
• Kaisa Kotakorpi & Tuomas Nurminen & Topi Miettinen & Satu Metsälampi, 2022, "Bearing the burden – Implications of tax reporting institutions and image concerns on evasion and incidence," Working Papers, Finnish Centre of Excellence in Tax Systems Research, number 3, Nov.
• Belev Sergey & Moguchev Nikita & Matveev Evgeniy, 2022, "Methodological approaches to forecasting non-oil and non-gas tax revenues of the budget system of the Russian Federation," Working Papers, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, number wpaper-2023-1258, revised 2022.
• Emmanuel Lorenzon, 2023, "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03558786, Jan, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0009.
• Pierre-Henri Morand & François Marechal, 2023, "Achats publics responsables et achat local : enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03842464.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2022, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04469151, Dec, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00823-2.
• Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2022, "Radical Activism and Self-regulation: An Optimal Campaign Mechanism," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03586793, Feb.
• Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2022, "Radical Activism and Self-regulation: An Optimal Campaign Mechanism," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03586793, Feb.
• Li, Zhi & Zhang, Da & Zhang, Xiliang, 2022, "Emissions Trading with Consignment Auctions: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment," EfD Discussion Paper, Environment for Development, University of Gothenburg, number 22-10, Jun.
• Blázquez, Mario & Koptyug, Nikita, 2022, "Equilibrium Selection in Hawk-Dove Games," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2022/12, Jun.
• Tierney, Ryan, 2022, "Incentives And Efficiency In Matching With Transfers: Towards Nonquasilinear Package Auctions," Discussion Papers on Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics, number 6/2022, Apr.
• Granlund, David & Meens-Eriksson, Sef, 2022, "Firms price discriminate based on suppliers’ relative distances to competitors," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1006, Aug, revised 05 Feb 2024.
• Sato, Takashi, 2022, "Impact of Grading System on Efficiency of Government Procurement," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, volume 73, issue 3, pages 193-209, July, DOI: 10.15057/74217.
• Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2022, "Different Number of Bidders in Sequential Auctions," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, volume 63, issue 1, pages 72-85, June, DOI: 10.15057/hje.2022004.
• Estache, Antonio & Foucart, Renaud & Serebrisky, Tomás, 2022, "When can lotteries improve public procurement processes?," IDB Publications (Working Papers), Inter-American Development Bank, number 12484, Oct, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004522.
• Bara Kim & Seung Han Yoo, 2022, "Grand Mechanism and Population Uncertainty," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 2204.
• Thomas Kittsteiner & Marion Ott & Richard Steinberg, 2022, "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, volume 33, issue 4, pages 1130-1137, December, DOI: 10.1287/isre.2021.1018.
• Krzysztof R. Apt & Jan Heering, 2022, "Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 7, issue 1, pages 113-129, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.004.
• Lamprini Zarpala & Dimitris Voliotis, 2022, "Blind portfolios’ auctions in two-rounds," Annals of Finance, Springer, volume 18, issue 4, pages 545-552, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10436-021-00386-4.
• Luis Mario García Lafuente & Asunción Mochón Sáez, 2022, "Competition effects in EU external aid supply tenders funded with the Pre-accession and Neighbourhood instruments," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, volume 49, issue 2, pages 461-484, May, DOI: 10.1007/s10663-021-09518-5.
• Yves Breitmoser & Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2022, "Obviousness around the clock," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 2, pages 483-513, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09720-z.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2022, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 3, pages 902-941, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09736-5.
• Maria Karmeliuk & Martin G. Kocher & Georg Schmidt, 2022, "Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 5, pages 1327-1348, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09769-4.
• Alexander Maslov, 2022, "Competition in online markets with auctions and posted prices," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 137, issue 2, pages 145-169, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-022-00784-w.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Tomas Serebrisky, 2022, "When can lotteries improve public procurement processes?," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 359001116.
• Octavian Strimbu, 2022, "Partial Verifiability Induced Contests," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 22.05, Apr.

2021

• Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021, "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 10, pages 3256-3298, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200988.
• Francesco Decarolis & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2021, "From Mad Men to Maths Men: Concentration and Buyer Power in Online Advertising," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 10, pages 3299-3327, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190811.
• Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021, "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 4, pages 1055-1091, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170297.
• Paul Milgrom, 2021, "Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 5, pages 1383-1405, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.111.5.1383.
• Milena Wittwer, 2021, "Connecting Disconnected Financial Markets?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 1, pages 252-282, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180314.
• M. Kathleen Ngangoué & Georg Weizsäcker, 2021, "Learning from Unrealized versus Realized Prices," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 2, pages 174-201, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180268.
• Jingfeng Lu & Lixin Ye & Xin Feng, 2021, "Orchestrating Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 420-465, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190114.
• Aaron Barkley, 2021, "Cost and Efficiency in Government Outsourcing: Evidence from the Dredging Industry," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 514-547, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190018.
• Maximilian Mihm & Lucas Siga, 2021, "A Behavioral Characterization of the Likelihood Ratio Order," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 3, issue 3, pages 353-366, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200408.
• David Dillenberger & Uzi Segal, 2021, "Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 3, issue 4, pages 455-470, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200728.
• Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 83, Aug.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2021, "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2104.09942, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021, "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2105.09375, May.
• Maria Betto & Matthew W. Thomas, 2021, "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Spillovers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2106.08496, Jun, revised Feb 2023.
• Bernhard Kasberger & Kyle Woodward, 2021, "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2112.11320, Dec, revised Apr 2023.
• Bernardus Van Doornik & Armando Gomes & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2021, "Financial Access and Labor Market Outcomes: evidence from credit lotteries," Working Papers Series, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department, number 547, Apr.
• Roberto Burguet & Elisabetta Iossa & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021, "Cartels and Bribes," GREEN Working Papers, GREEN, Centre for Research on Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy & Networks, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, number 16.
• Ksenia Shakhgildyan & Maris Goldmanis & Francesco Decarolis & Antonio Penta, 2021, "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1258, May.
• Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum & Juan-José Ganuza, 2021, "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1275, Jul.
• Aner Sela, 2021, "Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2103.
• Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2021, "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2104.
• Aner Sela, 2021, "Resource Allocations In Multi-Stage Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2105.
• Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2021, "Optimal Seedings in Interdependent Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2108.
• Wenqian Huang & Haoxiang Zhu, 2021, "CCP Auction Design," BIS Working Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 938, May.
• Blake A. Allison & Jason J. Lepore & Aric P. Shafran, 2021, "Prize Scarcity And Overdissipation In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 59, issue 1, pages 361-374, January, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12935.
• Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2021, "Auctions With Leaks About Early Bids: Analysis And Experimental Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 59, issue 2, pages 722-739, April, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12953.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021, "Auctions with signaling concerns," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 30, issue 2, pages 420-448, May, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12406.
• Erik Lundin, 2021, "Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 69, issue 3, pages 485-536, September, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12271.
• Charles J. Thomas, 2021, "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 69, issue 3, pages 730-741, September, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12249.
• Stefano Colombo & Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2021, "Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 23, issue 5, pages 1052-1073, October, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12534.
• Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Andrea Guido & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2021, "Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 23, issue 5, pages 1074-1101, October, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12504.