Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2023

• Wasser, Cédric & Zhang, Mengxi, 2023, "Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 90-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.004.
• McClellan, Andrew, 2023, "Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 173-180, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.008.
• Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2023, "Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 210-228, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011.
• Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner, 2023, "Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 99-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.009.
• Ehlers, Lars, 2023, "Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 411-422, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.016.
• Goyal, Saurav & Narayanan, Aroon, 2023, "Ex-post implementation with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 440-453, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.002.
• Carnehl, Christoph & Weiergraeber, Stefan, 2023, "Bidder asymmetries in procurement auctions: Efficiency vs. information – Evidence from railway passenger services," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102902.
• Wong, Tak-Yuen & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2023, "Securities auctions with pre-project information management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102929.
• Kasberger, Bernhard, 2023, "When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Li, Muxin, 2023, "Regulating online search in the EU: From the android case to the digital markets act and digital services act," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102983.
• Claeys, Grégory & Papioti, Chara & Tryphonides, Andreas, 2023, "Liquidity risk, market power and the informational effects of policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103732.
• Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G. & Marszalec, Daniel, 2023, "Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106945.
• Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco, 2023, "Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, pages 141-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.002.
• Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2023, "Radical activism and self-regulation: An optimal campaign mechanism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102789.
• Balmford, Ben & Collins, Joseph & Day, Brett & Lindsay, Luke & Peacock, James, 2023, "Pricing rules for PES auctions: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102889.
• Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023, "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594.
• Chen, Yi & Jungbauer, Thomas & Wang, Zhe, 2023, "The strategic decentralization of recruiting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105639.
• Deng, Shanglyu, 2023, "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105692.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023, "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105710.
• Sano, Ryuji, 2023, "Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105742.
• Harrison, Rodrigo & Parada-Contzen, Marcela & Villena, Marcelo, 2023, "Can auctions increase competition in the pension funds market? The Chilean experience," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 5, pages 975-993, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2023.07.002.
• Cohen, Chen & Lagziel, David & Levi, Ofer & Sela, Aner, 2023, "The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102820.
• Klingler, Sven & Sundaresan, Suresh, 2023, "Diminishing treasury convenience premiums: Effects of dealers’ excess demand and balance sheet constraints," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 55-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.01.002.
• Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Tsodikovich, Yevgeny & Viossat, Yannick, 2023, "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118706, Nov.
• David Newbery, 2023, "Regulation of access, fees, and investment planning of transmission in Great Britain," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2307, Apr.
• Edward Anderson & Pär Holmberg, 2023, "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2310, May.
• Agnieszka Kus, 2023, "Do the High Spectrum Prices Harm Consumers? Evidence from Poland," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, volume 0, issue 3, pages 415-437.
• Marina Núñez & Francisco Robles, 2023, "Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2023/440.
• Rodney Garratt & David Murphy & Travis D. Nesmith & Xiaopeng Wu, 2023, "Optimal Bidder Selection in Clearing House Default Auctions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 2023-033r1, May, revised 01 Aug 2024, DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2023.033r1.
• Isa Hafalir & Onur Kesten & Katerina Sherstyuk & Cong Tao, 2023, "When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 202310, Dec.
• Yann Raineau & Éric Giraud-Héraud & Sébastien Lecocq & Stéphanie Pérès & Alexandre Pons & Sophie Tempère, 2023, "When health-related claims impact environmental demand: Results of experimental auctions with Bordeaux wine consumers," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03869423, Feb, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107663.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023, "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04099021, Apr, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01498-w.
• Grégory Claeys & Chara Papioti & Andreas Tryphonides, 2023, "Liquidity risk, market power and the informational effects of policy," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04164592, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103732.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2023, "Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04198736, Jun, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12331.
• Anderson, Edward & Holmberg, Pär, 2023, "Multi-Unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-Unit Demand," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1460, May.
• Ganhammar, Kajsa, 2023, "Bidding Behaviour in Interdependent Markets for Electricity and Green Certificates," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2023:8, Aug.
• Berggreen, Steve & Mattisson, Linn, 2023, "The Curse of Bad Geography: Stagnant Water, Diseases, and Children’s Human Capital," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2023:11, Nov.
• Laséen, Stefan, 2023, "Central bank asset purchases: Insights from quantitative easing auctions of government bonds," Working Paper Series, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), number 419, Jan.
• Drake, Samielle & Xu, Fei, 2023, "Regulation and Competition in Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1013, May.
• Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2023, "Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1014, May, revised 13 Oct 2023.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2023, "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object allocation problems with payments: Externalities with income effects," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-135, Nov.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2023, "Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-136, Dec.
• Eric M. Aldrich & Daniel Friedman, 2023, "Order Protection Through Delayed Messaging," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 69, issue 2, pages 774-790, February, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4370.
• Eduardo Cardadeiro & João E. Gata, 2023, "Market-based allocation of airport slots: the PAUSE auction mechanism and extensions," Working Papers REM, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa, number 2023/0260, Feb.
• Sjur Didrik Flam, 2023, "Golden rule in cooperative commons," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 8, issue 1, pages 57-74, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002.
• Gian Caspari, 2023, "A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 8, issue 1, pages 75-96, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.003.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2023, "Correction to: The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 26, issue 1, pages 249-250, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09746-x.
• Astrid Gamba & Luca Stanca, 2023, "Mis-judging merit: the effects of adjudication errors in contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 26, issue 3, pages 550-587, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09785-4.
• Kelvin Mashisia Shikuku & Erwin Bulte & Carl Johan Lagerkvist & Nhuong Tran, 2023, "Endowments, expectations, and the value of food safety certification: experimental evidence from fish markets in Nigeria," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 26, issue 5, pages 1060-1084, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09809-7.
• Kathryn Graddy & Lara Loewenstein & Jianping Mei & Mike Moses & Rachel A. J. Pownall, 2023, "Empirical evidence of anchoring and loss aversion from art auctions," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 47, issue 2, pages 279-301, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-022-09459-2.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Resource allocations in the best-of-k ( $$k=2,3$$ k = 2 , 3 ) contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 139, issue 3, pages 235-260, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00827-w.
• Tim M. Zhou, 2023, "Auctions of failed banks: an analysis of losing bidders," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, volume 61, issue 1, pages 155-176, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01146-3.
• Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2023, "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit objectassignment problems with money," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-23-007, Dec.

2022

• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 343-368, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210496.
• Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022, "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1703-1736, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864.
• Kirby Nielsen & John Rehbeck, 2022, "When Choices Are Mistakes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 7, pages 2237-2268, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201550.
• Pavlo Blavatskyy & Andreas Ortmann & Valentyn Panchenko, 2022, "On the Experimental Robustness of the Allais Paradox," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 143-163, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190153.
• Alexander MacKay, 2022, "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 164-212, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200128.
• Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser, 2022, "Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 622-664, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200027.
• Bin Liu & Jingfeng Lu, 2022, "Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 25-57, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200171.
• Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina G. De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2022, "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 394-419, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200216.
• Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2022, "License Complementarity and Package Bidding: US Spectrum Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 420-464, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210091.
• Xiaogang Che & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2022, "Deposit Requirements in Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 465-493, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200206.
• E. Glen Weyl & Anthony Lee Zhang, 2022, "Depreciating Licenses," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 422-448, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200426.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 3, pages 371-388, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504.
• B. Douglas Bernheim & Rebecca Royer & Charles Sprenger, 2022, "Robustness of Rank Independence in Risky Choice," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 415-420, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221090.
• Drew Fudenberg & Indira Puri, 2022, "Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 421-425, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221091.
• Marina Agranov & Pietro Ortoleva, 2022, "Revealed Preferences for Randomization: An Overview," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 426-430, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221093.
• Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2022, "Sovereign Debt Auctions in Turbulent Times," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 526-530, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221001.
• Olesea SPEIAN, 2022, "The Role Of The Primary Dealers In The Government Securities Market," Eastern European Journal for Regional Studies (EEJRS), Center for Studies in European Integration (CSEI), Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova (ASEM), volume 8, issue 2, pages 68-81, December, DOI: https://doi.org/10.53486/2537-6179..
• Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2022, "Flow Trading," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 146, Feb.
• Sarah Auster & Piero Gottardi, 2022, "Sorting versus Screening in Decentralized Markets with Adverse Selection," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 180, Jul.
• Shraman Banerjee, 2022, "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," Working Papers, Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics, number 2022-02, Mar.
• Shanglyu Deng, 2022, "Speculation in Procurement Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2203.03044, Mar, revised May 2022.
• Bernhard Kasberger & Alexander Teytelboym, 2022, "The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2203.11783, Mar, revised Oct 2025.
• Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2022, "Identification of Auction Models Using Order Statistics," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2205.12917, May, revised Apr 2023.
• Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2022, "Never Say Never: Optimal Exclusion and Reserve Prices with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Buyers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.10938, Oct, revised Jun 2023.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2212.03360, Dec, revised Mar 2025.
• Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022, "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1327, Mar.
• Massimo Motta & Antonio Penta, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1356, Jun.
• Aner Sela & Amit Yeshayahu, 2022, "Contests with identity-dependent externalities," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2203.
• Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2022, "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2204.
• Aner Sela, 2022, "Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2205.
• Aner Sela, 2022, "Status Classification By Lottery Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2206.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2022, "The economics of social data," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 53, issue 2, pages 263-296, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12407.
• Sarah Auster & Piero Gottardi, 2022, "Sorting Versus Screening in Decentralized Markets With Adverse Selection," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_362, Aug.
• Hongbin Li & Lei Li & Hong Ma, 2022, "China’s Skill-Biased Imports," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_363, Aug.
• Ju Biung-Ghi & Yoo Seung Han, 2022, "Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 22, issue 1, pages 199-231, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0143.
• Gupta Neha, 2022, "Effectiveness of Auctions in Securing Price Support for Farmers: The Case of a Grain Market in India," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, volume 20, issue 2, pages 99-117, December, DOI: 10.1515/jafio-2021-0005.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Optimal Reserve Prices," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 22/07, Mar.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Reserve Prices as Signals," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 22/10, Feb.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022, "Procuring Survival," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10124.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Reserve Prices as Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9581.
• Kaisa Kotakorpiⓡ & Tuomas Nurminenⓡ & Topi Miettinen ⓡ & Satu Metsälampiⓡ, 2022, "Bearing the Burden - Implications of Tax Reporting Institutions and Image Concerns on Evasion and Incidence," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9791.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2022, "Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9900.
• Jacqueline Adelowo & Moritz Bohland, 2022, "Redesigning Automated Market Power Mitigation in Electricity Markets," ifo Working Paper Series, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 387.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen & Sorokin, Constantine & Winter, Eyal, 2022, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16858, Jan.
• Lotti, Clarissa & Muco, Arieda & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2022, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17019, Feb.
• Motta, Massimo & Penta, Antonio, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17401, Jun.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17502, Jul.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro, 2022, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17544, Sep.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2338, Jul.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2338R, Dec.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2022, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2343, Aug.
• Mats Kröger & Karsten Neuhoff & Jörn C. Richstein, 2022, "Contracts for Difference Support the Expansion of Renewable Energy Sources while Reducing Electricity Price Risks," DIW Weekly Report, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 12, issue 35/36, pages 205-213.
• Mats Kröger & Karsten Neuhoff & Jörn C. Richstein, 2022, "Differenzverträge fördern den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien und mindern Strompreisrisiken," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 89, issue 35, pages 439-447.
• Mats Kröger & Karsten Neuhoff & Jörn C. Richstein, 2022, "Discriminatory Auction Design for Renewable Energy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2013.
• Eric Darmon, 2022, "Bids for Speed: An empirical Study of Investment Strategy Automation in a Peer-to-Business Lending Platform," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2022-2.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Tomas Serebrisky, 2022, "When can Lotteries improve Public Procurement Processes?," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2022-22, Jun.
• Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2022, "Strategic Foundations of Rational Expectations," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4042, Aug.
• Shahi Md. Tanvir Alam, 2022, "Renewable Energy (Solar and Wind) Generation and its Effect on some Variables for Selected EU Countries with Panel VAR Model," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, volume 12, issue 5, pages 303-310, September.
• Anufriev, Mikhail & Arifovic, Jasmina & Ledyard, John & Panchenko, Valentyn, 2022, "The role of information in a continuous double auction: An experiment and learning model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104387.
• Bao, Te, 2022, "Comments on “the role of information in a continuous double auction: An experiment and learning model” by Mikhail Anufriev, Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard and Valentyn Panchenko," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104388.
• Cho, Myeonghwan & Song, Joon, 2022, "Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110176.
• Sela, Aner, 2022, "Effort allocations in elimination tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110261.
• Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi & Zeng, Xianjie, 2022, "Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110526.
• Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Press, Robert, 2022, "Supply side effects of infrastructure spending," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110642.
• Vikram, Aditya, 2022, "A top-only mechanism with reserve price for single-good allocation problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110646.
• Maslov, Alexander & Noiset, Luc & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022, "A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110728.
• Foster, Joshua, 2022, "Semi-nonparametric estimation of secret reserve prices in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110843.
• Jun, Sung Jae & Zincenko, Federico, 2022, "Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 226, issue 2, pages 295-320, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.11.015.
• Choo, Lawrence & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2022, "Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103958.
• Ma, Marshall Xiaoyin & Noussair, Charles N. & Renneboog, Luc, 2022, "Colors, Emotions, and the Auction Value of Paintings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.104004.
• De Silva, Dakshina G. & Gertsberg, Marina & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pownall, Rachel A.J., 2022, "Evolution of a dealer trading network and its effects on art auction prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104083.
• Mill, Wladislaw & Morgan, John, 2022, "Competition between friends and foes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104171.
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