Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2017

• Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017, "A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 177-179, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032.
• Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2017, "First-price auction implements efficient investments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 198-200, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.013.
• Shi, Yang & Xu, Hui & Wang, Mancang & Conroy, Paul, 2017, "Home bias in domestic art markets: Evidence from China," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 201-203, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.015.
• Mill, Wladislaw, 2017, "The spite motive in third price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 71-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.028.
• Hu, Yingyao, 2017, "The econometrics of unobservables: Applications of measurement error models in empirical industrial organization and labor economics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 200, issue 2, pages 154-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.002.
• An, Yonghong, 2017, "Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: A measurement error approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 200, issue 2, pages 326-343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.014.
• Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Ong, David & Segev, Ella, 2017, "Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 23-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.002.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017, "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 84-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.012.
• Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier, 2017, "Forestry auctions with interdependent values: Evidence from timber auctions," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 107-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2017.02.004.
• McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017, "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 34-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Choi, Syngjoo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2017, "An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 20-43, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.008.
• Wellman, Michael P. & Sodomka, Eric & Greenwald, Amy, 2017, "Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 339-372, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.007.
• Thompson, David R.M. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2017, "Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 583-623, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009.
• Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2017, "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 199-224, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.006.
• Li, Yunan, 2017, "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 225-253, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.006.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mukherjee, Conan, 2017, "Bidding rings: A bargaining approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 67-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007.
• Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017, "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 252-270, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.004.
• Gelder, Alan & Kovenock, Dan, 2017, "Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 444-455, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.008.
• Ben-Zwi, Oren, 2017, "Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 456-467, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.013.
• Bose, Subir & Daripa, Arup, 2017, "Shills and snipes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 507-516, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.010.
• Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2017, "Some further properties of the cumulative offer process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 656-665, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.006.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017, "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 78-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005.
• Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017, "Auctions with selective entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 104-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.016.
• Paes Leme, Renato, 2017, "Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 294-316, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.016.
• Wang, Hong, 2017, "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 48-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.12.003.
• Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob K., 2017, "Frontiers in spectrum auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 372-391, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.006.
• Janssen, Maarten & Karamychev, Vladimir, 2017, "Raising rivals’ cost in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 473-490, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.011.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 91-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.001.
• Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2017, "Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 165-187, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.005.
• Seres, Gyula, 2017, "Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 282-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.002.
• Koh, Youngwoo, 2017, "Incentive and sampling effects in procurement auctions with endogenous number of bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 393-426, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.006.
• Olimov, Jafar M. & Roe, Brian E., 2017, "Multidimensional quality sorting between online and offline auctions: The role of attribute transparency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 145-169, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.003.
• Marszalec, Daniel, 2017, "The impact of auction choice on revenue in treasury bill auctions – An empirical evaluation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 215-239, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.005.
• Daglish, Toby & Sağlam, Yiğit & Ho, Phuong, 2017, "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: A model for spectrum auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 63-98, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.04.004.
• Vadovič, Radovan, 2017, "Bidding behavior and price search in Internet auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 125-147, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.006.
• Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017, "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 148-174, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009.
• Platt, Brennan C., 2017, "Inferring ascending auction participation from observed bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 65-88, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.001.
• Sogo, Takeharu, 2017, "Effects of seller’s information disclosure in equity auctions requiring post-auction investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 166-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.005.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Auctions with bid credits and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 58-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.002.
• De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2017, "Subcontracting and the survival of plants in the road construction industry: A panel quantile regression analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 113-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.016.
• Bošković, Branko & Nøstbakken, Linda, 2017, "The cost of endangered species protection: Evidence from auctions for natural resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 174-192, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.08.003.
• Holzer, Jorge & DePiper, Geret & Lipton, Douglas, 2017, "Buybacks with costly participation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 130-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.05.001.
• Du, Songzi & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2017, "Bilateral trading in divisible double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 285-311, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.001.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2017, "Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 453-473, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.002.
• Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 629-640, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008.
• Troyan, Peter, 2017, "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 319-345, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.010.
• Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2017, "The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 385-416, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.009.
• Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2017, "Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 86-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.005.
• Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017, "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 35-63, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.001.
• Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam, 2017, "Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 313-347, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001.
• Acharya, Viral V. & Fleming, Michael J. & Hrung, Warren B. & Sarkar, Asani, 2017, "Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 123, issue 1, pages 81-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.12.004.
• Holmes, William B., 2017, "Environmental services auctions under regulatory threat," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 584-591, DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.06.004.
• Chira, Inga & Volkov, Nikanor, 2017, "The choice of sale method and its consequences in mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 170-184, DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2016.04.005.
• Denny, Eleanor & O'Mahoney, Amy & Lannoye, Eamonn, 2017, "Modelling the impact of wind generation on electricity market prices in Ireland: An econometric versus unit commitment approach," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 109-119, DOI: 10.1016/j.renene.2016.11.003.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Castro, Manuel, 2017, "Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 28-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.12.008.
• Kechagia, Varvara & Drichoutis, Andreas C., 2017, "The effect of olfactory sensory cues on willingness to pay and choice under risk," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, pages 33-46, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.07.005.
• Bichler, Martin & Gretschko, Vitali & Janssen, Maarten, 2017, "Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 5, pages 325-340, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2017.01.005.
• Kuroda, Toshifumi & Baquero Forero, Maria del Pilar, 2017, "The effects of spectrum allocation mechanisms on market outcomes: Auctions vs beauty contests," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 5, pages 341-354, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2017.01.006.
• Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Ong, David & Segev, Ella, 2017, "Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 70793, Jun.
• David M Newbery, 2017, "What future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative?," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1705, Mar.
• Juha Teirilä, 2017, "Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1712, Jul.
• Thomas Greve & Fei Teng & Michael Pollitt & Goran Strbac, 2017, "A system operator's utility function for the frequency response market," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1713, Jul.
• Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2017, "Signaling in auctions: experimental evidence," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven, number 585499, Jun.
• Charles N. Noussair & Gyula Seres, 2017, "The Effect of Collusion on Efficiency in Experimental Auctions," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, number 2017-09, Feb.
• Huagang Li & Guofu Tan, 2017, "Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders," Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities, Higher Education Press, volume 12, issue 3, pages 341-370, September.
• Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2017, "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.02, Jan.
• Ruben Juarez & Kohei Nitta, 2017, "Profit-Sharing and Implementation of Efficient Outcomes," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 201702, May.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti, & Paola Valbonesi, 2018, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number hal-01619040, Nov, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150240.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctons," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-01440891, Jan.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," CIRED Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01557657, Jul.
• Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01688261.
• Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2017, "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01688267.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctons," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01440891, Jan.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01557657, Jul.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017, "On the benefits of set-asides," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01557657, Jul.
• Bernergård, Axel & Wärneryd, Karl, 2017, "Self-Allocation in Contests," SSE Working Paper Series in Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, number 2017:2, Aug.
• Blázquez De Paz, Mario, 2017, "Production or Transmission Investments? A Comparative Analysis," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1158, Mar.
• Lundin, Erik & Tangerås, Thomas, 2017, "Cournot Competition in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The Nordic Power Exchange, Nord Pool," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1191, Nov.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "All-pay auctions with affiliated values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 13/2017, Jun.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "War of attrition with affiliated values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 16/2017, Sep.
• Repetto, Luca & Solis, Alex, 2017, "The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 2017:10, Sep.
• Ivan Susin, 2017, "Auctions with Resale: A Survey," HSE Economic Journal, National Research University Higher School of Economics, volume 21, issue 2, pages 333-350.
• Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2017, "Round-Robin Tournaments with Limited Resources," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics, number WP BRP 171/EC/2017.
• MENG, Xin & GUNAY, Hikmet, 2017, "Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-43, Feb.
• GUNAY, Hikmet & MENG, Xin, 2017, "Which good to sell first in a sequential auction?," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-45, May.
• Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017, "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2017-069, Sep.
• Thomas Deckers & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse & Pia Pinger & Hannah Schildberg-Horisch, 2017, "Socio-Economic Status and Inequalities in Children's IQ and Economic Preferences," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2017-088, Dec.
• Seung Han Yoo, 2017, "Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1702.
• Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2017, "Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1705.
• Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2017, "Per Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalty Licensing," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1706.
• Hu, Yingyao, 2017, "The Econometrics of Unobservables -- Latent Variable and Measurement Error Models and Their Applications in Empirical Industrial Organization and Labor Economics
  [The Econometrics of Unobservables]," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, number 64578, revised 2021.
• Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2017, "On a spontaneous decentralized market process," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 2, issue 1, pages 1-37, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.001.
• Ola Andersson & Tommy Andersson, 2017, "Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 2, issue 1, pages 39-55, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.002.
• Akiyoshi Shioura, 2017, "On the Partnership formation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 2, issue 1, pages 105-140, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.004.
• Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2022, "Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 7, issue 1, pages 45-69, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.002.
• Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2017, "Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, number 2017-012, Oct.
• Karim Jamal & Michael Maier & Shyam Sunder, 2017, "Simple Agents, Intelligent Markets," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 49, issue 4, pages 653-675, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-016-9582-3.
• Luca Corazzini & Stefano Galavotti & Rupert Sausgruber & Paola Valbonesi, 2017, "Allotment in first-price auctions: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 20, issue 1, pages 70-99, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9476-1.
• Sotiris Georganas & Dan Levin & Peter McGee, 2017, "Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 20, issue 4, pages 772-792, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9510-y.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Justin E. Burkett & Emel Filiz-Ozbay, 2017, "An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 20, issue 4, pages 973-1006, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9520-9.
• Lars Hornuf & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2017, "Pricing shares in equity crowdfunding," Small Business Economics, Springer, volume 48, issue 4, pages 795-811, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11187-016-9807-9.
• Shinya Horie, 2017, "Procurement Auctions with Uncertainty in Corruption," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, number 1710, Mar.
• Martín Gonzalez-Eiras & Jesper Rüdiger, 2017, "Liquidity Shocks, Market Maker Turnover, and Bidding Behavior in Treasury Auctions," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 17-13, Aug.
• Ryuji Sano, 2017, "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 963, Feb.
• Dakshina Garfield De Silva & Marina Gertsberg & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Rachel Pownall, 2017, "Dealer Networks in the World of Art," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 198144199.

2016

• John Kennes & Daniel le Maire, 2016, "On the equivalence of buyer and seller proposals within canonical matching and pricing environments," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2016-10, Oct.
• Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2016, "Structural Analysis of First-Price Auction Data: Insights from the Laboratory," Adelaide Economics Working Papers, Adelaide University, School of Economics, number 2016-17, Dec.
• Nick Arnosti & Marissa Beck & Paul Milgrom, 2016, "Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 10, pages 2852-2866, October.
• Takeharu Sogo & Dan Bernhardt & Tingjun Liu, 2016, "Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 11, pages 3577-3589, November.
• Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2016, "Search Design and Broad Matching," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 3, pages 563-586, March.
• Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2016, "Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 4, pages 1073-1099, April.
• Henry S. Schneider, 2016, "The Bidder's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 4, pages 1182-1194, April.
• Ulrike Malmendier, 2016, "The Bidder's Curse: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 4, pages 1195-1213, April.
• Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Peter D. Hull & Parag A. Pathak, 2016, "Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 7, pages 1878-1920, July.
• Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016, "Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 9, pages 2528-2551, September.
• Nadine Ketel & Edwin Leuven & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw, 2016, "The Returns to Medical School: Evidence from Admission Lotteries," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 2, pages 225-254, April.
• Charles A. Holt & Angela M. Smith, 2016, "Belief Elicitation with a Synchronized Lottery Choice Menu That Is Invariant to Risk Attitudes," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 1, pages 110-139, February.
• Timothy G. Conley & Francesco Decarolis, 2016, "Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 2, pages 1-38, May.
• Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2016, "Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 2, pages 168-201, May.
• Dan Levin & James Peck & Asen Ivanov, 2016, "Separating Bayesian Updating from Non-Probabilistic Reasoning: An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 2, pages 39-60, May.
• James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2016, "Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition: The Case of the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 3, pages 257-288, August.
• Nicola Lacetera & Bradley J. Larsen & Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, 2016, "Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 4, pages 195-229, November.
• Zhang, Yu Yvette & Palma, Marco A. & Jin, Shaosheng & Yuan, Xiaotong, undated, "Investigating the US Consumer Response to the Chinese Acquisition of a US Firm," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, number 236024, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.236024.
• Wang, Xiaojin, 2016, "Is Fair Trade Fair for Consumers? A Hedonic Analysis of U.S. Retail Fair Trade Coffee Prices," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, number 236344, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.236344.
• Cotton, Christopher & Hickman, Brent R. & Price, Joseph P., 2016, "Affirmative Action and Human Capital Investment: Theory and Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 274676, May, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274676.
• Debasis Mishra & Anup Pramanik & Souvik Roy, 2016, "Local incentive compatibility with transfers," Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, number 16-01, Jan.
• M.Florencia Gabrielli & Roberto Latorre, 2020, "Mensajes colusivos en subastas con costos de entrada," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 1, Mar.
• Andreas C. Drichoutis & Varvara Kechagia, 2016, "The effect of olfactory sensory cues on economic decision making," Working Papers, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics, number 2016-4.
• Serafin Grundl & Yu Zhu, 2016, "Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 16-23, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2017-23.
• David Wettstein & Todd R. Kaplan, 2016, "Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1607.
• Aner Sela & Noam Cohen & Maor Guy, 2016, "Two-Stage Elimination Contests with Optimal Head Starts," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1611.
• Aner Sela, 2016, "Two Stage Contests With Effort-Dependent Rewards," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1612.
• Aner Sela & Maya Amiad, 2016, "The Optimal Allocation Of Punishments In Tullock Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1613.
• Aner Sela & Ezra Einy & 0ri Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Avishay Aiche & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2016, "Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1614.
• Syngjoo Choi & Lars Nesheim & Imran Rasul, 2016, "Reserve Price Effects In Auctions: Estimates From Multiple Regression-Discontinuity Designs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 54, issue 1, pages 294-314, January.
• Wei-Shiun Chang & Timothy C. Salmon & Krista J. Saral, 2016, "Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation And Wealth Constraints," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 54, issue 3, pages 1684-1704, July.
• André Kallåk Anundsen & Erling Røed Larsen, 2016, "Testing for micro efficiency in the housing market," Working Paper, Norges Bank, number 2016/6, Apr.
• Stefania Garetto, 2016, "Firms’ Heterogeneity, Incomplete Information, and Pass-Through," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics, number wp2016-004, Apr.
• Gallice Andrea, 2016, "Price Reveal Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 16, issue 2, pages 485-514, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2014-0099.
• Karsten Neuhoff & Nolan Ritter & Aymen Salah-Abou-El-Enien & Philippe Vassilopoulos, 2016, "Intraday Markets for Power: Discretizing the Continuous Trading," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1616, Mar.
• Thomas Greve & Michael G. Pollitt, 2016, "A VCG Auction for Electricity Storage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1628, Apr.
• Greve, T. & Charalampos, P. & Pollitt, M. & Phil Taylor, 2016, "Economic zones for future complex power systems," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1658, Dec.
• Greve, T. & Pollitt, M., 2016, "A future auction mechanism for distributed generation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1672, Dec.
• Glenn Boyle & Gerald Ward, 2016, "Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better?," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 16/29, Nov.
• Gon alves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2016, "Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, number E2016/13, Dec.
• Decio Coviello & Andrea Guglielmo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2016, "The effect of discretion on procurement performance," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, number dp1427, Apr.
• Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2016, "The Quantitative View of Myerson Regularity," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 5712.
• Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2016, "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 5838.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter A. Gautier & Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2016, "Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 5916.
• Branko Boskovic & Linda Nøstbakken, 2016, "The Cost of Endangered Species Protection: Evidence from Auctions for Natural Resources," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 5934.
• Benjamin Lester & Ludo Visschers & Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2016, "Competing with Asking Prices," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 5945.
• Branko Boskovic & Linda Nøstbakken, 2016, "How do Land Markets Anticipate Regulatory Change? Evidence from Canadian Conservation Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 5956.
• Carolina Manzano & Xavier Vives, 2016, "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6261.
• Kevin McLaughlin & Daniel Friedman, 2016, "Online Ad Auctions: An Experiment," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 16-05.
• Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock, 2016, "Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 16-12.
• Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2016, "All-Pay Auctions with Ties," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 16-31.
• BOS, Olivier & TRUYTS, Tom, 2016, "Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2016017, May.
• Sela, Aner, 2016, "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11113, Feb.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schwarz, Marco A., 2016, "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11179, Mar.
• Coviello, Decio & Guglielmo, Andrea & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2016, "The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11286, May.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2016, "Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11310, Jun.
• Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016, "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11376, Jul.
• Genesove, David & Hansen, James, 2016, "The Role of Auctions and Negotiation in Housing Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11392, Jul.
• Boyarchenko, Nina & Lucca, David & Veldkamp, Laura, 2016, "Taking Orders and Taking Notes: Dealer Information Sharing in Treasury Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11518, Sep.
• Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2016, "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11564, Oct.
• Hyytinen, Ari & Lundberg, Sofia & Toivanen, Otto, 2016, "Design of Public Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Cleaning Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11708, Dec.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2016, "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11731, Dec.
• Klenio Barbosa & Pierre Boyer, 2016, "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2016-37, Nov.
• Aiche, A. & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Selay, A. & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2016, "Information advantage in common-value classic Tullock contests," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 23939, Nov.
• Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 2016, "Reserve Prices in Auctions with Entry when the Seller in Risk Averse," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 23951, Dec.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016, "Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2064, Dec.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016, "Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2064R, Dec, revised Jul 2017.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016, "Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2065, Dec.
• Karsten Neuhoff & Nolan Ritter, 2016, "Kurzfristige Auktionen erhöhen Handelsvolumen und Marktliquidität an der Strombörse," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 83, issue 41, pages 987-993.
• Karsten Neuhoff & Nolan Ritter & Aymen Salah-Abou-El-Enien & Philippe Vassilopoulos, 2016, "Intraday Markets for Power: Discretizing the Continuous Trading?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1544.
• Tom Brijs & Daniel Huppmann & Sauleh Siddiqui & Ronnie Belmans, 2016, "Auction-Based Allocation of Shared Electricity Storage Resources through Physical Storage Rights," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1566.
• Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej H. & Leister, C. Matthew, 2016, "Liquidity Risk in Sequential Trading Networks," Working Paper Series, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, number 16-039, Oct.
• Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2016, "Optimal value of a patent in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 57, issue C, pages 93-105, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.04.005.
• Krawczyk, Michał & Bartczak, Anna & Hanley, Nick & Stenger, Anne, 2016, "Buying spatially-coordinated ecosystem services: An experiment on the role of auction format and communication," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 36-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.01.012.
• Donna, Javier & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory, 2016, "Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 81-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.033.
• Baisa, Brian & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2016, "Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 162-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.017.
• Bayrak, Halil I. & Pınar, Mustafa Ç., 2016, "Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 35-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.019.
• Eichberger, Jürgen & Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2016, "Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 98-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.012.
• Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2016, "“Buy-It-Now” or “Sell-It-Now” auctions: Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 27-30, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.025.
• Matros, Alexander & Possajennikov, Alex, 2016, "Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 74-77, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003.
• Waisman, Caio, 2016, "Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 1-3, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015.
• Liu, Zhiyang & Chen, Bo, 2016, "A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 6-10, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.004.
• Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sano, Ryuji, 2016, "Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 49-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.006.
• van den Berg, Vincent A.C. & Rouwendal, Jan, 2016, "Tender auctions with existing operators bidding," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, volume 6, issue C, pages 1-10, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2016.05.001.
• Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2016, "Nonstandard bidder behavior in real-world auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, pages 198-212, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.12.012.
• Zoltowska, Izabela, 2016, "Demand shifting bids in energy auction with non-convexities and transmission constraints," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 17-27, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.05.016.
• Erdogdu, Erkan, 2016, "Asymmetric volatility in European day-ahead power markets: A comparative microeconomic analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 398-409, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.04.002.
• Newbery, David, 2016, "Missing money and missing markets: Reliability, capacity auctions and interconnectors," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 401-410, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2015.10.028.
• Rydqvist, Kristian & Wu, Mark, 2016, "Pre-auction inventory and bidding behavior: Evidence from Canadian Treasury auctions," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 30, issue C, pages 78-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2016.07.001.
• Mishra, Debasis & Pramanik, Anup & Roy, Souvik, 2016, "Local incentive compatibility with transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 149-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.009.