Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151538
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2021.
"Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1869-1912, August.
- Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Rent extraction with securities plus cash," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1212, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Wenjun Wang, 2023. "Can experience mitigate precautionary bidding? Evidence from a quasi-experiment at an IPO auction," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(2), pages 148-163, March.
- Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023.
"Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 815-851.
- Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W. Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2017. "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," NBER Working Papers 23473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2020.
"Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2019. "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1200, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Lin William Cong, 2020. "Timing of Auctions of Real Options," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 3956-3976, September.
- Lam, Wing Tung, 2020. "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Andrés Fioriti & Allan Hernandez-Chanto, 2022. "Leveling the Playing Field for Risk-Averse Agents in Security-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5441-5463, July.
- Diego Carrasco-Novoa & Allan Hernández-Chanto, 2022. "Competing Sellers in Security-Bid Auctions under Risk-Averse Bidders," Discussion Papers Series 655, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Fioriti, Andres, 2019. "Bidding securities in projects with negative externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 14-36.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019.
"A Simple Model of Competitive Testing,"
MPRA Paper
99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sun, Wuqin & Wang, Dazhong & Zhang, Yue, 2018. "Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 57-66.
- Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2021. "Financing Skilled Labor," CEPR Discussion Papers 15751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
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JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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