Securities Auctions under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study
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- Shimon Kogan & John Morgan, "undated". "Securities Auctions under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E23, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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- Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektaş, 2011.
"Selling goods of unknown quality: forward versus spot auctions,"
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- Hafalir, Isa E. & Yektas, Hadi, 2010. "Selling Goods of Unknown Quality: Forward versus Spot Auctions," MPRA Paper 19956, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Isa E. Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, 2010. "Selling Goods of Unknown Quality: Forward versus Spot Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1091, The University of Melbourne.
- Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2014.
"Security bid auctions for agency contracts,"
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Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 289-319, December.
- Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2012. "Security bid auctions for agency contracts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 371, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2013. "Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 4554, CESifo Group Munich.
- Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2013. "Security bid auctions for agency contracts," Discussion Paper Series 1303, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2015. "Financing bidders in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 534-557.
- Allison, Thomas H. & McKenny, Aaron F. & Short, Jeremy C., 2013. "The effect of entrepreneurial rhetoric on microlending investment: An examination of the warm-glow effect," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 690-707.
- Liu, Tingjun, 2016. "Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 94-123.
- Dai, Yun & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Smit, Han T.J. & De Maeseneire, Wouter, 2013. "Similar bidders in takeover contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 544-561.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:267:y:2018:i:1:p:368-380 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:indorg:v:55:y:2017:i:c:p:166-181 is not listed on IDEAS
- Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2015. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts under the threat of early exit: the case of conservation auctions," Working Paper Series 2015:6, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.
- Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2011. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1806-1841, August.
- Takeharu Sogo & Dan Bernhardt & Tingjun Liu, 2016. "Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3577-3589, November.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
- Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R., 2015. "On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 66-80.
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