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Securities Auctions under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study

  • Shimon Kogan
  • John Morgan

We study, both theoretically and in the lab, the performance of open outcry debt and equity auctions in the presence of both private information and hidden e¤ort in an independent private value setting. We characterize symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies and show that these lead to e¢ cient allocation. More interestingly, the revenue ranking between the debt and equity auctions depends on the returns to en- trepreneurial e¤ort. When returns are either very low or vary high, the equity auction leads to higher expected revenues to the seller than does the debt auction. When the returns to e¤ort are intermediate, we show that debt auctions can outperform equity auctions. We then test these predictions in a controlled laboratory setting and …nd broad support for the comparative predictions of the model.

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File URL: https://student-3k.tepper.cmu.edu/gsiadoc/wp/2006-E23.pdf
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Paper provided by Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business in its series GSIA Working Papers with number 2006-E23.

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Handle: RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:2142915788
Contact details of provider: Postal: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Web page: http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/

Order Information: Web: http://student-3k.tepper.cmu.edu/gsiadoc/GSIA_WP.asp

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