Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2018

• Blázquez de Paz, Mario, 2018, "Electricity auctions in the presence of transmission constraints and transmission costs," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 605-627, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.07.001.
• Haufe, Marie-Christin & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2018, "Auctions for renewable energy support – Suitability, design, and first lessons learned," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 217-224, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.06.027.
• Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2018, "Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 41-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.027.
• Lindsay, Luke, 2018, "Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 170-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.020.
• Jagadeesan, Ravi, 2018, "Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 275-286, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.015.
• Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2018, "Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 287-294, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.010.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Money as minimal complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 432-451, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.003.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Graphical exchange mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 452-465, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.002.
• Mishra, Debasis & Nath, Swaprava & Roy, Souvik, 2018, "Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 240-261, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018.
• Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018, "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 327-363, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019.
• Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv, 2018, "An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 40-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.013.
• Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej H. & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018, "Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 565-581, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.004.
• Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018, "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 20-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.002.
• Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo, 2018, "The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 49-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.004.
• Chen, Kong-Pin & Lai, Hung-pin & Yu, Ya-Ting, 2018, "The seller's listing strategy in online auctions: Evidence from eBay," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 107-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.11.003.
• Zhang, Chenglin & Ye, Lixin & Johnson, Joel & Baker, Christopher & Wang, Huaiyi, 2018, "Efficient and optimal mechanisms with radio spectrum sharing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, pages 206-227, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.08.004.
• Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2018, "Optimal licensing of technology in the face of (asymmetric) competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, pages 32-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.07.009.
• Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018, "Permit market auctions with allowance reserves," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 283-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.09.005.
• Artigot, Mireia & Ganuza, Juan José & Gomez, Fernando & Penalva, Jose, 2018, "Product liability should reward firm transparency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 160-169, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.10.002.
• Thomas, Charles J., 2018, "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 269-293, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.004.
• Kimbrough, Erik O. & Smyth, Andrew, 2018, "Testing the boundaries of the double auction: The effects of complete information and market power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 372-396, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.017.
• Marszalec, Daniel, 2018, "Fear not the simplicity - An experimental analysis of auctions for complements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 81-97, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.023.
• Wang, Jianxin & Houser, Daniel & Xu, Hui, 2018, "Culture, gender and asset prices: Experimental evidence from the U.S. and China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 253-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.09.003.
• Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018, "Consignment auctions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, pages 42-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.11.003.
• Choi, Pak-Sing & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2018, "Conservation procurement auctions with bidirectional externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 559-579, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.009.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2018, "Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.010.
• Koch, Christian & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2018, "The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 57-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.002.
• Anderson, Edward & Holmberg, Pär, 2018, "Price instability in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 318-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.008.
• Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L. & Hickman, Brent R., 2018, "College assignment as a large contest," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 88-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.006.
• Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018, "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 245-279, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005.
• Baranov, Oleg, 2018, "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 495-517, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.005.
• Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018, "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 708-733, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.002.
• Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018, "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 734-779, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.004.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Condorelli, Daniele & Kim, Jinwoo, 2018, "Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 398-435, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.005.
• Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & Ritter, Moritz, 2018, "Bidding for teams," Labour Economics, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 68-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2018.04.001.
• Hu, Audrey & Matthews, Steven A. & Zou, Liang, 2018, "English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 33-44, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.02.002.
• Schwartz, Jesse A. & Wen, Quan, 2018, "A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 32-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.002.
• Zhang, Junhuan, 2018, "Influence of individual rationality on continuous double auction markets with networked traders," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, volume 495, issue C, pages 353-392, DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2017.12.098.
• Kashyap, Ravi, 2018, "Auction theory adaptations for real life applications," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 72, issue 4, pages 452-481, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.09.001.
• Kassas, Bachir & Palma, Marco A. & Anderson, David P., 2018, "Fine-tuning willingness-to-pay estimates in second price auctions for market goods," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 50-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.002.
• Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Galizzi, Matteo M. & Nieboer, Jeroen, 2018, "Experimental and self-reported measures of risk taking and digit ratio (2D:4D) evidence from a large, systematic study," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 80747, Aug.
• Koutroumpis, Pantelis & Cave, Martin, 2018, "Auction design and auction outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 88371, Jun.
• Michael Grubb & David Newbery, 2018, "UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition: Emerging Lessons," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1817, Jun.
• Juha Teirilä & Robert A. Ritz, 2018, "Strategic behaviour in a capacity market? The new Irish electricity market design," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1833, Oct.
• Brent Eldridge & Richard O'Neill & Benjamin F. Hobbs, 2018, "Pricing in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets with Near-Optimal Unit Commitment," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1840, Nov.
• Chandan Kumar, 2018, "Role of Bidding Method and Risk Allocation in the Performance of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Projects," Working Papers, eSocialSciences, number id:12688, Apr.
• Ari Hyytinen & Sofia Lundberg & Otto Toivanen, 2018, "Design of public procurement auctions: Evidence from cleaning contracts," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven, number 625202.
• F. Javier Otamendi & Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2018, "Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: An Experimental Investigation," Games, MDPI, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-31, March.
• Edwyna Harris & Sumner La Croix, 2018, "Did Speculation in Land Pay Off for British Investors? Buying and Selecting Land in South Australia, 1835-1850," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 201809, Aug.
• Stefano Galavotti & Luigi Moretti, & Paola Valbonesi, 2018, "Sophisticated Bidders in Beauty-Contest Auctions," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01619040, Nov, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150240.
• Gabrielle Demange, 2019, "Mechanisms in a digitalized world," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01715951.
• Vivien Lespagnol & Juliette Rouchier, 2018, "Trading Volume and Price Distortion: An Agent-Based Model with Heterogenous Knowledge of Fundamentals," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02084910, Apr, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9655-y.
• Marco Pagnozzi & Krista Saral, 2019, "Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01741462, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5.
• Jonathan Ma & Scott Duke Kominers, 2018, "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School, number 19-011, Aug.
• Boom, Anette & Buehler, Stefan, 2018, "Vertical Structure and the Risk of Rent Extraction in the Electricity Industry," Working Papers, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, number 8-2018, Aug.
• Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas & Ahlqvist, Victor, 2018, "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1257, Dec, revised 27 Mar 2019.
• Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim & Wu, Tingting, 2018, "Shill Bidding and Information in Sequential Auctions: A Laboratory Study," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2018:18, Jun.
• Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2018, "Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects: A Characterization Result," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2018:21, Sep, revised 10 May 2023.
• Chi, Chang Koo, 2018, "An analysis of the two-bidder all-pay auction with common values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 17/2018, Aug.
• Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018, "Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks," Scholarly Articles, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, number 35165081.
• Biung-Ghi Ju & Seung Han Yoo, 2018, "Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions:Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1802.
• Seung Han Yoo, 2018, "Membership Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1804.
• Mr. John Morgan & Justin Tumlinson & Mr. Felix J Vardy, 2018, "The Limits of Meritocracy," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund, number 2018/231, Nov.
• Chandan Kumar, 2018, "Role of bidding method and risk allocation in the performance of public private partnership (PPP) projects," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India, number 2018-013, Mar.
• Alejandro Melo Ponce, 2018, "The Secret Behind The Tortoise and the Hare: Information Design in Contests," 2018 Papers, Job Market Papers, number pme809, Nov.
• Vivien Lespagnol & Juliette Rouchier, 2018, "Trading Volume and Price Distortion: An Agent-Based Model with Heterogenous Knowledge of Fundamentals," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 51, issue 4, pages 991-1020, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9655-y.
• Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Antonello Eugenio Scorcu, 2018, "On the relationship between reserve prices and low estimates in art auctions," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 42, issue 1, pages 45-56, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-016-9279-4.
• Lisa Farrell & Jane M. Fry & Tim R. L. Fry, 2018, "Determinants of sales and price at auction for three Australian Indigenous artists: to pool or not to pool?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 42, issue 3, pages 507-520, August, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-017-9314-0.
• Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2018, "The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 125, issue 2, pages 107-136, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-017-0590-0.
• Peyman Khezr, 2018, "Why Sellers Avoid Auctions: Theory and Evidence," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, volume 56, issue 2, pages 163-182, February, DOI: 10.1007/s11146-016-9594-8.
• Pantelis Koutroumpis & Martin Cave, 2018, "Auction design and auction outcomes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 53, issue 3, pages 275-297, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-018-9358-x.
• Junhuan Zhang & Peter McBurney & Katarzyna Musial, 2018, "Convergence of trading strategies in continuous double auction markets with boundedly-rational networked traders," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, volume 50, issue 1, pages 301-352, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11156-017-0631-3.
• Olga Gorelkina, 2018, "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions," Working Papers, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics, number 20182, Aug.
• Jindřich Matoušek & Lubomír Cingl, 2018, "Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 56, issue 1, pages 28-56, January, DOI: 10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161.
• Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019, "Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Public Procurement Auctions," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 75, issue 2, pages 187-204, DOI: 10.1628/fa-2019-0002.
• Claudia Cerrone & Author-Name: Yoan Hermstruwer, 2018, "Debarment and Collusion in Procurement Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2018_05, Apr, revised Apr 2021.
• Haeringer, Guillaume, 2018, "Market Design: Auctions and Matching," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, number 0262037548, edition 1, ISBN: ARRAY(0x8f472430), December.

2017

• Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2017, "A Naïve Approach to Bidding," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy, number 2017-03, Mar.
• Shengwu Li, 2017, "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 11, pages 3257-3287, November.
• Semyon Malamud & Marzena Rostek, 2017, "Decentralized Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 11, pages 3320-3362, November.
• Daniel Fershtman & Alessandro Pavan, 2017, "Pandora's Auctions: Dynamic Matching with Unknown Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 186-190, May.
• Shengwu Li, 2017, "Obvious Ex Post Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 230-234, May.
• Atila Abdulkadroǧlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak & Roman A. Zarate, 2017, "Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 240-245, May.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2017, "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 6, pages 1399-1429, June.
• Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai, 2017, "Discrimination via Symmetric Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 275-314, February.
• Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017, "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 88-122, February.
• Oleg Baranov & Christina Aperjis & Lawrence M. Ausubel & Thayer Morrill, 2017, "Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 3, pages 1-27, August.
• Pieter A. Gautier & Christian L. Holzner, 2017, "Simultaneous Search and Efficiency of Entry and Search Intensity," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 3, pages 245-282, August.
• Charles R. Plott & Kirill Pogorelskiy, 2017, "Call Market Experiments: Efficiency and Price Discovery through Multiple Calls and Emergent Newton Adjustments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 1-41, November.
• Canice Prendergast, 2017, "How Food Banks Use Markets to Feed the Poor," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 31, issue 4, pages 145-162, Fall.
• Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 253215, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.253215.
• Kassas, Bachir & Palma, Marco & Ness, Meghan & Anderson, David, 2017, "Fine-Tuning Willingness-To-Pay Estimates in Second Price Auctions," 2017 Annual Meeting, February 4-7, 2017, Mobile, Alabama, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, number 252793, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.252793.
• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, number 17-03, May.
• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, number 17-04, Jun.
• Johannes Moser, 2017, "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," Working Papers, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), number 176, Nov.
• Moser, Johannes, 2017, "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics, number 36304, Nov.
• Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Eva Markowsky, 2017, "It's education, not gender: A research note on the determinants of an anchoring bias in experimental WTA elicitations," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), volume 1, issue 2, pages 51-55, September.
• Chen Cohen & Ofer Levi & Aner Sela, 2017, "All-Pay Auctions With Asymmetric Effort Constraints," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1706.
• Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017, "The Optimal Design Of Round-Robin Tournaments With Three Players," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1707.
• Tomer Ifergane & Aner Sela, 2017, "Signaling In Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1708.
• Netanel Nissim & Aner Sela, 2017, "The Third Place Game," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1709.
• A. Aiche & Ezra Einy & Aner Sela & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & B. Shitovitz, 2017, "Information In Tullock Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 1710.
• Toyotaka Sakai, 2017, "Considering Collective Choice: The Route 328 Problem in Kodaira City," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 68, issue 3, pages 323-332, September.
• Joaquín Coleff & Daniel Garcia, 2017, "Information Provision in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 19, issue 2, pages 426-444, April.
• Vlad Radoias & Simon J. Wilkie & Michael A. Williams, 2017, "Rules of evidence and liability in contract litigation: The efficiency of the General Dynamics rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 19, issue 6, pages 1139-1150, December.
• Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017, "Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 119, issue 4, pages 1167-1200, October, DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12204.
• Peter Eccles & Nora Wegner, 2017, "Scalable games: modelling games of incomplete information," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 641, Jan.
• Gerardo Ferrara & Xin Li, 2017, "Central counterparty auction design," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 669, Aug.
• Newbery, D., 2017, "What future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1714, Mar.
• Teirila, J., 2017, "Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1727, Jun.
• Greve, T. & Teng, F. & Pollitt, M. & Strbac, G., 2017, "A system operator's utility function for the frequency response market," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1728, Jul.
• Azacis, Helmuts, 2017, "Information Disclosure by a Seller in Sequential First-Price Auctions," Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, number E2017/2, Feb.
• Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017, "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt3xp2110t, Nov.
• Decio Coviello & Stefano Gagliarducci, 2017, "Tenure in office and public procurement," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, number dp1465, Jan.
• Martin F. Quaas & Ralph Winkler, 2017, "A Market Mechanism for Sustainable and Efficient Resource Use under Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6524.
• Axel Bernergard & Karl Wärneryd, 2017, "Self-Allocation in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6636.
• Deniz Dizdar & Benny Moldovanu & Nora Szech, 2017, "The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6803.
• Gabrielle Demange, 2018, "Mechanisms in a Digitalized World," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6984.
• Ying Liu & Sebastian Vogel & Yuan Zhang, 2018, "Electronic Trading in OTC Markets vs. Centralized Exchange," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 18-19, Mar.
• Charles J. Thomas, 2017, "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 17-07.
• David P. Brown & Derek E. H. Olmstead, 2017, "Measuring market power and the efficiency of Alberta's restructured electricity market: An energy-only market design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 50, issue 3, pages 838-870, August, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12280.
• Kim Nguyen & Michael Peters & Michel Poitevin, 2017, "Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 50, issue 5, pages 1573-1594, December, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12308.
• Guillem Roig, 2017, "Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 15892, Dec.
• Ali Palali & Bas Straathof & Rinske Windig, 2017, "The effect of geographical distance on online transactions: Evidence from the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, number 362, Oct.
• Matthew T. Cole & James Lake & Ben Zissimos, 2017, "Contesting an International Trade Agreement," Working Papers, California Polytechnic State University, Department of Economics, number 1703.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11782, Jan.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11783, Jan.
• Sela, Aner, 2017, "Signaling in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11798, Jan.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017, "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11904, Mar.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro'i, 2017, "Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11944, Mar.
• Skreta, Vasiliki & Condorelli, Daniele & Galeotti, Andrea, 2017, "Selling Through Referrals," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12048, May.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12240, Aug.
• Sela, Aner, 2017, "The Third Place Game," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12348, Oct.
• Schmidt, Klaus & Herweg, Fabian, 2017, "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12385, Oct.
• Sela, Aner & Minchuk, Yizhaq, 2017, "Contests with Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12456, Nov.
• Schiraldi, Pasquale & Komarova, Tatiana & Gentry, Matthew & Shin, Wiroy, 2017, "On Monotone Strategy Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12483, Dec.
• Gautier, Pieter & Cai, Xiaoming & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2017, "Meetings and Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12542, Dec.
• Zulehner, Christine & Gugler, Klaus & Weichselbaumer, Michael, 2017, "Effects of government spending on employment: Evidence from winners and runners-up in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12548, Dec.
• Aiche, A. & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Selay, A. & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2017, "Information in Tullock contest," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 25820, Nov.
• Breeden, Joseph L. & Liang, Sisi, 2017, "Auction-Price Dynamics for Fine Wines from Age-Period-Cohort Models," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 12, issue 2, pages 173-202, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2102, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2102R, Aug, revised Jun 2018.
• Caleb Stroup & Matthew L. Gentry, 2017, "Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions," Working Papers, Davidson College, Department of Economics, number 17-01, Jan.
• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1001, May.
• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1005, Jun.
• Ian Jewitt & Daniel Z. Li, 2017, "Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions: Horizontally vs Vertically Differentiated Products," Department of Economics Working Papers, Durham University, Department of Economics, number 2017_03, Apr.
• Daniel Z. Li & Minbo Xu, 2017, "Equilibrium Competition, Social Welfare and Corruption in Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers, Durham University, Department of Economics, number 2017_04, Apr.
• Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2014, "A Model of Trading in the Art Market," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1150, Mar, revised 22 Sep 2017.
• Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2017, "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," IESE Research Papers, IESE Business School, number D/1162, Jan.
• Messer, Kent D. & Duke, Joshua M. & Lynch, Lori & Li, Tongzhe, 2017, "When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 212-226, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.004.
• Zhang, Yu Yvette, 2017, "A shape constrained estimator of bidding function of first-price sealed-bid auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 67-72, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.001.
• Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2017, "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 73-76, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012.
• Li, Daniel Z., 2017, "Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 47-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003.
• Mathews, Timothy & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2017, "A note on k-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 6-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.020.
• Leoni, Patrick & Lundtofte, Frederik, 2017, "Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: The case of Treasury auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 80-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.004.
• Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert & Lavi, Ron & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017, "Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 55-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024.
• Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 2017, "Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 6-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.006.
• Zhou, Yu, 2017, "A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 76-79, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012.
• Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2017, "No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 142-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.04.022.
• Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2017, "On the efficiency of the first price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 159-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003.
• Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017, "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 36-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.030.
• Khezr, Peyman & Menezes, Flavio M., 2017, "A new characterization of equilibrium in multiple-object uniform-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 53-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.031.
• Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017, "A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 177-179, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032.
• Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2017, "First-price auction implements efficient investments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 198-200, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.013.
• Shi, Yang & Xu, Hui & Wang, Mancang & Conroy, Paul, 2017, "Home bias in domestic art markets: Evidence from China," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 201-203, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.015.
• Mill, Wladislaw, 2017, "The spite motive in third price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 71-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.028.
• Hu, Yingyao, 2017, "The econometrics of unobservables: Applications of measurement error models in empirical industrial organization and labor economics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 200, issue 2, pages 154-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.002.
• An, Yonghong, 2017, "Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: A measurement error approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 200, issue 2, pages 326-343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.014.
• Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Ong, David & Segev, Ella, 2017, "Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 23-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.002.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017, "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 84-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.012.
• Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier, 2017, "Forestry auctions with interdependent values: Evidence from timber auctions," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 107-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2017.02.004.
• McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017, "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 34-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Choi, Syngjoo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2017, "An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 20-43, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.008.
• Wellman, Michael P. & Sodomka, Eric & Greenwald, Amy, 2017, "Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 339-372, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.007.
• Thompson, David R.M. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2017, "Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 583-623, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009.
• Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2017, "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 199-224, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.006.
• Li, Yunan, 2017, "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 225-253, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.006.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mukherjee, Conan, 2017, "Bidding rings: A bargaining approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 67-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007.
• Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017, "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 252-270, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.004.
• Gelder, Alan & Kovenock, Dan, 2017, "Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 444-455, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.008.
• Ben-Zwi, Oren, 2017, "Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 456-467, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.013.
• Bose, Subir & Daripa, Arup, 2017, "Shills and snipes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 507-516, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.010.
• Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2017, "Some further properties of the cumulative offer process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 656-665, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.006.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017, "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 78-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005.
• Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017, "Auctions with selective entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 104-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.016.
• Paes Leme, Renato, 2017, "Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 294-316, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.016.
• Wang, Hong, 2017, "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 48-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.12.003.
• Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob K., 2017, "Frontiers in spectrum auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 372-391, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.006.
• Janssen, Maarten & Karamychev, Vladimir, 2017, "Raising rivals’ cost in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 473-490, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.011.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 91-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.001.
• Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2017, "Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 165-187, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.005.
• Seres, Gyula, 2017, "Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 282-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.002.
• Koh, Youngwoo, 2017, "Incentive and sampling effects in procurement auctions with endogenous number of bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 393-426, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.006.
• Olimov, Jafar M. & Roe, Brian E., 2017, "Multidimensional quality sorting between online and offline auctions: The role of attribute transparency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 53, issue C, pages 145-169, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.003.