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Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Krumer
  • Reut Megidish
  • Aner Sela

Abstract

We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round‐robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and we compare this tournament and the one‐stage contest with respect to the players' expected payoffs, expected total effort, and their probabilities of winning. We find that if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total effort, then – if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low – the one‐stage contest should be used. However, if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the round‐robin tournament should be used.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017. "Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 1167-1200, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:119:y:2017:i:4:p:1167-1200
    DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12204
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    Cited by:

    1. Deren Çağlayan & Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2022. "Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 119-137, July.
    2. Iqbal, Hamzah & Krumer, Alex, 2017. "Discouragement Effect and Intermediate Prizes in Multi-Stage Contests: Evidence from Tennis’s Davis Cup," Economics Working Paper Series 1719, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    3. László Csató, 2020. "Optimal Tournament Design: Lessons From the Men’s Handball Champions League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(8), pages 848-868, December.
    4. Catepillán, Jorge & Figueroa, Nicolás & Lemus, Jorge, 2025. "Signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous rivals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    5. Fabian Dietz & Marco Sahm, 2024. "Fairness in Round-Robin Tournaments with Four Players and Endogenous Sequences," CESifo Working Paper Series 11145, CESifo.
    6. Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2022. "Round-robin tournaments with limited resources," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 525-583, October.
    7. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022. "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
    8. Krumer, Alex & Lechner, Michael, 2017. "First in first win: Evidence on schedule effects in round-robin tournaments in mega-events," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 412-427.
    9. Iqbal, Hamzah & Krumer, Alex, 2019. "Discouragement effect and intermediate prizes in multi-stage contests: Evidence from Davis Cup," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 364-381.
    10. Laica, Christoph & Lauber, Arne & Sahm, Marco, 2021. "Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 421-448.
    11. Netanel Nissim & Aner Sela, 2020. "The Third Place Game," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(1), pages 64-86, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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