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Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege

Author

Listed:
  • Cary Deck

    () (University of Arkansas and Economic Science Institute)

  • Roman Sheremeta

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

Abstract

This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed predicted levels. Moreover, both defenders and attackers actually increase the intensity of the fight as they approach the end of the contest.

Suggested Citation

  • Cary Deck & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege," Working Papers 10-20, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-20
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    File URL: http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/FightorFlight-Deck-Sherermeta.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 12-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Krumer, Alex & Megidish, Reut & Sela, Aner, 2014. "Round-Robin Versus Elimination in Tournaments with a Dominant Player," CEPR Discussion Papers 10081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. repec:bla:scandj:v:119:y:2017:i:4:p:1167-1200 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017. "Round-Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 1167-1200, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Colonel Blotto; conflict resolution; weakest-link; game of siege; multi-period resource allocation; experiments.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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