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Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools

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Listed:
  • Atila Abdulkadroǧlu
  • Joshua D. Angrist
  • Yusuke Narita
  • Parag A. Pathak
  • Roman A. Zarate

Abstract

Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.

Suggested Citation

  • Atila Abdulkadroǧlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak & Roman A. Zarate, 2017. "Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 240-245, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:240-45
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171111
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Zuankuo & Xin, Li, 2019. "Has China's Belt and Road Initiative promoted its green total factor productivity？——Evidence from primary provinces along the route," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 360-369.
    2. Atı̇la Abdulkadı̇roğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2022. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 117-151, January.
    3. Zhuo, Chengfeng & Xie, Yuping & Mao, Yanhua & Chen, Pengqin & Li, Yiqiao, 2022. "Can cross-regional environmental protection promote urban green development: Zero-sum game or win-win choice?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    4. Suhas Vijaykumar, 2021. "Stability and Efficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship," Papers 2110.07024, arXiv.org.
    5. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2017. "Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1373-1432, September.
    6. Yusuke Narita, 2020. "A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality," Working Papers 2020-085, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    7. Shi, Ying, 2020. "Who benefits from selective education? Evidence from elite boarding school admissions," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    8. Angrist, Joshua D. & Pathak, Parag A. & Zarate, Roman A., 2023. "Choice and consequence: Assessing mismatch at Chicago exam schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    9. Jiafeng Chen, 2021. "Nonparametric Treatment Effect Identification in School Choice," Papers 2112.03872, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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