IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp10429.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation

Author

Listed:
  • Abdulkadiro?lu, Atila

    () (Duke University)

  • Angrist, Joshua

    () (MIT)

  • Narita, Yusuke

    () (Yale University)

  • Pathak, Parag A.

    () (MIT)

Abstract

A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed. The resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi-experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness. Yet the question of how best to separate the lottery-generated variation integral to such designs from non-random preferences and priorities remains open. This paper develops easily-implemented empirical strategies that fully exploit the random assignment embedded in a wide class of mechanisms, while also revealing why seats are randomized at one school but not another. We use these methods to evaluate charter schools in Denver, one of a growing number of districts that combine charter and traditional public schools in a unified assignment system. The resulting estimates show large achievement gains from charter school attendance. Our approach generates efficiency gains over ad hoc methods, such as those that focus on schools ranked first, while also identifying a more representative average causal effect. We also show how to use centralized assignment mechanisms to identify causal effects in models with multiple school sectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdulkadiro?lu, Atila & Angrist, Joshua & Narita, Yusuke & Pathak, Parag A., 2016. "Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation," IZA Discussion Papers 10429, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10429
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp10429.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Behaghel, Luc & Crépon, Bruno & Gurgand, Marc, 2013. "Robustness of the Encouragement Design in a Two-Treatment Randomized Control Trial," IZA Discussion Papers 7447, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Adrienne M. Lucas & Isaac M. Mbiti, 2014. "Effects of School Quality on Student Achievement: Discontinuity Evidence from Kenya," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 234-263, July.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiro?lu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2015. "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 1-42, February.
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
    5. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
    6. Joshua D. Angrist & Sarah R. Cohodes & Susan M. Dynarski & Parag A. Pathak & Christopher R. Walters, 2016. "Stand and Deliver: Effects of Boston's Charter High Schools on College Preparation, Entry, and Choice," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 275-318.
    7. Howard S. Bloom & Rebecca Unterman, 2014. "Can Small High Schools of Choice Improve Educational Prospects for Disadvantaged Students?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(2), pages 290-319, March.
    8. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
    9. de Haan, Monique & Gautier, Pieter A. & Oosterbeek, Hessel & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2015. "The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice," IZA Discussion Papers 9118, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2014. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives," Working Papers 811, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    11. Luc Behaghel & Bruno Crépon & Marc Gurgand, 2013. "Robustness of the encouragement design in a two-treatment randomized control trial," Working Papers halshs-00834169, HAL.
    12. Pathak, Parag A. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2011. "Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
    13. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Joshua Angrist & Parag Pathak, 2014. "The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(1), pages 137-196, January.
    14. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Simon Burgess & Ellen Greaves & Anna Vignoles & Deborah Wilson, 2015. "What Parents Want: School Preferences and School Choice," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(587), pages 1262-1289, September.
    16. Umut Mert Dur & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2016. "Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 906, Boston College Department of Economics.
    17. Vaart,A. W. van der, 2000. "Asymptotic Statistics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521784504, April.
    18. repec:mpr:mprres:6698 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, September.
    20. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    21. repec:oup:qjecon:v:132:y:2017:i:2:p:871-919. is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Peter D. Hull & Parag A. Pathak, 2016. "Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1878-1920, July.
    23. Alberto Abadie & Susan Athey & Guido W. Imbens & Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2014. "Finite Population Causal Standard Errors," NBER Working Papers 20325, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Joshua Angrist & Jinyong Hahn, 2004. "When to Control for Covariates? Panel Asymptotics for Estimates of Treatment Effects," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 58-72, February.
    25. Cristian Pop-Eleches & Miguel Urquiola, 2013. "Going to a Better School: Effects and Behavioral Responses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1289-1324, June.
    26. repec:bla:biomet:v:72:y:2016:i:4:p:1055-1065 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Susan M. Dynarski & Thomas J. Kane & Parag A. Pathak, 2011. "Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters And Pilots," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 699-748.
    28. Joshua D. Angrist & Peter D. Hull & Parag A. Pathak & Christopher R. Walters, 2017. "Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(2), pages 871-919.
    29. Bing-ru Teh & Moria McCullough & Brian P. Gill, 2010. "Student Achievement in New York City Middle Schools Affiliated with Achievement First and Uncommon Schools," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 9b7646f5c8ae4067840b186c5, Mathematica Policy Research.
    30. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo Somaini, 2014. "Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism," NBER Working Papers 20775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    31. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, 2016. "A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1235-1268.
    32. Abadie A., 2002. "Bootstrap Tests for Distributional Treatment Effects in Instrumental Variable Models," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 97, pages 284-292, March.
    33. Imbens,Guido W. & Rubin,Donald B., 2015. "Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521885881, April.
    34. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Weiwei Hu & Parag A. Pathak, 2013. "Small High Schools and Student Achievement: Lottery-Based Evidence from New York City," NBER Working Papers 19576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Coal pollution and health before WWI
      by Nicholas Gruen in Club Troppo on 2017-01-09 23:23:57

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Magnac, Thierry, 2018. "Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d'allocation centralisée," TSE Working Papers 18-899, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. M. Fort & A. Ichino & G. Zanella, 2016. "Cognitive and non-cognitive costs of daycare 0–2 for girls," Working Papers wp1056, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    3. Will Dobbie & Roland G. Fryer, 2016. "Charter Schools and Labor Market Outcomes," Working Papers 600, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    4. Yusuki Narita, 2016. "(Non)Randomization: A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2056, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Will S. Dobbie & Roland G. Fryer, Jr, 2016. "Charter Schools and Labor Market Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 22502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. repec:eee:ecoedu:v:63:y:2018:i:c:p:167-179 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Yusuki Narita, 2016. "(Non)Randomization: A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2056R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2017.
    8. Adam Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2017. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," Working Papers 612, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    treatment effects; experimental design; instrumental variables; policy evaluation;

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C36 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10429. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak). General contact details of provider: http://www.iza.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.