Tenure in Office and Public Procurement
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Decarolis, Francesco & Palumbo, Giuliana, 2015. "Renegotiation of public contracts: An empirical analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 77-81.
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More about this item
Keywordstenure in office; procurement auctions; public works; term limit;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-01-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2017-01-29 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2017-01-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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