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Tenure in Office and Public Procurement

Author

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  • Decio Coviello
  • Stefano Gagliarducci

Abstract

We study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement using a dataset on Italian municipal governments. To identify a causal relation, we first compare elections where the incumbent mayor barely won or barely lost another term. We then use the introduction of a two-term limit, which granted one potential extra term to mayors appointed before the reform. The main result is that an increase in tenure is associated with "worse" procurement outcomes. Our estimates are informative of the possibility that time in office progressively leads to collusion between government officials and local bidders.

Suggested Citation

  • Decio Coviello & Stefano Gagliarducci, 2017. "Tenure in Office and Public Procurement," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 59-105, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:9:y:2017:i:3:p:59-105
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150426
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Luis Garicano & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Canice Prendergast, 2001. "Favoritism Under Social Pressure," Working Papers 2001-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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    3. Ingraham Allan T, 2005. "A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, September.
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    6. Ernesto Dal Bó & Martín Rossi, 2008. "Term Length and Political Performance," NBER Working Papers 14511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories

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