Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2020

• Federica Alberti & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Kei Tsutsui, 2020, "Implementing stakeholder participation as “egalitarian bidding” – The test of the Kantian pudding is in the institutionalized eating," Working Papers in Economics & Finance, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group, number 2020-09, May.
• Gorecki, Paul, 2020, "The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry Merger: Three Into Two Won’t Go," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100477, May.
• Cumpston, Anne & Khezr, Peyman, 2020, "Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 101336, Jun.
• Zhang, nan & Qin, Botao, 2020, "Reference point adaptation and air quality – Experimental evidence with anti-PM 2.5 facemasks from China," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 102935, Jun.
• Tchoffo, Rodrigue & Ngouhouo, Ibrahim & Nkemgha, Guivis, 2020, "Trade Liberalization and Macroeconomic Performance in Cameroon: An Imperfect Competition Approach," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 98558, Feb, revised 09 Feb 2020.
• Vojtěch Klézl & Radoslav Delina & Lenka Senderáková & Michal Tkáč, 2020, "Vliv zvolených faktorů na výsledek elektronických reverzních aukcí
  [Impact of Selected Factors on the Results of Electronic Reverse Auctions]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, volume 2020, issue 1, pages 62-85, DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1268.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2020, "Primary Dealers and the Demand for Government Debt," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2020-27, Jul.
• Faruk Gul & Paulo Natenzon & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2020, "Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2020-71, Oct.
• Terry Moon & David Schoenherr, 2020, "The Rise of a Network: Spillover of Political Patronage and Cronyism to the Private Sector," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2020-72, Dec.
• Brant Abbott & Robin Brace, 2020, "Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Wealth Inequality in the Survey of Consumer Finances?," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1427, Mar.
• Christopher Cotton & Brent R. Hickman & Joseph P. Price, 2020, "Affirmative Action, Shifting Competition, and Human Capital Accumulation: A Comparative Static Analysis of Investment Contests," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1433, Jun.
• Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2020, "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1446, Jul.
• Engelmann, Dirk & Frank, Jeff & Koch, Alexander K. & Valente, Marieta, 2020, "Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 237, Apr.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "The quest for the perfect auction," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-1, Oct.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-2, Oct.
• Paul R. Milgrom, 2020, "Auction Theory Evolving: Theorems and Applications," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-3, Dec.
• Robert B. Wilson, 2020, "Strategic Analysis of Auction Markets," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-4, Dec.
• José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020, "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, number 20-1, Feb.
• Netanel Nissim & Aner Sela, 2020, "The Third Place Game," Journal of Sports Economics, , volume 21, issue 1, pages 64-86, January, DOI: 10.1177/1527002519859415.
• Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2020, "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 571, Jun.
• Henner Gimpel & Valerie Graf-Drasch & Alexander Kammerer & Maximilian Keller & Xinyi Zheng, 2020, "When does it pay off to integrate sustainability in the business model? – A game-theoretic analysis," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 30, issue 4, pages 699-716, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-019-00361-y.
• Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020, "Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 333-345, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00187-4.
• Joyce Delnoij & Kris Jaegher, 2020, "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 69, issue 1, pages 183-216, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1161-5.
• Matt Essen & John Wooders, 2020, "Dissolving a partnership securely," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 69, issue 2, pages 415-434, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01177-9.
• Yan Long, 2020, "Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 2, pages 467-502, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01216-5.
• Sérgio O. Parreiras & Anna Rubinchik, 2020, "Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 3, pages 765-783, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01227-2.
• Ruben Juarez & Kohei Nitta & Miguel Vargas, 2020, "Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 3, pages 817-846, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01230-7.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Oleg Baranov, 2020, "Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 1, pages 251-273, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00691-3.
• Helmuts Āzacis, 2020, "Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 2, pages 411-444, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00710-8.
• Aner Sela, 2020, "Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 3, pages 749-771, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00726-0.
• Miguel A. Fonseca & Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2020, "Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 4, pages 1003-1043, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1.
• Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2020, "The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, volume 23, issue 3, pages 379-396, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10951-019-00624-8.
• Sander Onderstal, 2020, "Premium auctions in the field," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 24, issue 1, pages 39-63, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00228-1.
• Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2020, "Contests with insurance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 24, issue 1, pages 1-22, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5.
• Takumi Kongo, 2020, "Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 24, issue 3, pages 199-213, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00233-4.
• Justus Haucap, 2020, "Nobelpreis für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom: Zwei Ökonomen, die echte Märkte schufen
  [Nobel Prize for Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom: Two Economists who Created Real Markets]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 100, issue 12, pages 969-975, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10273-020-2806-0.
• Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2020, "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 20-071/I, Oct.
• Penasse, Julien & Renneboog, Luc & Scheinkman, Jose, 2020, "When a Master Dies : Speculation and Asset Float," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2020-010.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-666, Jun.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2020, "Collusive Market Allocations," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 20-1084, Mar.
• Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2020, "Dutch versus First-Price Auctions with Dynamic Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences," Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2020/05, Jun.
• Xue-Zhong He & Junqing Kang & Xuan Zhou, 2020, "The Fast and the Furious: Exchange Latency and Ever-fast Trading," Research Paper Series, Quantitative Finance Research Centre, University of Technology, Sydney, number 419, Dec.
• Maria Marchenko, 2020, "Peer effects in art prices," Department of Economics Working Papers, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, number wuwp298, May.
• Marchenko, Maria, 2020, "Peer effects in art prices," Department of Economics Working Paper Series, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, number 298, May.
• Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020, "A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1249.
• Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020, "Manipulative Disclosure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1250.
• Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2020, "A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types: An Efficient Auction Design for Various Kinds of Indivisible Commodities," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 20/08, Jul.
• Budish, Eric B. & Lee, Robin S. & Shim, John J., 2020, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Working Papers, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, number 301.
• Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes, 2020, "Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 119, pages 30-55.
• Richstein, Jörn C. & Lorenz, Casimir & Neuhoff, Karsten, 2020, "An auction story: How simple bids struggle with uncertainty," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 89, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104784.
• Seifert, Stefan & Hüttel, Silke, 2020, "Common values and unobserved heterogeneity in farmland auctions in Germany," FORLand Working Papers, Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation", number 21 (2020), DOI: 10.18452/21172.
• Qin, Botao, 2020, "Does a promise script work to reduce the hypothetical bias? Evidence from an induced value experiment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy, volume 14, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2020-.
• Dilger, Alexander, 2020, "Stellungnahme zur Änderung des Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetzes," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 9/2020.
• Engelmann, Dirk & Koch, Alexander K. & Frank, Jeff & Valente, Marieta, 2020, "Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 224641.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Hanke, Ann-Katrin & Ott, Marion, 2020, "A small volume reduction that melts down the market: Auctions with endogenous rationing," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-014.
• Clark, Robert & Coviello, Decio & de Leverano, Adriano, 2020, "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-052.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2020, "Split-award auctions and supply disruptions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-082.
• Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin, 2020, "Optimal auctions with signaling bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-091.
• Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Brennan C. Platt, 2020, "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 12, pages 3748-3785, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190460.
• Helene Mass & Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2020, "Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 189-245, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160250.
• Michel Grosz, 2020, "The Returns to a Large Community College Program: Evidence from Admissions Lotteries," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 1, pages 226-253, February, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170506.
• Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2020, "Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 2, issue 2, pages 225-236, June, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190244.
• David K. Levine, 2020, "Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 58, issue 2, pages 471-487, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20191533.
• Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020, "The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 58, issue 4, pages 1180-1196, December, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20191504.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2020, "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 2044, Dec.
• Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020, "Auctioning Annuities," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 29, Nov.
• María Florencia Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020, "Assessment of collusion damages in first price auctions," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 5, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2020, "The Economics of Social Data," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2004.03107, Apr, revised Sep 2022.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Omer Edhan & Ravi Jagadeesan & Paul Klemperer & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2006.16939, Jun.
• Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020, "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2008.01618, Aug, revised Aug 2020.
• Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020, "Auctioning Annuities," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2011.02899, Nov, revised Jun 2021.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2020, "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 20-29, Jul, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2020-29.
• Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2020, "Corruption red flags in public procurement: new evidence from Italian calls for tenders," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 544, Feb.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2020-78.
• Andreas Tryphonides & Chara Papioti & Grégory Claeys, 2020, "Liquidity Risk, Market Power and the Informational Effects of Policy," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1206, Oct.
• Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020, "Continuity And Robustness Of Bayesian Equilibria In Tullock Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2003.
• Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2020, "Assortative Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2004.
• Aner Sela, 2020, "Two-Stage Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2005.
• Din Cohen & Aner Sela, 2020, "Common-Value Group Contests With Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2007.
• Chen Cohen & David Lagziel & Ofer Levi & Aner Sela, 2020, "All-Pay Auctions With Heterogeneous Prizes And Partially Asymmetric Players," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2010.
• Ori Haimanko, 2020, "Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Existence In (Almost Continuous) Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2013.
• Xin Feng & Jingfeng Lu & Yeneng Sun, 2020, "Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism With Private Entry Costs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 58, issue 3, pages 1531-1541, July, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12884.
• Anette Boom & Stefan Buehler, 2020, "Vertical structure and the risk of rent extraction in the electricity industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 29, issue 1, pages 210-237, January, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12327.
• Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020, "Financial contracts as coordination device," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 29, issue 2, pages 241-259, April, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12340.
• Olivier Bos, 2020, "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 22, issue 2, pages 320-337, April, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12406.
• Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020, "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_158, Feb.
• Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass & Achim Wambach, 2020, "Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_225v2, Nov.
• Marco Reuter & Carl-Christian Groh, 2020, "Mechanism Design for Unequal Societies," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_228, Nov.
• Wladislaw Mill & John Morgan, 2020, "Competition Between Friends and Foes," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_242, Nov.
• Roig Guillem, 2020, "Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 20, issue 2, pages 1-21, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0190.
• Chernomaz Kirill & Yoshimoto Hisayuki, 2020, "How Accurately Do Structural Asymmetric First-Price Auction Estimates Represent True Valuations?," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-19, January, DOI: 10.1515/jem-2017-0001.
• Haucap Justus, 2020, "Das optimale Design von Auktionen als Teil einer modernen Ordnungspolitik: Zum Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, volume 71, issue 1, pages 347-362, April, DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2021-0015.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2020, "It Ain’t Over Until It’s Over: English Auctions with Subsequent Negotiations," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 20/04, Mar.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2020, "Asymmetric auctions with risk averse preferences," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 304, Feb.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2020, "Unraveling of Value-Rankings in Auctions with Resale," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 308, Jun.
• Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2020, "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Market Games," Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, number E2020/8, May.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020, "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8650.
• Dan Kovenock & Jingfeng Lu, 2020, "All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-01.
• Diego Aycinena & Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Lucas Rentschler, 2020, "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-26.
• D Aycinena & A Elbittar & A Gomberg & L Rentschler, 2020, "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It‚Äôs a matter of timing," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 18358, Aug.
• Bonatti, Alessandro & Bergemann, Dirk & Gan, Tan, 2020, "The Economics of Social Data," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14466, Mar.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2020, "Collusive Market Allocations," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14563, Apr.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "Assortative Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14598, Apr.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "Two-Stage Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14610, Apr.
• Klemperer, Paul & Baldwin, Elizabeth & Edhan, Omer & Jagadeesan, Ravi & Teytelboym, Alexander, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14926, Jun.
• Klemperer, Paul & Baldwin, Elizabeth & Goldberg, Paul & Lock, Edwin, 2020, "Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14976, Jun.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2020, "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15104, Jul.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2020, "Progressive Participation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15111, Jul.
• Bonatti, Alessandro & Argenziano, Rossella, 2020, "Information Revelation and Privacy Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15203, Aug.
• Bobtcheff, Catherine & Alary, David & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2020, "Organizing insurance supply for new and undiversifiable risks," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15234, Aug.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "All-Pay Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15293, Sep.
• Xiaohong Chen & Matthew Gentry & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu, 2020, "Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders and Selective Entry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2257, Sep.
• Moritz Bohland & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020, "Technology Policy and Market Structure: Evidence from the Power Sector," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1856.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109, Dec.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109r, Dec, revised May 2021.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109rr, Dec, revised Oct 2021.
• Ostrovsky, Michael, 2020, "Choice Screen Auctions," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3912, Nov.
• McCannon, Bryan C. & Minuci, Eduardo, 2020, "Shill bidding and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 26, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100279.
• Tan, Lijia & Wei, Lijia, 2020, "Evaluating car license auction mechanisms: Theory and experimental evidence," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2019.101387.
• Grinblatt, Mark & Wan, Kam-Ming, 2020, "State pricing, effectively complete markets, and corporate finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101542.
• Lindström, Hanna & Lundberg, Sofia & Marklund, Per-Olov, 2020, "How Green Public Procurement can drive conversion of farmland: An empirical analysis of an organic food policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106622.
• Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108805.
• Cao, Xiaoyong & Hsueh, Shao-Chieh & Wang, Wei, 2020, "On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108918.
• Pan, Lijun & Peng, Linyu & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "An assignment model with local constraints: Competitive equilibrium and ascending auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108905.
• Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020, "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109000.
• Chen, Bo, 2020, "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109122.
• Cohen, Din & Sela, Aner, 2020, "Common-value group contests with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164.
• Liu, Bin & Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2020, "Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109251.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2020, "Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615.
• Luo, Yao, 2020, "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 216, issue 2, pages 354-374, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.07.009.
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• Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2020, "Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 280, issue 3, pages 1108-1121, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.08.013.
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• Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2020, "Jump bids in real estate auctions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2020.101713.
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