Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2020

• Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020, "Auctioning Annuities," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2011.02899, Nov, revised Jun 2021.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2020, "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 20-29, Jul, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2020-29.
• Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2020, "Corruption red flags in public procurement: new evidence from Italian calls for tenders," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 544, Feb.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2020-78.
• Andreas Tryphonides & Grégory Claeys, 2020, "Liquidity Risk, Market Power and the Informational Effects of Policy," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1206, Oct.
• Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020, "Continuity And Robustness Of Bayesian Equilibria In Tullock Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2003.
• Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2020, "Assortative Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2004.
• Aner Sela, 2020, "Two-Stage Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2005.
• Din Cohen & Aner Sela, 2020, "Common-Value Group Contests With Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2007.
• Chen Cohen & David Lagziel & Ofer Levi & Aner Sela, 2020, "All-Pay Auctions With Heterogeneous Prizes And Partially Asymmetric Players," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2010.
• Ori Haimanko, 2020, "Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Existence In (Almost Continuous) Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2013.
• Xin Feng & Jingfeng Lu & Yeneng Sun, 2020, "Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism With Private Entry Costs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 58, issue 3, pages 1531-1541, July, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12884.
• Anette Boom & Stefan Buehler, 2020, "Vertical structure and the risk of rent extraction in the electricity industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 29, issue 1, pages 210-237, January, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12327.
• Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020, "Financial contracts as coordination device," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 29, issue 2, pages 241-259, April, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12340.
• Olivier Bos, 2020, "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 22, issue 2, pages 320-337, April, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12406.
• Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020, "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_158, Feb.
• Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass & Achim Wambach, 2020, "Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_225v2, Nov.
• Marco Reuter & Carl-Christian Groh, 2020, "Mechanism Design for Unequal Societies," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_228, Nov.
• Wladislaw Mill & John Morgan, 2020, "Competition Between Friends and Foes," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_242, Nov.
• Roig Guillem, 2020, "Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 20, issue 2, pages 1-21, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0190.
• Chernomaz Kirill & Yoshimoto Hisayuki, 2020, "How Accurately Do Structural Asymmetric First-Price Auction Estimates Represent True Valuations?," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-19, January, DOI: 10.1515/jem-2017-0001.
• Haucap Justus, 2020, "Das optimale Design von Auktionen als Teil einer modernen Ordnungspolitik: Zum Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, volume 71, issue 1, pages 347-362, April, DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2021-0015.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2020, "It Ain’t Over Until It’s Over: English Auctions with Subsequent Negotiations," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 20/04, Mar.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2020, "Asymmetric auctions with risk averse preferences," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 304, Feb.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2020, "Unraveling of Value-Rankings in Auctions with Resale," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 308, Jun.
• Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2020, "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Market Games," Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, number E2020/8, May.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020, "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8650.
• Dan Kovenock & Jingfeng Lu, 2020, "All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-01.
• Diego Aycinena & Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Lucas Rentschler, 2020, "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-26.
• D Aycinena & A Elbittar & A Gomberg & L Rentschler, 2020, "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It‚Äôs a matter of timing," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 18358, Aug.
• Bonatti, Alessandro & Bergemann, Dirk & Gan, Tan, 2020, "The Economics of Social Data," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14466, Mar.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2020, "Collusive Market Allocations," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14563, Apr.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "Assortative Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14598, Apr.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "Two-Stage Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14610, Apr.
• Klemperer, Paul & Baldwin, Elizabeth & Edhan, Omer & Jagadeesan, Ravi & Teytelboym, Alexander, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14926, Jun.
• Klemperer, Paul & Baldwin, Elizabeth & Goldberg, Paul & Lock, Edwin, 2020, "Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14976, Jun.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2020, "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 15104, Jul.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2020, "Progressive Participation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 15111, Jul.
• Bonatti, Alessandro & Argenziano, Rossella, 2020, "Information Revelation and Privacy Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 15203, Aug.
• Bobtcheff, Catherine & Alary, David & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2020, "Organizing insurance supply for new and undiversifiable risks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 15234, Aug.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "All-Pay Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 15293, Sep.
• Xiaohong Chen & Matthew Gentry & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu, 2020, "Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders and Selective Entry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2257, Sep.
• Moritz Bohland & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020, "Technology Policy and Market Structure: Evidence from the Power Sector," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1856.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109, Dec.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109r, Dec, revised May 2021.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109rr, Dec, revised Oct 2021.
• Ostrovsky, Michael, 2020, "Choice Screen Auctions," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3912, Nov.
• McCannon, Bryan C. & Minuci, Eduardo, 2020, "Shill bidding and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 26, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100279.
• Tan, Lijia & Wei, Lijia, 2020, "Evaluating car license auction mechanisms: Theory and experimental evidence," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2019.101387.
• Grinblatt, Mark & Wan, Kam-Ming, 2020, "State pricing, effectively complete markets, and corporate finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101542.
• Lindström, Hanna & Lundberg, Sofia & Marklund, Per-Olov, 2020, "How Green Public Procurement can drive conversion of farmland: An empirical analysis of an organic food policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106622.
• Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108805.
• Cao, Xiaoyong & Hsueh, Shao-Chieh & Wang, Wei, 2020, "On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108918.
• Pan, Lijun & Peng, Linyu & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "An assignment model with local constraints: Competitive equilibrium and ascending auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108905.
• Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020, "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109000.
• Chen, Bo, 2020, "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109122.
• Cohen, Din & Sela, Aner, 2020, "Common-value group contests with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164.
• Liu, Bin & Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2020, "Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109251.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2020, "Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615.
• Luo, Yao, 2020, "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 216, issue 2, pages 354-374, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.07.009.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2020, "When today’s rewards are tomorrow’s endowments: The effects of inequality on social competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103533.
• Freeman, David J. & Kimbrough, Erik O. & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2020, "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder’s curse," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103543.
• Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2020, "Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 280, issue 3, pages 1108-1121, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.08.013.
• Wang, Hong, 2020, "Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 283, issue 3, pages 1124-1135, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.053.
• Richstein, Jörn C. & Lorenz, Casimir & Neuhoff, Karsten, 2020, "An auction story: How simple bids struggle with uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104784.
• Zarnikau, J. & Tsai, C.H. & Woo, C.K., 2020, "Determinants of the wholesale prices of energy and ancillary services in the U.S. Midcontinent electricity market," Energy, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2020.117051.
• Noussair, Charles N. & Seres, Gyula, 2020, "The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 267-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.002.
• Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes, 2020, "Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 30-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.013.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.001.
• Doni, Nicola & Menicucci, Domenico, 2020, "On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 58-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.002.
• Wittwer, Milena, 2020, "Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 506-530, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.009.
• Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan, 2020, "Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 327-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.009.
• Goel, Gagan & Mirrokni, Vahab & Paes Leme, Renato, 2020, "Clinching auctions with online supply," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 342-358, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.008.
• Shafer, Rachel C., 2020, "Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 281-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.010.
• Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020, "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 386-405, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.014.
• Lundin, Erik & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2020, "Cournot competition in wholesale electricity markets: The Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102536.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2020, "Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.06.003.
• Birulin, Oleksii, 2020, "Optimality of simple procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102610.
• Li, Yanhai, 2020, "Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102624.
• Yan, Haomin, 2020, "Auctions with quantity externalities and endogenous supply," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102638.
• Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander & Treuren, Leonard, 2020, "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102642.
• Rosa, Benjamin V., 2020, "Affirmative action subcontracting regulations in dynamic procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102657.
• De Silva, Dakshina G. & Hubbard, Timothy P. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2020, "An evaluation of a bidder training program," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102661.
• Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020, "Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104954.
• Bobkova, Nina, 2020, "Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104975.
• Mensch, Jeffrey, 2020, "On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105026.
• Kim, Jinwoo & Koh, Youngwoo, 2020, "Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105029.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030.
• Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2020, "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105041.
• Utgoff, Naomi, 2020, "Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105054.
• Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2020, "Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105121.
• Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2020, "Jump bids in real estate auctions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2020.101713.
• Tkachenko, Andrey & Esaulov, Daniil, 2020, "Autocratic governors in public procurement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101825.
• Gugler, Klaus & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2020, "Employment behavior and the economic crisis: Evidence from winners and runners-up in procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104112.
• Wallis, Ian, 2020, "Value for money in procurement of urban bus services – Competitive tendering versus negotiated contracts: Recent New Zealand experience," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2020.100960.
• Foster, Joshua, 2020, "Loss aversion and sunk cost sensitivity in all-pay auctions for charity: Theory and experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 84, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101486.
• Gehrlein, Jonas & Crede, Ann-Kathrin & Adrian, Nana, 2020, "The impact of markets on moral reasoning: Evidence from an online experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101577.
• Kuś, Agnieszka, 2020, "Polish experience from first-ever spectrum auction," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 44, issue 7, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2020.101971.
• Yu-Wei Hsieh & Matthew Shum, 2020, "Bayesian Estimation of Linear Sum Assignment Problems," Advances in Econometrics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, "Essays in Honor of Cheng Hsiao", DOI: 10.1108/S0731-905320200000041011.
• Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2020, "Optimal Environmental Radical Activism," Working Papers, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, number 2020.07, Feb.
• Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Andrea Guido & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2020, "Controlling Monopoly Power in a Double-Auction Market Experiment," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, number 2020-06, Mar.
• Emmanuel LORENZON, 2020, "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Bordeaux Economics Working Papers, Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE), number 2020-20.
• Edwyna Harris & Sumner La Croix, 2020, "Did Speculation in Land Pay Off for British Investors? Buying and Selecting Land in South Australia, 1835-1850," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 202010, Apr.
• Edwyna Harris & Sumner La Croix, 2020, "Understanding the Gains to Capitalists from Colonization: Lessons from Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Karl Marx and Edward Gibbon Wakefield," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 202023, Sep.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020, "Auctions with signaling concerns," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04120416, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12406.
• Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020, "Financial contracts as coordination device," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04129332, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12340.
• Olivier Bos, 2020, "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04129340, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12406.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020, "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03229982, Aug, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz021.
• Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020, "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03229982, Aug, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz021.
• Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2020, "Optimal Environmental Radical Activism," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-02492834, Feb.
• David Alary & Catherine Bobtcheff & Carole Haritchabalet, 2020, "Organizing insurance supply for new and undiversifiable risks," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-02928816, Sep.
• Mathieu Aubry & Roman Kraeussl & Gustavo Manso & Christophe Spaenjers, 2020, "Machines and Masterpieces: Predicting Prices in the Art Auction Market," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02896049, Jul, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3347175.
• Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2020, "Optimal Environmental Radical Activism," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-02492834, Feb.
• David Alary & Catherine Bobtcheff & Carole Haritchabalet, 2020, "Organizing insurance supply for new and undiversifiable risks," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-02928816, Sep.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2020, "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03078811, Oct.
• Boom, Anette & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2020, "Is Real-time Pricing Smart for Consumers?," Working Papers, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, number 12-2020, Jul.
• Knutsson, Daniel & Tyrefors, Björn, 2020, "The Quality and Efficiency Between Public and Private Firms: Evidence from Ambulance Services," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1365, Oct, revised 01 Jul 2021.
• Hungria Gunnelin, Rosane, 2020, "Bidding strategies and winner’s curse in auctions of non-distressed residential real estate," Working Paper Series, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance, number 20/13, Oct.
• Lundberg, Johan & Lundberg, Sofia, 2020, "Att utvärdera mot pris och kvalitet. Om utvärderingsmodeller, delaktighet & tillgänglighet," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 976, May.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2020, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 66, issue 10, pages 4433-4454, October, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457.
• Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2020, "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 66, issue 5, pages 2194-2212, May, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3290.
• Orrenius, Pia M. & Zavodny, Madeline, 2020, "An Auctions Approach to Immigration Policy," IZA Policy Papers, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), number 151, Feb.
• Chukwudi Henry Dike, 2020, "Strategic Interactions in Financial Networks," 2020 Papers, Job Market Papers, number pdi579, Dec.
• Eric M. Aldrich & Kristian López Vargas, 2020, "Experiments in high-frequency trading: comparing two market institutions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 23, issue 2, pages 322-352, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-019-09605-2.
• M. W. Luke Chan & Dan Sabrina Gong & Terry A. Yip, 2020, "Return on violin and macroeconomic fluctuation," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 44, issue 2, pages 339-346, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-019-09356-1.
• William E. Gryc, 2020, "Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 129, issue 2, pages 103-142, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-019-00674-8.
• Mats A. Bergman & Johan Lundberg & Sofia Lundberg & Johan Y. Stake, 2020, "Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, volume 56, issue 1, pages 107-130, February, DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-09676-0.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Fumihiro Yonekura, 2020, "Implementation in Iterative Elimination of Obviously Dominated Strategies: An Experiment on King Solomon's Dilemma," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2020-17, Apr.
• Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2020, "Bond Losses and Systemic Risk," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 288072615.
• Donna, Javier D. & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory F., 2020, "Networks, frictions, and price dispersion," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 84735.
• Karine Brisset & François Cochard & François Maréchal, 2020, "The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 176, issue 3, pages 526-548, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0034.
• Bo Chen & Marco Serena, 2020, "Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2020-08, Jun.

2019

• Chenghuan Sean Chu & Marc Rysman, 2019, "Competition and Strategic Incentives in the Market for Credit Ratings: Empirics of the Financial Crisis of 2007," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 10, pages 3514-3555, October.
• Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2019, "Auctions with Limited Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 3, pages 876-910, March.
• Andrey Malenko & Anton Tsoy, 2019, "Selling to Advised Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 4, pages 1323-1348, April.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 5, pages 1911-1929, May.
• Helmut Elsinger & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler & Christine Zulehner, 2019, "Competition in Treasury Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 1, pages 157-184, February.
• David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2019, "A Bias of Screening," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 1, issue 3, pages 343-356, December.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 57, issue 2, pages 235-274, June.
• Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2019, "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1912.03607, Dec, revised May 2021.
• Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Brent Hickman & Eric Richert, 2019, "Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 19-30, Aug, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2019-30.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," GREEN Working Papers, GREEN, Centre for Research on Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy & Networks, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, number 03.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," IEFE Working Papers, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, number 109.
• Dejan Trifunović, 2019, "Hibridne Aukcije I Aukcije Sa Premijom (Hybrid Auctions And Premium Auctions)," Ekonomske ideje i praksa, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, issue 33, pages 7-24, June.
• Maris Goldmanis & Francesco Decarolis & Antonio Penta, 2019, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1088, Apr.
• Minbo Xu & Sanxi Li & Jianye Yan, 2019, "All‐Pay Auctions With A Buy‐Price Option," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 57, issue 1, pages 617-630, January, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12585.
• Sascha Füllbrunn & Dirk‐Jan Janssen & Utz Weitzel, 2019, "Risk Aversion And Overbidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: New Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 57, issue 1, pages 631-647, January, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12716.
• Indranil Chakraborty, 2019, "Reserve Price Versus Entry Fee In Standard Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 57, issue 1, pages 648-653, January, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12715.
• Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2019, "Mix‐and‐match divestitures and merger harm," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 70, issue 3, pages 346-366, September, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12237.
• Anouar El Haji & Sander Onderstal, 2019, "Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 28, issue 4, pages 670-686, November, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12314.
• Benjamin V. Rosa, 2019, "Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 67, issue 2, pages 161-208, June, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12202.
• Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019, "The bidder exclusion effect," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 50, issue 1, pages 93-120, March, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12263.
• Stephan Lauermann & Andre Speit, 2019, "Bidding in Common-Value Auctions With an Uncertain Number of Competitors," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_136, Nov.
• Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner, 2019, "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics, number WP2019-04, Mar.
• Matsushima Hitoshi, 2019, "Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 19, issue 1, pages 1-11, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0072.
• Bourjade Sylvain, 2019, "Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 19, issue 1, pages 1-14, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0188.
• Landi Massimiliano & Menicucci Domenico, 2019, "Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 19, issue 1, pages 1-25, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0125.
• Doni Nicola & Menicucci Domenico, 2019, "A First Price Auction with an Arbitrary Number of Asymmetric Bidders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 19, issue 2, pages 1-7, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0105.
• Ahlqvist, V. & Holmberg, P & Tangeras, T., 2019, "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1902, Jan.
• Newbery, D. & Gissey, G. & Guo, B. & Dodds, P., 2019, "The private and social value of British electrical interconnectors," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 1941, Apr.
• Aldrich, Eric M & Friedman, Daniel, 2019, "Order Protection through Delayed Messaging," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz, number qt4938f518, Jun.
• Oliver Kirchkamp & Wladislaw Mill, 2019, "Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7631.
• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2019, "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7805.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-459, May.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-462, Jul.
• David K Levine, 2019, "Radical Markets by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl: a review essay," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 786969000000001522, May.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick & Waterson, Michael, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13461, Jan.
• Klemperer, Paul & Baldwin, Elizabeth, 2019, "Understanding Preferences: "Demand Types", and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13586, Mar.
• Graddy, Kathryn & Ashenfelter, Orley C, 2019, "Art Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13665, Apr.
• Klemperer, Paul, 2019, "Product-Mix Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13667, Apr.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Rovigatti, Gabriele, 2019, "From Mad Men to Maths Men: Concentration and Buyer Power in Online Advertising," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13897, Jul.
• Gautier, Pieter & Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Vroman, Susan, 2019, "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13912, Aug.
• Pycia, Marek & Troyan, Peter, 2022, "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14043, Jan.
• Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER, 2019, "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2019-15, Sep.
• Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Sela, A., 2019, "Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 28116, Feb.
• Francisco Alvarez & Cristina Mazon, 2019, "Overpricing in Spanish Treasury Auctions," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 20, issue 1, pages 199-220, May.
• Faye, Benoît & Le Fur, Eric, 2019, "On the Constancy of Hedonic Wine Price Coefficients over Time," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 14, issue 2, pages 182-207, May.
• Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2019, "The Role of Individual Risk Attitudes on Old Wine Valuations," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 14, issue 4, pages 417-426, November.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2162, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2162R, Feb, revised Feb 2019.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2162R2, Feb, revised Mar 2021.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2162R3, Feb, revised Aug 2021.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2162R4, Feb, revised Oct 2021.
• Nicholas Ryan, 2019, "Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2164, Feb.
• Nicholas Ryan, 2019, "Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2164R, Feb, revised Jul 2019.
• Karim Jamal & Michael Maier & Shyam Sunder, 2019, "Aggregation of Diverse Information with Double Auction Trading among Minimally-Intelligent Algorithmic Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2182, Jun.
• Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019, "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2189, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019, "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2189R, Aug, revised Jan 2020.
• Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019, "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2189R2, Aug, revised Jul 2020.
• Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019, "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2189R3, Aug, revised Nov 2020.
• Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019, "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2189R4, Aug, revised Jul 2021.
• Idione Meneghel & Rabee Tourky, 2019, "On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2190, Aug.
• Idione Meneghel & Rabee Tourky, 2019, "On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2190r, Aug, revised Nov 2019.
• Idione Meneghel & Rabee Tourky, 2019, "On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2190r2, Aug, revised Mar 2020.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2200, Sep.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2019, "The Economics of Social Data," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2203, Sep.