Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2021

• Viehmann, Johannes & Lorenczik, Stefan & Malischek, Raimund, 2021, "Multi-unit multiple bid auctions in balancing markets: An agent-based Q-learning approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.105035.
• Heim, Sven & Götz, Georg, 2021, "Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308.
• Alexakis, Christos & Pappas, Vasileios & Skarmeas, Emmanouil, 2021, "Market abuse under different close price determination mechanisms: A European case," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101707.
• Frei, Christoph & Mitra, Joshua, 2021, "Optimal closing benchmarks," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2020.101674.
• Bian, Timothy Yang & Huang, Jun & Zhe, Siqi & Zhang, Man, 2021, "Anchoring effects in the Chinese art market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 43, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102050.
• Chen, Jiakai, 2021, "LIBOR's poker," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2020.100586.
• Ghosh, Gagan, 2021, "Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, pages 75-93, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.002.
• Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021, "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 155-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.001.
• Yan, Haomin, 2021, "Position auctions with multi-unit demands," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 179-193, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.002.
• Garratt, Rodney & Georganas, Sotiris, 2021, "Auctions with speculators: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 256-270, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.004.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Zongwei & Riis, Christian, 2021, "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.001.
• Cerrone, Claudia & Hermstrüwer, Yoan & Robalo, Pedro, 2021, "Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 114-143, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011.
• Sano, Ryuji, 2021, "Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 465-473, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.006.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2021, "Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 616-635, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.003.
• Barbosa, Klenio & Boyer, Pierre C., 2021, "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102754.
• Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021, "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102737.
• Hippel, Svenja & Hoeppner, Sven, 2021, "Contracts as reference points: A replication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105973.
• Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Onderstal, Sander & Parisi, Francesco, 2021, "Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105981.
• Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2021, "How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 189-205, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.015.
• Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021, "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, pages 328-343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.031.
• Harris, Edwyna & La Croix, Sumner, 2021, "Understanding the gains to capitalists from colonization: Lessons from Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Karl Marx and Edward Gibbon Wakefield," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, pages 348-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.030.
• Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, pages 448-469, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001.
• Lim, Wooyoung & Xiong, Siyang, 2021, "Does jump bidding increase sellers’ revenue? Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, pages 84-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.026.
• Duffy, John & Matros, Alexander, 2021, "All-pay auctions versus lotteries as provisional fixed-prize fundraising mechanisms: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, pages 434-464, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.10.010.
• Bernardino, Wilton & Ospina, Raydonal & Souza, Filipe Costa de & Rêgo, Leandro & Pereira, Felipe, 2021, "Risk curves: A methodology to evaluate the risk of fraud by stock price manipulation based on game theory and detection software," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2020.105953.
• Fu, Hu & Haghpanah, Nima & Hartline, Jason & Kleinberg, Robert, 2021, "Full surplus extraction from samples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105230.
• Milgrom, Paul & Mollner, Joshua, 2021, "Extended proper equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 194, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105258.
• Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John, 2021, "Allocating positions fairly: Auctions and Shapley value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105315.
• Ichihashi, Shota, 2021, "The economics of data externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105316.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2021, "Sequential auctions with ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105324.
• von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2021, "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105328.
• Long, Yan & Sethuraman, Jay & Xue, Jingyi, 2021, "Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105350.
• Menicucci, Domenico, 2021, "In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105371.
• von Hobe, Cord-Friedrich & Musshoff, Oliver, 2021, "On the effectiveness of restricted tendering as a form of policy intervention on agricultural land markets," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105343.
• Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2021, "Your failure is my opportunity—Effects of elimination in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102495.
• Agarwal, Sumit & Hauswald, Robert, 2021, "Information disclosure and the choice between arm’s-length and inside debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, pages 1008-1022, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.08.001.
• Koska, Onur A. & Stähler, Frank, 2021, "It ain’t over until it’s over: English auctions with subsequent negotiations," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, pages 121-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2020.11.010.
• Matteucci, Nicola, 2021, "Procuring NGA infrastructure: The performance of EMAT auctions in Italy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2020.102074.
• David Newbery, 2021, "Designing Efficient Renewable Electricity Support Schemes," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2107, Mar.
• Karim Anaya & Michael Pollitt, 2021, "An evaluation of a local reactive power market: the case of Power Potential," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2124, Oct.
• Bernardo David & Lorenzo Gentile & Mohsen Pourpouneh, 2021, "FAST: Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2021/02, Mar.
• James Albrecht & Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~21-21-16, Jul.
• Yann Raineau & Éric Giraud-Héraud & Sébastien Lecocq & Stéphanie Pérès & Alexandre Pons & Sophie Tempère, 2021, "When Undue Health Claims Supersede Genuine Environmental Efforts: Evidence from Experimental Auctions with Bordeaux Wine Consumers," Bordeaux Economics Working Papers, Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE), number 2021-21.
• Adriana Cuoco Portugal & Maurício Soares Bugarin, 2021, "Licitações com preço de reserva secreto e negociação: Uma análise de teoria dos leilões para o caso de valores privados," Economics and Politics Working Paper Series, Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília, number 105/2021, Oct, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23574391.
• Sven Heim & Georg Götz, 2021, "Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03519694, Aug, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308.
• Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Andrea Guido & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2021, "Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03520328, Oct, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12504.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021, "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03544026, Jan, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa092.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2021, "Organizing Competition for the Market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03551028, Oct, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvab044.
• Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04120443, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001.
• Tierney, Ryan, 2021, "Simple Social Choice Rules for Exchange," Discussion Papers on Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics, number 4/2021, Mar.
• Lindström, Hanna & Lundberg, Sofia & Marklund, Per-Olov, 2021, "Green Public Procurement: An empirical analysis of the uptake of organic food policy," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 997, Oct.
• Dmitriy Ivanov & Nikita Kalinin & Alexander Nesterov & Ivan Susin, 2021, "2019 Crab Quota Auction: History, Evaluation, and Alternative Scenarios," HSE Economic Journal, National Research University Higher School of Economics, volume 25, issue 4, pages 574-594.
• Alex Imas & Kristóf Madarász, 2021, "Mimetic Dominance and the Economics of Exclusion: Private Goods in Public Context," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2021-001, Jan.
• Siti Afni ANISAH & Lestari Rahayu WALUYATI & Agus Dwi NUGROHO, 2021, "Could A New Agricultural Auction Market Implement A Good Marketing Mix?," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, volume 0, issue 2, pages 181-191, June.
• Dirk Bethmann & Robert Rudolf, 2021, "The paradox of wealthy nations' unhappy adolescents," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 2101.
• Paolo Riccardo Morganti, 2021, "Extreme Value Theory and Auction Models," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, volume 16, issue 2, pages 1-15, Abril - J.
• Stjepan Srhojer & Melko Dragojevic, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2021-28.
• Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan, 2021, "On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 14524, Jun.
• Pengfei Liu, 2021, "Balancing Cost Effectiveness and Incentive Properties in Conservation Auctions: Experimental Evidence from Three Multi-award Reverse Auction Mechanisms," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 78, issue 3, pages 417-451, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00538-0.
• Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2021, "An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 78, issue 4, pages 571-585, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00543-3.
• Daniel G. Stephenson & Alexander L. Brown, 2021, "Playing the field in all-pay auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 24, issue 2, pages 489-514, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09669-5.
• Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2021, "Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 24, issue 2, pages 536-557, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09671-x.
• Koki Arai, 2021, "The Characteristics of Low Bid Price Survey Standards and Their Impact," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, volume 21, issue 4, pages 593-608, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10842-021-00372-6.
• Anette Boom & Sebastian Schwenen, 2021, "Is real-time pricing smart for consumers?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 60, issue 2, pages 193-213, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09440-5.
• Marie BLUM & Régis BLAZY, 2021, "The three stages of an auction: how do the bid dynamics influence auction prices? Evidence from live art auctions," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg, number 2021-10.

2020

• Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Brennan C. Platt, 2020, "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 12, pages 3748-3785, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190460.
• Helene Mass & Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2020, "Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 189-245, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160250.
• Michel Grosz, 2020, "The Returns to a Large Community College Program: Evidence from Admissions Lotteries," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 1, pages 226-253, February, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170506.
• Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2020, "Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 2, issue 2, pages 225-236, June, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190244.
• David K. Levine, 2020, "Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 58, issue 2, pages 471-487, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20191533.
• Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020, "The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 58, issue 4, pages 1180-1196, December, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20191504.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2020, "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 2044, Dec.
• Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020, "Auctioning Annuities," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 29, Nov.
• María Florencia Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020, "Assessment of collusion damages in first price auctions," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 5, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2020, "The Economics of Social Data," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2004.03107, Apr, revised Sep 2022.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Omer Edhan & Ravi Jagadeesan & Paul Klemperer & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2006.16939, Jun.
• Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020, "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2008.01618, Aug, revised Aug 2020.
• Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020, "Auctioning Annuities," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2011.02899, Nov, revised Jun 2021.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2020, "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 20-29, Jul, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2020-29.
• Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2020, "Corruption red flags in public procurement: new evidence from Italian calls for tenders," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 544, Feb.
• Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020, "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2020-78.
• Grégory Claeys & Chara Papioti & Andreas Tryphonides, 2020, "Liquidity Risk, Market Power and the Informational Effects of Policy," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1206, Oct.
• Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020, "Continuity And Robustness Of Bayesian Equilibria In Tullock Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2003.
• Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2020, "Assortative Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2004.
• Aner Sela, 2020, "Two-Stage Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2005.
• Din Cohen & Aner Sela, 2020, "Common-Value Group Contests With Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2007.
• Chen Cohen & David Lagziel & Ofer Levi & Aner Sela, 2020, "All-Pay Auctions With Heterogeneous Prizes And Partially Asymmetric Players," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2010.
• Ori Haimanko, 2020, "Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Existence In (Almost Continuous) Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2013.
• Xin Feng & Jingfeng Lu & Yeneng Sun, 2020, "Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism With Private Entry Costs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 58, issue 3, pages 1531-1541, July, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12884.
• Anette Boom & Stefan Buehler, 2020, "Vertical structure and the risk of rent extraction in the electricity industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 29, issue 1, pages 210-237, January, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12327.
• Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020, "Financial contracts as coordination device," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 29, issue 2, pages 241-259, April, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12340.
• Olivier Bos, 2020, "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 22, issue 2, pages 320-337, April, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12406.
• Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020, "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_158, Feb.
• Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass & Achim Wambach, 2020, "Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_225v2, Nov.
• Marco Reuter & Carl-Christian Groh, 2020, "Mechanism Design for Unequal Societies," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_228, Nov.
• Wladislaw Mill & John Morgan, 2020, "Competition Between Friends and Foes," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_242, Nov.
• Roig Guillem, 2020, "Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 20, issue 2, pages 1-21, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0190.
• Chernomaz Kirill & Yoshimoto Hisayuki, 2020, "How Accurately Do Structural Asymmetric First-Price Auction Estimates Represent True Valuations?," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-19, January, DOI: 10.1515/jem-2017-0001.
• Haucap Justus, 2020, "Das optimale Design von Auktionen als Teil einer modernen Ordnungspolitik: Zum Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, volume 71, issue 1, pages 347-362, April, DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2021-0015.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2020, "It Ain’t Over Until It’s Over: English Auctions with Subsequent Negotiations," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 20/04, Mar.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2020, "Asymmetric auctions with risk averse preferences," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 304, Feb.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2020, "Unraveling of Value-Rankings in Auctions with Resale," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 308, Jun.
• Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2020, "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Market Games," Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, number E2020/8, May.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020, "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8650.
• Dan Kovenock & Jingfeng Lu, 2020, "All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-01.
• Diego Aycinena & Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Lucas Rentschler, 2020, "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-26.
• D Aycinena & A Elbittar & A Gomberg & L Rentschler, 2020, "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It‚Äôs a matter of timing," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 18358, Aug.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Gan, Tan, 2020, "The Economics of Social Data," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14466, Mar.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2020, "Collusive Market Allocations," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14563, Apr.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "Assortative Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14598, Apr.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "Two-Stage Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14610, Apr.
• Baldwin, Elizabeth & Edhan, Omer & Jagadeesan, Ravi & Klemperer, Paul & Teytelboym, Alexander, 2020, "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14926, Jun.
• Baldwin, Elizabeth & Goldberg, Paul & Klemperer, Paul & Lock, Edwin, 2020, "Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14976, Jun.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2020, "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15104, Jul.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2020, "Progressive Participation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15111, Jul.
• Argenziano, Rossella & Bonatti, Alessandro, 2020, "Data Linkages and Privacy Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15203, Aug.
• Bobtcheff, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole & Alary, David, 2020, "Organizing insurance supply for new and undiversifiable risks," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15234, Aug.
• Sela, Aner, 2020, "All-Pay Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15293, Sep.
• Xiaohong Chen & Matthew Gentry & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu, 2020, "Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders and Selective Entry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2257, Sep.
• Moritz Bohland & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020, "Technology Policy and Market Structure: Evidence from the Power Sector," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1856.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109, Dec.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109r, Dec, revised May 2021.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020, "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1109rr, Dec, revised Oct 2021.
• Ostrovsky, Michael, 2020, "Choice Screen Auctions," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3912, Nov.
• McCannon, Bryan C. & Minuci, Eduardo, 2020, "Shill bidding and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, volume 26, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100279.
• Tan, Lijia & Wei, Lijia, 2020, "Evaluating car license auction mechanisms: Theory and experimental evidence," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2019.101387.
• Grinblatt, Mark & Wan, Kam-Ming, 2020, "State pricing, effectively complete markets, and corporate finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101542.
• Lindström, Hanna & Lundberg, Sofia & Marklund, Per-Olov, 2020, "How Green Public Procurement can drive conversion of farmland: An empirical analysis of an organic food policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106622.
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• Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2020, "Jump bids in real estate auctions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2020.101713.
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