IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v120y2020icp58-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)

Author

Listed:
  • Doni, Nicola
  • Menicucci, Domenico

Abstract

Gentry, Li, Lu (2017) (GLL henceforth) study an auction model with endogenous entry in which, before the entry decision, each bidder observes a private signal; a higher signal implies a better distribution for the bidder's valuation. GLL claim that the optimal reserve price is greater than the seller's value for the object on sale and that the optimal entry fee is positive. We prove that these claims are incorrect: The seller may want to subsidize entry to stimulate competition in the auction (through a negative entry fee or through a reserve price below the seller's value), or to provide appropriate entry incentives if a suitable reserve price is effective at maximizing total surplus and at extracting bidders' rents.

Suggested Citation

  • Doni, Nicola & Menicucci, Domenico, 2020. "On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 58-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:58-66
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619301782
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017. "Auctions with selective entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 104-111.
    2. Paulo K. Monteiro & Flavio M. Menezes, 2000. "original papers : Auctions with endogenous participation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 71-89.
    3. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2007. "When are Auctions Best?," Economics Papers 2007-W03, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    2. Ginsburgh, Victor & Legros, Patrick & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2010. "On the incidence of commissions in auction markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 639-644, November.
    3. J.M.J. Delnoij & K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2016. "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Working Papers 16-07, Utrecht School of Economics.
    4. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2011. "On favoritism in auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 265-267, March.
    5. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Sweeting, Andrew & Bhattacharya, Vivek, 2015. "Selective entry and auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 189-207.
    7. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    8. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
    9. Diego Aycinena & Lucas Rentschler, 2018. "Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 924-949, December.
    10. Peyman Khezr & Flavio M. Menezes, 2021. "Entry and social efficiency under Bertrand competition and asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 927-944, December.
    11. Jingfeng Lu, 2009. "Auction design with opportunity cost," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 73-103, January.
    12. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
    13. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
    14. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019. "The bidder exclusion effect," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 93-120, March.
    16. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
    17. Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    18. Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2020. "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    19. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "On asymmetric reserve prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    20. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Endogenous entry; Reserve price; Entry fee;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:58-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.