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Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default

Author

Listed:
  • Engelmann, Dirk
  • Koch, Alexander K.
  • Frank, Jeff
  • Valente, Marieta

Abstract

Winning bidders in online auctions frequently fail to complete the transaction. Because enforcing bids usually is too costly, auction platforms often allow sellers to make a "secondchance" offer to the second highest bidder, to buy at the bid price of this bidder, and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who fail to pay. We show theoretically that, all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces amounts bid in auctions where there is a probability that a bidder defaults. Nevertheless, we show that it is not optimal for a seller to exclude a buyer who is likely to default. In addition, buyer reputation systems create a strategic effect that rewards bidders who have a reputation for defaulting, counter to the idea of creating a deterrent against such behavior. Actual bidding in experimental auctions support these predictions and provide insights on their practical relevance.

Suggested Citation

  • Engelmann, Dirk & Koch, Alexander K. & Frank, Jeff & Valente, Marieta, 2020. "Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224641, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224641
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lingfang (Ivy) Li & Steven Tadelis & Xiaolan Zhou, 2020. "Buying reputation as a signal of quality: Evidence from an online marketplace," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 965-988, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Default; Reputation; Second-Chance Offers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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