Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1999

• Ahmed Anwar, 1999, "The Case for a Discriminatory Pricing Rule in Competitive Electricity Pools," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 39, Jul.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1999, "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 2, issue 2, pages 99-134, May.
• Kultti, Klaus, 1999, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 1, pages 106-113, April.
• Cameron, Lisa & Cramton, Peter, 1999, "The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, volume 12, issue 3, pages 71-81, April.
• Vayanos, Dimitri, 1999, "Strategic trading and welfare in a dynamic market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 449, Apr.
• David Lucking-Reiley, 1999, "Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet," Framed Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00183.
• Menezes, Flavio Marques & Monteiro, P. K., 1999, "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE), EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), number 360, Oct.
• Menezes, F., 1999, "Auctions of Identical Objects with Single-Unit Demands: a Survey," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 363.
• Menezes, F. & Monteiro, P.K., 1999, "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 366.
• Lunander, A., 1999, "Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1999:17.
• Thierry Foucault, 1999, "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00459769, May, DOI: 10.1016/S1386-4181(98)00012-3.
• Konrad, Kai A. & Peters, Wolfgang & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999, "Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 316, Apr.
• Lunander, Anders, 1999, "Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1999:17, Oct.
• Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999, "Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 2, issue 1, pages 59-75, August, DOI: 10.1023/A:1009929832148.
• Olivier Chanel & Stéphanie Vincent, 1999, "The Declining Price Effect in Sequential Auctions: What Theory Does Not Predict," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1999-13, Sep.
• Lebrun, Bernard & Tremblay, Marie-Christine, 1999, "Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auction with One-Dimensional Multi-Unit Demands," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9921.

1998

• Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 3, pages 643-651, June.
• Wang, Ruqu & Bag, Parimal Kanti & Dinlersoz, Murat Emim, 1998, "More on Phantom Bidding," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273405, Oct, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273405.
• Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998, "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Discussion Papers, Resources for the Future, number 10668, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10668.
• Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998, "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, number 197846, Feb, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.197846.
• Burguet, R., 1998, "Auction Theory: a Guided Tour," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 422.98.
• Ruqu Wang, 1998, "Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 2, pages 395-410, May.
• d’ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998010, Jan.
• CALCAGNO, Riccardo & LOVO, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-ask price competition with asymmetric information between market makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998016, Feb.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998017, Feb.
• ALBANO, Gian Luigi & JOUNEAU, Fréféric, 1998, "A Bayesian approach to the econometrics of first-price auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998031, Apr.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1998, "Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in Dynamic Limit Order Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1817, Mar.
• Felli, Leonardo & Cornelli, Francesca, 1998, "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2030, Nov.
• Calcagno, Riccardo & Lovo, Stefano M., 1998, "Bid-Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market Makers," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1998012, May.
• Giuseppe Moscarini & Marco Ottaviani, 1998, "Price Competition for an Informed Buyer," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1199, Oct.
• Cramton, Peter, 1998, "Ascending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 745-756, May.
• Klemperer, Paul, 1998, "Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 757-769, May.
• Gjerstad, Steven & Dickhaut, John, 1998, "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 1, pages 1-29, January.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1998, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 82, issue 1, pages 65-88, September.
• Eugenia Kazamaki Ottersten, 1998, "Screening contracts when institutions matter : an example," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, volume 11, issue 2, pages 110-116, Autumn.
• Leonardo Felli & Francesca Cornelli, 1998, "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp300, Aug.
• Chanel, O. & Vincent, S., 1998, "Price Decline in Sequential Auction: Reasons and Measures," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98b05.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 93.
• Neeman, Z., 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics, number 95.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0093, Sep.
• Zvika Neeman, 1998, "The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0095, May.
• Parlane, S., 1998, "Procurement Contracts under Limited Liability," Papers, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-, number 98/3.
• Parlane, S., 1998, "Contracting with Capacity Constrained Suppliers," Papers, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-, number 98/4.
• Laffont, J.-J. & Loisel, P. & Robert, J., 1998, "Intra-Day Dynamics in Sequential Auctions: Theory and Estimation," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 98.488.
• P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998, "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1857.
• Gupta, M. & Lebrun, B., 1998, "A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale," Papers, Laval - Recherche en Energie, number 98-08.
• Bergman, Mats A. & Lundberg, Sofia, 1998, "Auctioned and Re-Auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 273, Oct.
• von der Fehr, N.-H. M. & Riis, C., 1998, "Option Values in Sequential Markets," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 07/1998.
• Bergman, Mats & Lundberg, Sofia, 1998, "Auctioned and Re-auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 468, May.
• Menezes, Flavio M & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 1998, "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, volume 17, issue 3, pages 219-232, November.
• Kala Krishna & Torben Tranæs, 1998, "Allocating multiple units by sealed-bid auctions," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-05, Apr.
• Stéphanie Vincent, 1998, "Sequential auctions with heterogeneous bidders," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-19, Oct.
• Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1998, "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 9809, May.
• Lebrun, Bernard & Gupta, Madhurima, 1998, "A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9819.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1998, "Collusion without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 610.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1998, "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97jems, Jun, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1998, "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98cra2, Mar.
• Peter Cramton, 1998, "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98eer, Jul, revised 28 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & John Williams, 1998, "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98jleer, Jul, revised 12 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton, 1998, "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98jlefcc, Jul, revised 27 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1998, "A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98mdi, Sep.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998, "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpoe, May, revised 18 Jun 1999.
• Singh, Bhupal & Dhal, Sarat C., 1998, "Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 12147, Sep.
• Alan Gunderson & Ruqu Wang, 1998, "Signally By Jump Bidding In Private Value Auctions," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 975, Oct.
• Parimal Kanti Bag & Emim Murat Dinlersoz & Ruqu Wang, 1998, "More On Phantom Bidding," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 976, Oct.
• Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter, 1998, "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number dp-98-34, May.
• Péter Esõ, 1998, "Farkas Törvény az Árveréselméletben," Rajk László Szakkollégium Working Papers, Rajk László College, number 1, Mar.
• Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998, "Bidding for Labour," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp98-03.
• Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998, "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 227-258.
• Ulrich Kamecke, 1998, "Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 27, issue 3, pages 407-426.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "Structural Estimation Of Auction Models," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-01, Sep.
• Matthew Shum, 1998, "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mshum-98-02, Sep.
• Michael Peters, 1998, "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-98-01, Jul.
• Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998, "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 41, issue 2, pages 647-675, October, DOI: 10.1086/467407.
• Cramton, Peter, 1998, "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 41, issue 2, pages 727-736, October, DOI: 10.1086/467410.
• Juan J. Ganuza & Lambros Pechlivanos, 1998, "Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 377, Jan, revised Jan 1999.
• Juan J. Ganuza, 1998, "Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 471, Oct, revised Mar 2002.
• Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998, "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9805001, May, revised 26 Jul 1999.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809003, Sep.
• Oehler, Andreas & Unser, Matthias, 1998, "Market Transparency and Call Markets," Discussion Papers, University of Bamberg, Chair of Finance, number 6.
• Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1998, "Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,62.
• Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel, 1998, "A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,63.

1997

• Athey, S., 1997, "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Vleugels, Jan, 1997, "Bidding against an unknown number of competitors sharing affiliated information," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 97-13.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 97-11.
• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997, "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5872, Jan.
• Catherine D. Wolfram, 1997, "Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6269, Nov.
• Klemperer, P., 1997, "Almost Common Value Auctions: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 134.
• Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97cra, Sep.
• Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97cra1b, Oct.
• Lisa J. Cameron & Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97elec, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Peter Cramton, 1997, "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97jemsfcc, revised 12 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Andrew Parece & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Auction Design for Standard Offer Service," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97wpad, Sep, revised 26 Sep 1997.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997, "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpas, Feb, revised Mar 1998.
• Barja, Gover, 1997, "La industria de la electricidad: Un análisis microeconómico de la regulación
  [The electricity industry: A microeconomic analysis of its regulation]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 130715, Dec.
• Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, 1997, "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 28, issue 3, pages 544-565, Autumn.
• Tony Curzon Price, 1997, "Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 219-254.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Price Formation by Bargaining and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-56.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-57.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number fad8afd3-eb42-4a0d-8d60-8.
• Michael Peters, 1997, "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-97-02, Jul.
• Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997, "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 105, issue 4, pages 657-699, August, DOI: 10.1086/262089.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 208, Feb.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "Auctions of licences and market structure," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 209, Feb.
• Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997, "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703010, Mar, revised 28 Apr 1998.
• Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707010, Jul, revised 01 Apr 1998.
• Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir, 1997, "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9701004, Jan.
• Michael B. Gordy, 1997, "Hedging Winner's Curse with Multiple Bids: Evidence from the Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9702002, Feb.
• Hon-Suir, S. & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 97-11, Jun.
• Peter Cramton, 1997, "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 6, issue 3, pages 431-495, September, DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00431.x.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997, "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 6, issue 3, pages 497-527, September, DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00497.x.
• Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997, "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-29, Jun.
• KLINGER MONTEIRO, Paulo, 1997, "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997042, Jun.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997077, Oct.
• Schmidt, Klaus & Schnitzer, Monika, 1997, "Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1541, Jan.
• Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1997, "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1564, Jan.
• Klemperer, Paul, 1997, "Almost Common Value Auctions: The 'Wallet Game' and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1682, Aug.
• Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1997, "The Winner's Curse and the Failure of the Law of Demand," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1754, Nov.
• Bosch-Domenech, Antoni & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1997, "Credit Constraints in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 107, issue 444, pages 1445-1464, September.
• Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997, "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 1, pages 1-35, January.
• Cameron, Lisa J. & Cramton, Peter & Wilson, Robert, 1997, "Using auctions to divest generation assets," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, volume 10, issue 10, pages 22-31, December.
• d'Aspremont, C & Cremer, J & Gerard-Varet, L-A, 1997, "Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a15.
• Vagstad, S., 1997, "Centralized vs. Decentralized Procurement: Does Dispersed Information Call for Decentralized Decision-Making," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 1497.
• Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman, 1997, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0083, Mar.
• Minehart, D. & Neeman, Z., 1997, "Termination and Coordination in Partnerships," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 83.
• Celentani, M. & Ganuza, J.-J., 1997, "Auctions and the Dynamics of Corruption," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 97.459.
• Stewart, M & Wu, C-L, 1997, "The Right To Host The Olympic Games Should Be Auctioned To The Highest Bidder," Papers, Melbourne - Centre in Finance, number 97-1.
• Zheng, C.Z., 1997, "The Optimal Design of First-Price Auctions with Financial Constraints and Default Risks," Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research, number 301.
• Pezanis-Christou, P, 1997, "On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 97/05.
• Eső, Péter, 1997, "Árverés és verseny a közbeszerzésben
  [Auction and competition in public procurement]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 597-611.
• Peter Lyk-Jensen, 1997, "How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals are Affiliated," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-05, Feb.

1996

• R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996, "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 1, pages 159-175, Winter.
• Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul & Huang, Ming, 1996, "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1486, Oct.
• Corns, Allan & Schotter, Andrew, 1996, "Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-02.
• Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996, "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1142, Dec.
• Ogiogio, G.O., 1996, "A Statistical Analysis of Foreign Exchange Rate Behaviour in Nigeria's Auction," Papers, African Economic Research Consortium, number 49.
• Lyk-Jensen, P., 1996, "Some Suggestions on How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals Are Affiliated," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a27.
• Chanel, O. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1996, "Auction Theory and Practice Evidence from the Market for Jewellery," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96b05.
• Menezes, F.M. & Monteiro, P.K., 1996, "Simultaneous Ooled Auctions," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 302.
• Jones, C. & Menezes, F. & Vella, F., 1996, "Auctions Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 303.
• Menezes, F.M. & Monteiro, P.K., 1996, "A Note on Auctions with Endogenous Participation," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 312.
• Cornu, P., 1996, "The Dissuasive Role of the Mean of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.10.
• Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.394.
• Pezanis-Christou, P., 1996, "Sequential Auctions with Supply Uncertainty," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 96/15.
• Gans, J.S, 1996, "Competing for Public Goods and Private Business," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 96/2.
• Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996, "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 39, Dec.
• Szatmári, Alexandra, 1996, "Aukciók, avagy a képbe kerül, ha a Louvre a képbe kerül?," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 4, pages 303-314.
• Kondrát, Zsolt, 1996, "Az aukciós módszer hatása a kincstár bevételére
  [The impact of the auction method on the revenues of the Treasury]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 6, pages 506-524.
• I. Krinsky & J. Lee, 1996, "Earning Announcements and the Components of the Bid-Ask Aspread," Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population Research Reports, McMaster University, number 313.
• Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee & Elizabeth M. Bailey, 1996, "Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5745, Sep.
• Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1168, Oct.
• Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1173, Oct.
• Beggs, A. & Graddy, K., 1996, "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 99184.
• Robert A. Feldman & Vincent Reinhart, 1996, "Auction Format Matters: Evidence on Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 43, issue 2, pages 395-418, June.
• Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996, "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 96slr, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Hermann Schnabl, 1996, "A close eye on the invisible hand," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 6, issue 3, pages 261-280.
• Fernando Branco, 1996, "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 283-309, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499137.
• Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996, "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, Springer, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_12.
• Katz, B.G. & Owen, J., 1996, "The Investment Choices of Voucher Holders and Their Impact on Privarizad Firm Performance," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 96-08.
• Michael Peters, 1996, "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-01, Apr.
• Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 1996, "Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 105, Oct.
• Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Shyam Sunder, 1996, "Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 91, Jun.
• Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996, "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9608001, Aug.
• Shlomit Hon-Snir & Dov Monderer & Aner Sela, 1996, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9610004, Oct, revised 07 Oct 1996.
• Flavio Menezes & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1996, "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9611001, Nov.

1995

• Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992, "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 4205, Nov.
• Peter Cramton, 1995, "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 95jems, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995, "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpdr, Nov, revised 22 Jul 2002.
• Horstman, I.J. & LaCasse, C., 1995, "Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Re-Sale Option," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9522.
• Waterson, Michael & Doyle, Chris, 2010, "Your call: eBay and demand for the iPhone 4," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 949.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1995, "Third- and higher-price auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1996,3.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1995, "Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Eine Diskussion," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1996,4.
• Cramton, Peter C, 1995, "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 4, issue 2, pages 267-343, Summer, DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00267.x.
• Jamal, K. & Sunder, S., 1995, "Biased Heuristic Traders and Attainment of Bayesian Equilibria in Double Auctions," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1995-09.
• Branco, Fernando, 1995, "Multi-object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1216, Aug.
• Gopal Naik, 1995, "Price-Quality Relationships In Raw Silk Markets," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, volume 30, issue 1, pages 101-119, January.
• Bosch-Domenech, A. & Silvestre, J., 1995, "Credit Constraint in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs, number 95-07.
• Bosch-Domenech, A. & Silvestre, J., 1995, "Credit Constraint in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results," Department of Economics, California Davis - Department of Economics, number 95-07.
• Hamao, Y. & Jegadeesh, N., 1995, "Japanese Government Bond Auctions: The U.S. Experience," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-28.
• Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995, "Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 7-95-3.
• Vuong, Q. & Laffont, J.J. & Elyakime, B. & Loisel, P., 1995, "Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Papers, Southern California - Department of Economics, number 9502.
• Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995, "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions: Technical Appendices," Papers, Southern California - Department of Economics, number 9503.
• Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995, "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers, Southern California - Department of Economics, number 9504.

1994

• John McMillan, 1994, "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 3, pages 145-162, Summer.
• Bosch, A. & Sunder, S., 1994, "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1994-11.
• Cornelli, Francesca & Li, David, 1994, "Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control and Optimal Schemes for Privatization," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 891, Feb.