Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1997

• Lisa J. Cameron & Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97elec, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Peter Cramton, 1997, "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97jemsfcc, revised 12 Jul 1998.
• Peter Cramton & Andrew Parece & Robert Wilson, 1997, "Auction Design for Standard Offer Service," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 97wpad, Sep, revised 26 Sep 1997.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997, "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpas, Feb, revised Mar 1998.
• Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, 1997, "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 28, issue 3, pages 544-565, Autumn.
• Tony Curzon Price, 1997, "Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 219-254.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Price Formation by Bargaining and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-56.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-57.
• Kultti, K.K., 1997, "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number fad8afd3-eb42-4a0d-8d60-8.
• Michael Peters, 1997, "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-97-02, Jul.
• Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997, "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 105, issue 4, pages 657-699, August, DOI: 10.1086/262089.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 208, Feb.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "Auctions of licences and market structure," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 209, Feb.
• Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997, "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703010, Mar, revised 28 Apr 1998.
• Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707010, Jul, revised 01 Apr 1998.
• Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir, 1997, "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9701004, Jan.
• Michael B. Gordy, 1997, "Hedging Winner's Curse with Multiple Bids: Evidence from the Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9702002, Feb.
• Hon-Suir, S. & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 97-11, Jun.

1996

• Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee & Elizabeth M. Bailey, 1996, "Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5745, Sep.
• Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1168, Oct.
• Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1173, Oct.
• Beggs, A. & Graddy, K., 1996, "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 99184.
• Robert A. Feldman & Vincent Reinhart, 1996, "Auction Format Matters: Evidence on Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 43, issue 2, pages 395-418, June.
• Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996, "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 96slr, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Hermann Schnabl, 1996, "A close eye on the invisible hand," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 6, issue 3, pages 261-280.
• Fernando Branco, 1996, "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 283-309, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499137.
• Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996, "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, Springer, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_12.
• Katz, B.G. & Owen, J., 1996, "The Investment Choices of Voucher Holders and Their Impact on Privarizad Firm Performance," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 96-08.
• Michael Peters, 1996, "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-01, Apr.
• Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 1996, "Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 105, Oct.
• Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Shyam Sunder, 1996, "Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 91, Jun.
• Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996, "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9608001, Aug.
• Shlomit Hon-Snir & Dov Monderer & Aner Sela, 1996, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9610004, Oct, revised 07 Oct 1996.
• Flavio Menezes & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1996, "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9611001, Nov.
• R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996, "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 1, pages 159-175, Winter.
• Bulow, Jeremy I. & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996, "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1486, Oct.
• Corns, Allan & Schotter, Andrew, 1996, "Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-02.
• Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996, "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1142, Dec.
• Ogiogio, G.O., 1996, "A Statistical Analysis of Foreign Exchange Rate Behaviour in Nigeria's Auction," Papers, African Economic Research Consortium, number 49.
• Lyk-Jensen, P., 1996, "Some Suggestions on How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals Are Affiliated," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a27.
• Chanel, O. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1996, "Auction Theory and Practice Evidence from the Market for Jewellery," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96b05.
• Menezes, F.M. & Monteiro, P.K., 1996, "Simultaneous Ooled Auctions," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 302.
• Jones, C. & Menezes, F. & Vella, F., 1996, "Auctions Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 303.
• Menezes, F.M. & Monteiro, P.K., 1996, "A Note on Auctions with Endogenous Participation," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 312.
• Cornu, P., 1996, "The Dissuasive Role of the Mean of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 96.10.
• Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.394.
• Pezanis-Christou, P., 1996, "Sequential Auctions with Supply Uncertainty," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 96/15.
• Gans, J.S, 1996, "Competing for Public Goods and Private Business," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 96/2.
• Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996, "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 39, Dec.
• Szatmári, Alexandra, 1996, "Aukciók, avagy a képbe kerül, ha a Louvre a képbe kerül?," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 4, pages 303-314.
• Kondrát, Zsolt, 1996, "Az aukciós módszer hatása a kincstár bevételére
  [The impact of the auction method on the revenues of the Treasury]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 6, pages 506-524.
• I. Krinsky & J. Lee, 1996, "Earning Announcements and the Components of the Bid-Ask Aspread," Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population Research Reports, McMaster University, number 313.

1995

• Cramton, Peter C, 1995, "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 4, issue 2, pages 267-343, Summer, DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00267.x.
• Jamal, K. & Sunder, S., 1995, "Biased Heuristic Traders and Attainment of Bayesian Equilibria in Double Auctions," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1995-09.
• Branco, Fernando, 1995, "Multi-object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1216, Aug.
• Gopal Naik, 1995, "Price-Quality Relationships In Raw Silk Markets," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, volume 30, issue 1, pages 101-119, January.
• Bosch-Domenech, A. & Silvestre, J., 1995, "Credit Constraint in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs, number 95-07.
• Bosch-Domenech, A. & Silvestre, J., 1995, "Credit Constraint in General Equilibrium: Experimental Results," Department of Economics, California Davis - Department of Economics, number 95-07.
• Hamao, Y. & Jegadeesh, N., 1995, "Japanese Government Bond Auctions: The U.S. Experience," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-28.
• Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995, "Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 7-95-3.
• Vuong, Q. & Laffont, J.J. & Elyakime, B. & Loisel, P., 1995, "Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Papers, Southern California - Department of Economics, number 9502.
• Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995, "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions: Technical Appendices," Papers, Southern California - Department of Economics, number 9503.
• Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995, "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers, Southern California - Department of Economics, number 9504.
• Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992, "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 4205, Nov.
• Peter Cramton, 1995, "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 95jems, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995, "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 98wpdr, Nov, revised 22 Jul 2002.
• Horstman, I.J. & LaCasse, C., 1995, "Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Re-Sale Option," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9522.
• Waterson, Michael & Doyle, Chris, 2010, "Your call: eBay and demand for the iPhone 4," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 949.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1995, "Third- and higher-price auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1996,3.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1995, "Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Eine Diskussion," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1996,4.

1994

• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1994, "Auctions vs. Negotiations," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 4608, Jan.
• Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1994, "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 102, issue 1, pages 1-23, February, DOI: 10.1086/261919.
• John McMillan, 1994, "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 3, pages 145-162, Summer.
• Bosch, A. & Sunder, S., 1994, "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1994-11.
• Cornelli, Francesca & Li, David Daokui, 1994, "Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control and Optimal Schemes for Privatization," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 891, Feb.
• Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1994, "Auctions vs. Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 924, Mar.
• Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994, "Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 55, issue 2, pages 203-231, October.
• Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994, "Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 20039.

1993

• Demougin, Dominique & Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1993, "Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 743, Jan.
• Kenneth Hendrix, 1993, "Optimal Selling Strategies for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Buyer," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1038, Mar.
• Robert A. Feldman & Rajnish Mehra, 1993, "Auctions: Theory and Applications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 40, issue 3, pages 485-511, September.

1992

• Gács, János & Karimov, Il'dar & Schneider, Christoph, 1992, "Small Scale Privatization in Eastern Europe and Russia from a Historical and Comparative Perspective," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 60799, Sep.
• John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2010, "Procurement when price and quality matter," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2013/99378.
• Hans-Werner Sinn & Dominique Demougin, 1992, "Privatization, Risk Taking and the Communist Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 16.
• Dominique Demougin & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1992, "Privatization, Risk-Taking and the Communist Firm," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9216, Oct.
• Pagano, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1992, "Auction and dealership markets : What is the difference?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 2-3, pages 613-623, April.

1991

• Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1991, "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 81, issue 1, pages 362-369, March.
• Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1991, "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 593, Oct.
• Pagano, Marco & Röell, Ailsa, 1991, "Auction and dealership markets what is the difference?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119185, Sep.
• Ailsa Röell & Marco Pagano, 1991, "Auction and Dealership Markets: What is the Difference?," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group, number dp125, Sep.
• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1991, "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," NBER Technical Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 0112, Sep.
• Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Alan, 1991, "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 7, issue 1, pages 27-53, Spring.
• Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, 1991, "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 91jleo, revised 09 Jun 1998.

1988

• Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013, "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1017.

1987

• Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1987, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 87econ, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul, 1987, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 55, issue 3, pages 615-632, May.

1986

• Hirschel Kasper, 1986, "On Understanding the Rise in Non-Tenure Track Appointments," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section., number 591, Aug.

1985

• Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1985, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 406, Nov.

0

• Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, , "Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2003-4.
• Hector Chade & Jorge Aseff, , "An Optimal Auction with Identity-Dependent Externalities," Working Papers, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, number 2133477.
• Phoebe Koundouri & Andreas Drichoutis & Kyriaki Remoundou, , "Isolating Warm Glow in Charitable Auction Giving: A Comparison between Student and Non-student Subject Pools," DEOS Working Papers, Athens University of Economics and Business, number 1222.
• Anna Pechan & Gert Brunekreeft & Martin Palovic, , "Increasing resilience of electricity networks: Auctioning of priority supply to minimize outage costs," Bremen Energy Working Papers, Bremen Energy Research, number 0045.
• Theodosios DIMOPOULOS & Stefano SACCHETTO, 2011, "Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 11-47, Oct.
• Ichiro Obara, , "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 374.
• Burton Hollifield & Robert Miller & Patrik Sandas, , "Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number -290183991.
• Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, , "Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2012-E23.
• Hafalir Isa & Kurnaz Musab, , "Discriminatory Auctions with Resale," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2015-E12.
• Shyam Sunder & Karim Jamal, , "Why do Biased Heuristics Approximate Bayes Rule in Double Auctions?," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1999-23.
• Theodosios Dimopoulos & Stefano Sacchetto, 2014, "Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 2012-E46, Dec.
• BAUWENS, Luc & GINSBURGH, Victor, 2000, "Art experts and auctions are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1485, Jan.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1596, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00081.
• ELLEFLAMME, Paul & BLOCH, Francis, 2004, "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1711, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00130.x.
• JEHIEL, Philippe & THISSE, Jacques-François, 2005, "How to win a decision in a confederation," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1781, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.001.
• d’ASPREMONT, CLaude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2005, "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1974, Jan.
• Jozsef Sakovics & Lluis Bru & Daniel Cardona, 2018, "Block sourcing," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 287, Jun.
• Ahmed Anwar, 2002, "Affiliation in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 58, Jun.
• Cramton, Peter & Ingraham, Allan T. & Singer, Hal J., 0, "The effect of incumbent bidding in set-aside auctions: An analysis of prices in the closed and open segments of FCC Auction 35," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, volume 32, issue 3-4, pages 273-290, April.
• Werner Güth & Maria Vittoria Levati & Andreas Stiehler, , "Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2002-01.
• Werner Güth & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, , "Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2002-36.
• Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, , "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 18-98.
• Burton Hollifield & Robert A. Miller & patrik Sandas, , "An Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, number 29-99.
• Kaplan, Todd & Wettstein, David, , "The Optimal Design of Rewards in Contests," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2010/6, revised 22 Nov 2010.
• Rachmilevitch, Shiran, , "Bribing in second-price auctions," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2011/7.
• Rachmilevitch, Shiran, , "Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2011/9.
• Benyamin Shitovitz & Diego Moreno, , "The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, number WP2017/7.
• Matthias Sutter & Martin Kocher & Sabine Strauß, , "Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2007-23.
• John Kennes & Aaron Schiff, , "Simple Reputation Systems," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 05-21, revised Nov 2005.
• Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2020, "When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-21-008, Jan.
• Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2024, "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-23-007-v2, Apr.
• José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, , "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, number 20/07.
• Bo Chen & Marco Serena & Zijia Wang, 2023, "Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Affiliation," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2023-05, Mar.
• Kai Flinkerbusch, , "A more efficient procurement mechanism for reserve capacity in the German market for balancing power," Working Papers, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary, number 201178.
• Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Jun Nakabayashi & Kei Kawai, 2022, "Screening Adaptive Cartels," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2022-23, Jun.
• Le, Phuong, 2018, "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Tierney, Ryan, 2019, "On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Safronov, Mikhail, 2018, "Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 3, September.
• Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020, "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 2, May.
• Auster, Sarah & Gottardi, Piero, 2019, "Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 3, July.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020, "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020, "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Janssen, Maarten & Kasberger, Bernhard, 2019, "On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke & Nichifor, Alexandru & Ostrovsky, Michael & Westkamp, Alexander, 2019, "Full substitutability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Baisa, Brian, 2020, "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2020, "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020, "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 4, November.
• Rosato, Antonio, 2023, "Loss aversion in sequential auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Zhang, Mengxi, 2024, "Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2023, "On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022, "When Walras meets Vickrey," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2024, "Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 1, January.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2023, "Equilibrium existence in games with ties," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
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• Alan S. Blinder, 2004, "The Case Against the Case Against Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 102, Jun.