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Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications: Inefficiency in Private Value Auctions with Correlation

Author

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  • Jehiel, Philippe

    (Department of Economics, PSE and UCL)

Abstract

We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor’s bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady-states in such environments with a mix of rational and data-driven bidders, and we allow for correlation across bidders in the signal distributions about the ex post values. After reviewing the working of the approach in second-price and first-price auctions, we show our main result that there is no efficient auction in such environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Jehiel, Philippe, 0. "Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications: Inefficiency in Private Value Auctions with Correlation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:5655
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-883, December.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Belief Formation; Auctions; Efficiency; Analogy-based Expectations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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