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Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth
  • Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Abstract

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, "undated". "Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-36, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-36
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2017. "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Otheres are Doing," Vienna Economics Papers 1707, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    3. Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Breitmoser, Yves, 2019. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 423-447.
    6. Shraman Banerjee & Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2023. "Virtue of Simplicity in Asymmetric Auctions," Working Papers 2023-01, Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics.
    7. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February.
    8. Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex, 2012. "Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 102-119.
    9. Rodney Garratt & Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2012. "Behavior in second-price auctions by highly experienced eBay buyers and sellers," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(1), pages 44-57, March.
    10. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt S. Schnier, 2012. "Individual Behavior And Bidding Heterogeneity In Sealed Bid Auctions Where The Number Of Bidders Is Unknown," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 516-533, April.
    11. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "Bidding with Outside Options," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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