Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions
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- Andrew Schotter & Allan Corns, 1999. "Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March.
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More about this item
KeywordsAffirmative action; auctions; experiments;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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