On Rationalizable Outcomes in Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions
In this paper, we extend the result of Dekel and Wollinsky ("Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions" Games and Economic Behavior, 2003) on rationalizable outcomes in first-price auctions. Dekel and Wollinsky show that under certain conditions, each player chooses a unique bid conditional on her valuation. Their result however depends on the assumption that the number of players is sufficiently large (relative to the number of available bids). We first provide a different set of sufficient conditions for the uniqueness result. We then show that for the independent (possibly asymmetric) private value case, (i) the result holds if the distributions are such that the inverse hazard rate is sufficiently high for each valuation, implying that auctions need not necessarily be large, and (ii) if the distributions satisfy the conditions of Dekel and Wollinsky, they always satisfy ours
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- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007.
"Interim correlated rationalizability,"
Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
- Morris, Stephen & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3196333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
- Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2001.
"Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions,"
1321, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2003. "Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 175-188, May.
- Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers 00-13, Tel Aviv.
- Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers 2000-13, Tel Aviv.
- Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions," Discussion Papers 1308, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
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