Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2023

• Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner, 2023, "Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 99-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.009.
• Ehlers, Lars, 2023, "Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 411-422, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.016.
• Goyal, Saurav & Narayanan, Aroon, 2023, "Ex-post implementation with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 440-453, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.002.
• Carnehl, Christoph & Weiergraeber, Stefan, 2023, "Bidder asymmetries in procurement auctions: Efficiency vs. information – Evidence from railway passenger services," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102902.
• Wong, Tak-Yuen & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2023, "Securities auctions with pre-project information management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102929.
• Kasberger, Bernhard, 2023, "When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Li, Muxin, 2023, "Regulating online search in the EU: From the android case to the digital markets act and digital services act," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102983.
• Claeys, Grégory & Papioti, Chara & Tryphonides, Andreas, 2023, "Liquidity risk, market power and the informational effects of policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103732.
• Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G. & Marszalec, Daniel, 2023, "Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106945.
• Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco, 2023, "Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, pages 141-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.002.
• Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2023, "Radical activism and self-regulation: An optimal campaign mechanism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102789.
• Balmford, Ben & Collins, Joseph & Day, Brett & Lindsay, Luke & Peacock, James, 2023, "Pricing rules for PES auctions: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102889.
• Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023, "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594.
• Chen, Yi & Jungbauer, Thomas & Wang, Zhe, 2023, "The strategic decentralization of recruiting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105639.
• Deng, Shanglyu, 2023, "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105692.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023, "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105710.
• Sano, Ryuji, 2023, "Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105742.
• Harrison, Rodrigo & Parada-Contzen, Marcela & Villena, Marcelo, 2023, "Can auctions increase competition in the pension funds market? The Chilean experience," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 5, pages 975-993, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2023.07.002.
• Cohen, Chen & Lagziel, David & Levi, Ofer & Sela, Aner, 2023, "The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102820.
• Klingler, Sven & Sundaresan, Suresh, 2023, "Diminishing treasury convenience premiums: Effects of dealers’ excess demand and balance sheet constraints," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 55-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.01.002.
• Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Tsodikovich, Yevgeny & Viossat, Yannick, 2023, "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118706, Nov.
• David Newbery, 2023, "Regulation of access, fees, and investment planning of transmission in Great Britain," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2307, Apr.
• Edward Anderson & Pär Holmberg, 2023, "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2310, May.
• Agnieszka Kus, 2023, "Do the High Spectrum Prices Harm Consumers? Evidence from Poland," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, volume 0, issue 3, pages 415-437.
• Marina Núñez & Francisco Robles, 2023, "Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2023/440.
• Rodney Garratt & David Murphy & Travis D. Nesmith & Xiaopeng Wu, 2023, "Optimal Bidder Selection in Clearing House Default Auctions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 2023-033r1, May, revised 01 Aug 2024, DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2023.033r1.
• Isa Hafalir & Onur Kesten & Katerina Sherstyuk & Cong Tao, 2023, "When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 202310, Dec.
• Yann Raineau & Éric Giraud-Héraud & Sébastien Lecocq & Stéphanie Pérès & Alexandre Pons & Sophie Tempère, 2023, "When health-related claims impact environmental demand: Results of experimental auctions with Bordeaux wine consumers," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03869423, Feb, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107663.
• Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023, "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03924664, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.10.003.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023, "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04099021, Apr, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01498-w.
• Grégory Claeys & Chara Papioti & Andreas Tryphonides, 2023, "Liquidity risk, market power and the informational effects of policy," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04164592, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103732.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2023, "Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04198736, Jun, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12331.
• Anderson, Edward & Holmberg, Pär, 2023, "Multi-Unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-Unit Demand," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1460, May.
• Ganhammar, Kajsa, 2023, "Bidding Behaviour in Interdependent Markets for Electricity and Green Certificates," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2023:8, Aug.
• Berggreen, Steve & Mattisson, Linn, 2023, "The Curse of Bad Geography: Stagnant Water, Diseases, and Children’s Human Capital," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2023:11, Nov.
• Laséen, Stefan, 2023, "Central bank asset purchases: Insights from quantitative easing auctions of government bonds," Working Paper Series, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), number 419, Jan.
• Drake, Samielle & Xu, Fei, 2023, "Regulation and Competition in Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1013, May.
• Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2023, "Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1014, May, revised 13 Oct 2023.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2023, "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object allocation problems with payments: Externalities with income effects," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-135, Nov.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2023, "Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-136, Dec.
• Eric M. Aldrich & Daniel Friedman, 2023, "Order Protection Through Delayed Messaging," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 69, issue 2, pages 774-790, February, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4370.
• Eduardo Cardadeiro & João E. Gata, 2023, "Market-based allocation of airport slots: the PAUSE auction mechanism and extensions," Working Papers REM, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa, number 2023/0260, Feb.
• Sjur Didrik Flam, 2023, "Golden rule in cooperative commons," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 8, issue 1, pages 57-74, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002.
• Gian Caspari, 2023, "A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 8, issue 1, pages 75-96, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.003.
• Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2023, "Correction to: The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 26, issue 1, pages 249-250, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09746-x.
• Astrid Gamba & Luca Stanca, 2023, "Mis-judging merit: the effects of adjudication errors in contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 26, issue 3, pages 550-587, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09785-4.
• Kelvin Mashisia Shikuku & Erwin Bulte & Carl Johan Lagerkvist & Nhuong Tran, 2023, "Endowments, expectations, and the value of food safety certification: experimental evidence from fish markets in Nigeria," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 26, issue 5, pages 1060-1084, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09809-7.
• Kathryn Graddy & Lara Loewenstein & Jianping Mei & Mike Moses & Rachel A. J. Pownall, 2023, "Empirical evidence of anchoring and loss aversion from art auctions," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 47, issue 2, pages 279-301, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-022-09459-2.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Resource allocations in the best-of-k ( $$k=2,3$$ k = 2 , 3 ) contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 139, issue 3, pages 235-260, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00827-w.
• Tim M. Zhou, 2023, "Auctions of failed banks: an analysis of losing bidders," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, volume 61, issue 1, pages 155-176, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01146-3.
• Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2023, "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit objectassignment problems with money," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-23-007, Dec.
• Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023, "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 31036, Mar.
• Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2023, "Flow Trading," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 31098, Apr.
• Zachary Liscow & Will Nober & Cailin Slattery, 2023, "Procurement and Infrastructure Costs," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 31705, Sep.
• Belev, S. & Veterinarov, V. & Matveev, E., 2023, "Vertical collusion in public procurement: Estimation based on data for R&D composite auctions," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, volume 59, issue 2, pages 36-63, DOI: 10.31737/22212264_2023_2_36-63.
• Tanvir ALAM SHAHI, 2023, "Practicing Of Renewable Energy Auction Scheme — Expected Societal & Economic Gains For The Developing Countries," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 14-32, July.
• Lotti, Clarissa & Muço, Arieda & SPAGNOLO, GIANCARLO & Valletti, Tommaso, 2023, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," OSF Preprints, Center for Open Science, number c678u, Feb, DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/c678u.
• Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023, "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 90, issue 2, pages 815-851.
• Carabalí, Jaime & Perez, Alex & Meneses, Luis Ángel & Rojas, Libardo, 2023, "Reconciliaciones y estrategias de oferta en el mercado mayorista de electricidad de Colombia
  [Reconciliations and bid strategies in the Colombian wholesale electricity market]," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, volume 35, issue 1, pages 57-79, June, DOI: https://doi.org/10.46661/revmetodos.
• Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023, "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 23-002, Mar.
• Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo & Sterner, Martin, 2023, "Bilateral communication in procurement auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117612, Jun.
• Hernando, Andres & Villena, Mauricio & Apablaza, Valentina, 2023, "Optimal Bidding for a Bundle of Power Transmission Infrastructure Works," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120849, Dec, revised 30 Apr 2024.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023, "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 382, Feb.
• Dipankar Das & Sanjeev Kapoor, 2023, "Measurement of Collusion in Open Ascending Price Auctions in Agricultural Commodity Markets," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 11, issue 3, pages 340-359, December, DOI: 10.1177/23210222211051443.
• Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2023, "Optimal seedings in interdependent contests," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 328, issue 2, pages 1263-1285, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05373-8.
• Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar & Sonakshi Jain, 2023, "Incompetence and corruption in procurement auctions," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 24, issue 4, pages 421-451, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00296-3.
• Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2023, "Bunching below thresholds to manipulate public procurement," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 64, issue 1, pages 303-319, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00181-022-02250-4.
• Harriet Toto Olita & Md. Sayed Iftekhar & Steven G. M. Schilizzi, 2023, "Optimizing contract allocation for risky conservation tenders," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, volume 25, issue 1, pages 63-85, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10018-022-00341-1.
• Bruno Bosco, 2023, "Trade, equilibrium prices and rents in European auctions for emission allowances," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, volume 25, issue 1, pages 87-113, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10018-022-00344-y.
• Hideto Koizumi, 2023, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 223-233, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00253-7.
• Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023, "Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 255-275, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3.
• Boaz Zik, 2023, "Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 567-590, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01416-6.
• Charles R. Plott & Timothy N. Cason & Benjamin J. Gillen & Hsingyang Lee & Travis Maron, 2023, "General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 641-693, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01431-7.
• Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023, "Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 4, pages 983-1007, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01433-5.
• Mingshi Kang & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023, "Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 4, pages 1141-1180, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01442-4.
• Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2023, "Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1069-1114, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01492-2.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023, "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1329-1362, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01498-w.
• Fredrik Ødegaard & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023, "Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 195-230, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00815-2.
• Xin Feng, 2023, "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 401-421, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00822-3.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2023, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 423-450, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00823-2.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "All-pay matching contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 587-606, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00831-2.
• Zhonghao Shui, 2023, "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 3, pages 925-951, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00845-4.
• Steven R. Williams, 2023, "Trade of a common value good," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 4, pages 701-724, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6.
• El Hadi Caoui & Gérard Marty, 2023, "Random drawing in sequential auctions: investigating the role of a market device in timber sales," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, volume 104, issue 2, pages 101-122, June, DOI: 10.1007/s41130-022-00184-0.
• Xinyu Li & Marco Haan & Sander Onderstal & Jasper Veldman, 2023, "A Wind Tunnel Test of Wind Farm Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-046/VII, Aug.
• Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2023, "Aftermarket Welfare and Procurement Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-081/VII, 12.
• Rey, Patrick & Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie, 2023, "Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1441, Jun.
• Willems, Bert & Yueting, Yu, 2023, "Bidding and Investment in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Discriminatory versus Uniform-Price Auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1462, Aug.
• Claudia Allende & Juan Pablo Atal & Rodrigo Carril & Jose Ignacio Cuesta & Andrés González Lira, 2023, "Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1874, Nov.
• Rodrigo Carril & Audrey Guo, 2023, "The impact of preference programs in public procurement: Evidence from veteran set-asides," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1876, Dec.
• Vitezslav Titl, 2023, "The One and Only: Single-Bidding in Public Procurement," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics, number 2308, Oct.
• Lars Isenhardt & Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023, "Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions: Competition and Price Effects," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, volume 99, issue 2, pages 302-324.
• Josheski Dushko & Apostolov Mico, 2023, "The Prospect Theory and First Price Auctions: an Explanation of Overbidding," Econometrics. Advances in Applied Data Analysis, Sciendo, volume 27, issue 1, pages 33-74, March, DOI: 10.15611/eada.2023.1.03.
• Wauer Niels & Lehmann Paul & Maurer Christoph, 2023, "Gebotskostenförderung in Windenergie-Auktionen," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, volume 103, issue 2, pages 112-117, February, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2023-0033.
• Alexander Cuntz & Matthias Sahli, 2023, "Ars longa, vita brevis: The death of the creator and the impact on exhibitions and auction markets," WIPO Economic Research Working Papers, World Intellectual Property Organization - Economics and Statistics Division, number 76, Aug.
• Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023, "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 91, issue 4, pages 1495-1526, July, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16310.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2023, "Meetings And Mechanisms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 64, issue 1, pages 155-185, February, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12592.
• Pranjal Chandrakar & Manaswini Bhalla & Shubhabrata Das, 2023, "Sequential Auctions with Multiple Synergies," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 25, issue 01, pages 1-39, March, DOI: 10.1142/S0219198923500019.
• Chulyoung Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jinhyuk Lee & Jaeok Park, 2023, "Auctions with Externalities: An Experimental Study," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2023rwp-214, Apr.
• Aubry, Mathieu & Kräussl, Roman & Manso, Gustavo & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2023, "Biased auctioneers," CFS Working Paper Series, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), number 692.
• Ceesay, Muhammed, 2023, "Suspecting Collusion," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 268306.
• Ceesay, Muhammed, 2023, "Secret vs Public Rings in Common Value Auctions," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 279484.
• Zagdanski, Jakub & Castells, Pau, 2023, "The impact of spectrum policy on carbon emissions," 32nd European Regional ITS Conference, Madrid 2023: Realising the digital decade in the European Union – Easier said than done?, International Telecommunications Society (ITS), number 278024.
• De Leverano, Adriano & Coviello, Decio & Clark, Robert, 2023, "Centralized Procurement and Delivery Times: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Italy," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage", Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 277589.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Tolksdorf, Michel, 2023, "Measuring Preferences for Algorithms - Are people really algorithm averse after seeing the algorithm perform?," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage", Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 277692.
• Heczko, Alexander & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion, 2023, "The benefits of auctioneer competition: Merging auctions and adding auctioneers," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 23-038.
• Groh, Carl-Christian & Reuter, Marco, 2023, "Mechanism design for unequal societies," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 23-050.
• Reuter, Marco, 2023, "Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 23-051.

2022

• Harold L. Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2022, "Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30216, Jul.
• Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2022, "Screening Adaptive Cartels," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30219, Jul.
• El Hadi Caoui & Chiara Farronato & John J. Horton & Robert Schultz, 2022, "Consumer Demand with Social Influences: Evidence from an E-Commerce Platform," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30351, Aug.
• Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2022, "Organising Competition for the Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 20, issue 2, pages 822-868.
• Dakshina G De Silva & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Rachel A J Pownall & Robert Press, 2022, "Posthumous trading patterns affecting artwork prices
  [Financial returns, price determinants, and genre effects in American art investment]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 74, issue 2, pages 453-472.
• Ecaterina Milica Dobrotă & Roxana Sârbu & Silvius Stanciu, 2022, "The Influencing Factors of Smes Participation in Public Procurement," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, volume 0, issue 1, pages 61-69, September.
• Sümeyra Atmaca & Riccardo Camboni & Elena Podkolzina & Koen Schoors & Paola Valbonesi, 2022, "Setting reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0289, Oct.
• Melissa Boyle & Justin Svec, 2022, "The Roundness of Antiquity Valuations from Auction Houses and Sales," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, volume 48, issue 4, pages 602-630, October, DOI: 10.1057/s41302-022-00222-1.
• Thành Nguyen & Rakesh Vohra, 2022, "(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 22-010, Mar.
• Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordonez, 2022, "Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 22-017, Jun.
• Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka, 2022, "A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 115427.
• Sharma, Shashidharan, 2022, "Cheating in Second Price Auctions and Emotional Responses," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121492, Dec.
• Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2022, "Screening Adaptive Cartels," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 300, Jun.
• Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2022, "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2022-12, Mar.
• Zachary Breig & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Declan Hunt, 2022, "Experimental Auctions with Securities," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 657, Aug.
• Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kocher, Martin G. & Schudy, Simeon, 2022, "Cross-game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 358, Dec.
• Sergey L. Alekseev & Sergey G. Gordeev, 2022, "The Potential of Public Procurement for Economic Growth and Social Activity," Economic Consultant, Scientific and Educational Initiative LLC, volume 4, issue 4, pages 4-13.
• Clarissa Lotti & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2022, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 532, Feb, revised 01 Feb 2022.
• Matteo Bizzarri, 2022, "Multilateral Market Power in Input-output Networks," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 648, Jun, revised 16 Oct 2025.
• Alexander Dentler & Enzo Rossi, 2022, "Public debt management announcements under "beat-the-market" opportunities," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, number 2022-06.
• Satoshi Takahashi & Yoichi Izunaga & Naoki Watanabe, 2022, "An experimental study of VCG mechanism for multi-unit auctions: competing with machine bidders," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, volume 19, issue 1, pages 97-117, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40844-021-00198-1.
• Marc T. P. Adam & Jan Krämer, 2022, "Evaluating the emotional bidding framework: new evidence from a decade of neurophysiology," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 32, issue 3, pages 1529-1540, September, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-022-00555-x.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2022, "Auctions with resale and risk aversion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 117-128, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00221-7.
• Seewoo Lee & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2022, "Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 293-302, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00234-2.
• Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022, "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 8, issue 1, pages 45-55, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-022-00119-x.
• Christian Ewerhart, 2022, "A “fractal” solution to the chopstick auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1025-1041, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1052-1.
• Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022, "All-pay auctions with ties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1183-1231, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01195-7.
• Wojciech Olszewski & Ron Siegel, 2022, "Large contests without single crossing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1043-1055, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01244-1.
• Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2022, "Two-stage contests with preferences over style," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1141-1161, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01388-z.
• Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2022, "Introduction to the Special Issue on Contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1017-1023, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01470-0.
• Pranjal Chandrakar & Shubhabrata Das & Manaswini Bhalla, 2022, "Lease Auctions with Retention Options," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 20, issue 1, pages 97-136, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-021-00279-3.
• Benjamin Kang & James Unwin, 2022, "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, volume 15, issue 2, pages 145-160, August, DOI: 10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8.
• Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2022, "Round-robin tournaments with limited resources," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 59, issue 3, pages 525-583, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01402-w.
• Andrea Gallice & Giuseppe Sorrenti, 2022, "Curious about the price? Consumers’ behavior in price reveal auctions," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 29, issue 9, pages 831-834, May, DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1893263.
• Lauermann, Stephan & Wolinsky, Asher, 2022, "A common-value auction with state-dependent participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2022, "Progressive participation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Ma, X. & Noussair, C.N. & Renneboog, Luc, 2022, "Colors, emotions, and the auction value of paintings," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6e02bd92-e90d-4b93-a066-4.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2022, "Meetings and Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-727, Jul.
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• Motta, Massimo & Penta, Antonio, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 22-1370, Oct.
• Christopher S. Cotton & Brent R. Hickman & Joseph P. Price, 2022, "Affirmative Action and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, volume 40, issue 1, pages 157-185, DOI: 10.1086/713743.
• Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022, "Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1824, Mar.
• Massimo Motta & Antonio Penta, 2022, "Market effects of sponsored search auctions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1844, Jun.
• Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2022, "Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, pages 505-543, May, DOI: 10.3982/QE1151.
• Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2022, "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, pages 787-823, May, DOI: 10.3982/QE1692.
• Sang-Hyun Kim & Chulyoung Kim & Jaeok Park & Jinhyuk Lee, 2022, "First-Price and Second-Price Auctions with Externalities: An Experimental Study," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2022rwp-199, Aug.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2022, "An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Item Ascending Auction under Financial Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 22/02, May.
• Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2022, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-016.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2022, "Congestion management games in electricity markets," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-060.
• Riehm, Tobias, 2022, "Motivated beliefs in auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-062.
• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022, "On market prices in double auctions," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 404, Feb.
• Simon Jantschgi & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & Marek Pycia, 2022, "Markets and transaction costs," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 405, Feb, revised Sep 2022.
• Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 343-368, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210496.
• Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022, "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1703-1736, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864.
• Kirby Nielsen & John Rehbeck, 2022, "When Choices Are Mistakes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 7, pages 2237-2268, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201550.
• Pavlo Blavatskyy & Andreas Ortmann & Valentyn Panchenko, 2022, "On the Experimental Robustness of the Allais Paradox," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 143-163, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190153.
• Alexander MacKay, 2022, "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 164-212, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200128.
• Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser, 2022, "Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 622-664, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200027.
• Bin Liu & Jingfeng Lu, 2022, "Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 25-57, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200171.
• Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina G. De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2022, "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 394-419, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200216.
• Mo Xiao & Zhe Yuan, 2022, "License Complementarity and Package Bidding: US Spectrum Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 420-464, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210091.
• Xiaogang Che & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2022, "Deposit Requirements in Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 465-493, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200206.
• E. Glen Weyl & Anthony Lee Zhang, 2022, "Depreciating Licenses," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 422-448, August, DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200426.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 4, issue 3, pages 371-388, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504.
• B. Douglas Bernheim & Rebecca Royer & Charles Sprenger, 2022, "Robustness of Rank Independence in Risky Choice," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 415-420, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221090.
• Drew Fudenberg & Indira Puri, 2022, "Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 421-425, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221091.
• Marina Agranov & Pietro Ortoleva, 2022, "Revealed Preferences for Randomization: An Overview," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 426-430, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221093.
• Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2022, "Sovereign Debt Auctions in Turbulent Times," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 526-530, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221001.
• Olesea SPEIAN, 2022, "The Role Of The Primary Dealers In The Government Securities Market," Eastern European Journal for Regional Studies (EEJRS), Center for Studies in European Integration (CSEI), Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova (ASEM), volume 8, issue 2, pages 68-81, December, DOI: https://doi.org/10.53486/2537-6179..
• Jeff Opgrand, Paul V. Preckel, Douglas J. Gotham, and Andrew L. Liu, 2022, "Price Formation in Auctions for Financial Transmission Rights," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, volume 0, issue Number 3.
• Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2022, "Flow Trading," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 146, Feb.
• Sarah Auster & Piero Gottardi, 2022, "Sorting versus Screening in Decentralized Markets with Adverse Selection," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 180, Jul.
• Shraman Banerjee, 2022, "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," Working Papers, Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics, number 2022-02, Mar.
• Shanglyu Deng, 2022, "Speculation in Procurement Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2203.03044, Mar, revised May 2022.
• Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2022, "Identification of Auction Models Using Order Statistics," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2205.12917, May, revised Apr 2023.
• Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2022, "Never Say Never: Optimal Exclusion and Reserve Prices with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Buyers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.10938, Oct, revised Jun 2023.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022, "Screening with Persuasion," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2212.03360, Dec, revised Mar 2025.
• Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker & Rodrigo Carril, 2022, "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1327, Mar.
• Antonio Penta & Massimo Motta, 2022, "Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1356, Jun.
• Aner Sela & Amit Yeshayahu, 2022, "Contests with identity-dependent externalities," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2203.
• Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2022, "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2204.
• Aner Sela, 2022, "Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2205.
• Aner Sela, 2022, "Status Classification By Lottery Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2206.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2022, "The economics of social data," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 53, issue 2, pages 263-296, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12407.
• Sarah Auster & Piero Gottardi, 2022, "Sorting Versus Screening in Decentralized Markets With Adverse Selection," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_362, Aug.
• Hongbin Li & Lei Li & Hong Ma, 2022, "China’s Skill-Biased Imports," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_363, Aug.
• Ju Biung-Ghi & Yoo Seung Han, 2022, "Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 22, issue 1, pages 199-231, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0143.
• Gupta Neha, 2022, "Effectiveness of Auctions in Securing Price Support for Farmers: The Case of a Grain Market in India," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, volume 20, issue 2, pages 99-117, December, DOI: 10.1515/jafio-2021-0005.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Optimal Reserve Prices," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 22/07, Mar.
• Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Reserve Prices as Signals," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 22/10, Feb.
• Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022, "Procuring Survival," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10124.