Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2024

• Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-04928908, Nov, DOI: 10.3982/te5655.
• Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2024, "Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-04928908, Nov, DOI: 10.3982/te5655.
• Alain Jean-Marie & Mabel Tidball, 2024, "Equilibrium bids for reverse auctions when the budget is announced - Some preliminary results
  [Équilibres pour les enchères inversées quand le budget est annoncé – Quelques résultats préliminaires]," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04520388, Mar.
• Meens-Eriksson, Sef, 2024, "The Economics of Residual Waste: Policies, Price discrimination, and Welfare," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1022, Feb.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024, "Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-137, Feb.
• SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024, "Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, number HIAS-E-138, Feb.
• Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2024, "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 70, issue 7, pages 4219-4235, July, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4899.
• Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2024, "Spatial Search," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 16824, Feb.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2024, "An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 9, issue 1, pages 105-130, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006.
• Olivier Armantier & Charles A. Holt, 2024, "Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 9-35, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.
• Thomas Giebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy, 2024, "Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 80-108, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8.
• Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2024, "Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 1, pages 58-79, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0.
• James W. Boudreau & Haikady N. Nagaraja & Lucas Rentschler & Shane D. Sanders, 2024, "The role of luck in political and economic competition: noisy all-pay auctions," Public Choice, Springer, volume 199, issue 1, pages 137-157, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01023-y.
• Guillermo Marshall, 2024, "Identification in english auctions with shill bidding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, volume 22, issue 2, pages 193-222, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9.
• Nicolas Stevens & Yves Smeers & Anthony Papavasiliou, 2024, "Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 238-272, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11149-024-09473-6.
• Aner Sela, 2024, "Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 97, issue 4, pages 721-743, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09992-w.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024, "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 413554011.
• Meg Snyder & Daniel Bragen & Matthew Rousu & Christopher M. Snyder, 2024, "Money Isn’t Everything: Estimating the Prestige Value of Winning Cutthroat Kitchen from Overbidding in Sabotage Auctions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32070, Jan.
• Kristian Blickle & Zhiguo He & Jing Huang & Cecilia Parlatore, 2024, "Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32155, Feb.
• Jackson Dorsey & Derek C. Wolfson, 2024, "Unequal Uptake: Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32814, Aug.
• Marleen R. Marra & Nathan H. Miller & Gretchen Sileo, 2024, "Phoning Home: The Procurement of Telecommunications for Incarcerated Individuals in the United States," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33292, Dec.
• Dakshina G. De Silva & Benjamin Rosa, 2024, "Highway Procurement During the Great Recession and Stimulus," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33299, Dec.
• Stjepan Srhoj & Melko Dragojević, 2024, "Public Procurement and Supplier Job Creation: Insights from Auctions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 2, pages 470-527.
• Pablo Montagnes & Richard Van Weelden, 2024, "On the incentives to exacerbate polarization," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 3, pages 854-890.
• Daniel G Garrett, 2024, "Conflicts of Interest in Municipal Bond Advising and Underwriting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 37, issue 12, pages 3835-3876.
• Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer & Edwin Lock, 2024, "Implementing Walrasian Equilibrium: The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 1060, Dec.
• Hikmet Gunay & Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar, 2024, "Experiments on the Different Numbers of Bidders in Sequential Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, number 2024-530, DOI: 10.18800/2079-8474.0530.
• Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024, "Information Requirements for Mechanism Design," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 24-035, Oct.
• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Cerjak, Marija & Kovačić, Damir & Juračak, Josip, 2024, "To be(tween) or not to be(tween)? Combining between- and within-subjects design characteristics in preference elicitation for organic and local apples," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120880, May.
• Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Palma, Marco & Feldman, Paul, 2024, "Incentives and Payment Mechanisms in Preference Elicitation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120898, May.
• Enzo Rossi, 2024, "Swiss treasury bill auctions: a review," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2024-12.
• Mauricio Bugarin & Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado, 2024, "Endogenous Asymmetry in Sequential Auctions," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2024_21, Jul.
• Mario Blazquez Paz, 2024, "Production or transmission investments? A comparative analysis," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 51, issue 4, pages 957-1000, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-024-00318-z.
• Arijit Mukherjee & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2024, "Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 17-24, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1.
• Daniel Marszalec, 2024, "Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 215-242, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z.
• Jeongwoo Lee & Jaeok Park, 2024, "Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 4, pages 1085-1126, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01518-9.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Auctions with resale at a later date," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 843-875, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6.
• Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2024, "Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 4, pages 1233-1273, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01580-x.
• Dmitriy Knyazev, 2024, "Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 3, pages 1073-1075, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00904-4.
• Rajesh Kumar Acha & Sumit Sarkar, 2024, "A Note on Bankruptcy Auction with a Fair Bidder," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 1, pages 211-221, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-023-00372-9.
• Ceesay Muhammed, 2024, "Collusion with Not-So-Secret Rings," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 22, issue 2, pages 563-570, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-024-00387-w.
• Swaminathan Rammohan & Rahul R. Marathe & Nandan Sudarsanam, 2024, "Recent advancements in revenue management of taxi services: a systematic review and research agenda," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, volume 74, issue 2, pages 1029-1055, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11301-023-00326-8.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Fumihiro Yonekura, 2024, "King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 1-19, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8.
• Ricardo Gonçalves & Indrajit Ray, 2024, "Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 125-150, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7.
• Steven R. Williams & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, 2024, "The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 151-187, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6.
• Jianxin Yi, 2024, "A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 331-345, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 455-483, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5.
• Inácio Bó & Jörgen Kratz & Makoto Shimoji, 2024, "Generalized cumulative offer processes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 3, pages 573-591, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4.
• Romans Pancs, 2024, "A vaccine auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 4, pages 763-780, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9.
• Eberhard Feess & Arthur Grimes & Yigit Saglam & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2024, "Simultaneous Versus Sequential Learning of Valuations: Theory and Evidence From House Sales," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2024-06, May.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2024, "Spatial Search," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 24-015/VIII, Feb.
• Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2024, "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-776, May.
• Jackson Dorsey & Derek Wolfson, 2024, "Unequal Uptake: Assessing Distributional Disparities in the Residential Solar Market," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, volume 11, issue S1, pages 71-109, DOI: 10.1086/732840.
• Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2024, "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 132, issue 4, pages 1209-1246, DOI: 10.1086/727284.
• Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024, "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics, University of Cyprus Department of Economics, number 04-2024, Jun.
• Gretschko Vitali & Ockenfels Axel & Wambach Achim, 2024, "Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt," Wirtschaftsdienst, Paradigm, volume 104, issue 11, pages 794-799, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2024-0202.
• Waterson, Michael & Wojciechowska , Olga, 2024, "Individual bidder behaviour in repeated auctions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1498.
• Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024, "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1516.
• Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2024, "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA, number 83.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2024, "Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-025.
• Chiappinelli, Olga & Dalò, Ambrogio & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2024, "The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-060.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Simon, Jasmina, 2024, "An efficient dynamic mechanism with covert information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-081.

2023

• Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023, "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 31036, Mar.
• Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2023, "Flow Trading," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 31098, Apr.
• Zachary Liscow & Will Nober & Cailin Slattery, 2023, "Procurement and Infrastructure Costs," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 31705, Sep.
• Belev, S. & Veterinarov, V. & Matveev, E., 2023, "Vertical collusion in public procurement: Estimation based on data for R&D composite auctions," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, volume 59, issue 2, pages 36-63, DOI: 10.31737/22212264_2023_2_36-63.
• Tanvir ALAM SHAHI, 2023, "Practicing Of Renewable Energy Auction Scheme — Expected Societal & Economic Gains For The Developing Countries," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 14-32, July.
• Lotti, Clarissa & Muço, Arieda & SPAGNOLO, GIANCARLO & Valletti, Tommaso, 2023, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," OSF Preprints, Center for Open Science, number c678u, Feb, DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/c678u.
• Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023, "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 90, issue 2, pages 815-851.
• Carabalí, Jaime & Perez, Alex & Meneses, Luis Ángel & Rojas, Libardo, 2023, "Reconciliaciones y estrategias de oferta en el mercado mayorista de electricidad de Colombia
  [Reconciliations and bid strategies in the Colombian wholesale electricity market]," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, volume 35, issue 1, pages 57-79, June, DOI: https://doi.org/10.46661/revmetodos.
• Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023, "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 23-002, Mar.
• Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo & Sterner, Martin, 2023, "Bilateral communication in procurement auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117612, Jun.
• Hernando, Andres & Villena, Mauricio & Apablaza, Valentina, 2023, "Optimal Bidding for a Bundle of Power Transmission Infrastructure Works," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120849, Dec, revised 30 Apr 2024.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023, "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 382, Feb.
• Dipankar Das & Sanjeev Kapoor, 2023, "Measurement of Collusion in Open Ascending Price Auctions in Agricultural Commodity Markets," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 11, issue 3, pages 340-359, December, DOI: 10.1177/23210222211051443.
• Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2023, "Optimal seedings in interdependent contests," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 328, issue 2, pages 1263-1285, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05373-8.
• Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar & Sonakshi Jain, 2023, "Incompetence and corruption in procurement auctions," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 24, issue 4, pages 421-451, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00296-3.
• Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2023, "Bunching below thresholds to manipulate public procurement," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 64, issue 1, pages 303-319, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00181-022-02250-4.
• Harriet Toto Olita & Md. Sayed Iftekhar & Steven G. M. Schilizzi, 2023, "Optimizing contract allocation for risky conservation tenders," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, volume 25, issue 1, pages 63-85, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10018-022-00341-1.
• Bruno Bosco, 2023, "Trade, equilibrium prices and rents in European auctions for emission allowances," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, volume 25, issue 1, pages 87-113, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10018-022-00344-y.
• Hideto Koizumi, 2023, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 223-233, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00253-7.
• Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023, "Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 255-275, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3.
• Boaz Zik, 2023, "Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 567-590, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01416-6.
• Charles R. Plott & Timothy N. Cason & Benjamin J. Gillen & Hsingyang Lee & Travis Maron, 2023, "General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 641-693, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01431-7.
• Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023, "Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 4, pages 983-1007, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01433-5.
• Mingshi Kang & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023, "Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 4, pages 1141-1180, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01442-4.
• Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2023, "Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1069-1114, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01492-2.
• Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023, "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1329-1362, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01498-w.
• Fredrik Ødegaard & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023, "Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 195-230, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00815-2.
• Xin Feng, 2023, "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 401-421, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00822-3.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2023, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 423-450, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00823-2.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "All-pay matching contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 587-606, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00831-2.
• Zhonghao Shui, 2023, "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 3, pages 925-951, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00845-4.
• Steven R. Williams, 2023, "Trade of a common value good," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 4, pages 701-724, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6.
• El Hadi Caoui & Gérard Marty, 2023, "Random drawing in sequential auctions: investigating the role of a market device in timber sales," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, volume 104, issue 2, pages 101-122, June, DOI: 10.1007/s41130-022-00184-0.
• Xinyu Li & Marco Haan & Sander Onderstal & Jasper Veldman, 2023, "A Wind Tunnel Test of Wind Farm Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-046/VII, Aug.
• Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2023, "Aftermarket Welfare and Procurement Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-081/VII, 12.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2023, "Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1441, Jun.
• Willems, Bert & Yueting, Yu, 2023, "Bidding and Investment in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Discriminatory versus Uniform-Price Auctions," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1462, Aug.
• Claudia Allende & Juan Pablo Atal & Rodrigo Carril & Jose Ignacio Cuesta & Andrés González Lira, 2023, "Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1874, Nov.
• Rodrigo Carril & Audrey Guo, 2023, "The impact of preference programs in public procurement: Evidence from veteran set-asides," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1876, Dec.
• Vitezslav Titl, 2023, "The One and Only: Single-Bidding in Public Procurement," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics, number 2308, Oct.
• Lars Isenhardt & Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023, "Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions: Competition and Price Effects," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, volume 99, issue 2, pages 302-324.
• Josheski Dushko & Apostolov Mico, 2023, "The Prospect Theory and First Price Auctions: an Explanation of Overbidding," Econometrics. Advances in Applied Data Analysis, Paradigm, volume 27, issue 1, pages 33-74, March, DOI: 10.15611/eada.2023.1.03.
• Wauer Niels & Lehmann Paul & Maurer Christoph, 2023, "Gebotskostenförderung in Windenergie-Auktionen," Wirtschaftsdienst, Paradigm, volume 103, issue 2, pages 112-117, February, DOI: 10.2478/wd-2023-0033.
• Alexander Cuntz & Matthias Sahli, 2023, "Ars longa, vita brevis: The death of the creator and the impact on exhibitions and auction markets," WIPO Economic Research Working Papers, World Intellectual Property Organization - Economics and Statistics Division, number 76, Aug.
• Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023, "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 91, issue 4, pages 1495-1526, July, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16310.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2023, "Meetings And Mechanisms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 64, issue 1, pages 155-185, February, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12592.
• Pranjal Chandrakar & Manaswini Bhalla & Shubhabrata Das, 2023, "Sequential Auctions with Multiple Synergies," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 25, issue 01, pages 1-39, March, DOI: 10.1142/S0219198923500019.
• Chulyoung Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jinhyuk Lee & Jaeok Park, 2023, "Auctions with Externalities: An Experimental Study," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2023rwp-214, Apr.
• Aubry, Mathieu & Kräussl, Roman & Manso, Gustavo & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2023, "Biased auctioneers," CFS Working Paper Series, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), number 692.
• Ceesay, Muhammed, 2023, "Suspecting Collusion," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 268306.
• Ceesay, Muhammed, 2023, "Secret vs Public Rings in Common Value Auctions," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 279484.
• Zagdanski, Jakub & Castells, Pau, 2023, "The impact of spectrum policy on carbon emissions," 32nd European Regional ITS Conference, Madrid 2023: Realising the digital decade in the European Union – Easier said than done?, International Telecommunications Society (ITS), number 278024.
• De Leverano, Adriano & Coviello, Decio & Clark, Robert, 2023, "Centralized Procurement and Delivery Times: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Italy," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage", Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 277589.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Tolksdorf, Michel, 2023, "Measuring Preferences for Algorithms - Are people really algorithm averse after seeing the algorithm perform?," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage", Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 277692.
• Heczko, Alexander & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion, 2023, "The benefits of auctioneer competition: Merging auctions and adding auctioneers," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 23-038.
• Groh, Carl-Christian & Reuter, Marco, 2023, "Mechanism design for unequal societies," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 23-050.
• Reuter, Marco, 2023, "Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 23-051.
• Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2023, "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 3, pages 628-663, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191594.
• Giuseppe Lopomo & Nicola Persico & Alessandro T. Villa, 2023, "Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1505-1529, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211437.
• M. Kathleen Ngangoue & Andrew Schotter, 2023, "The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1572-1599, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191927.
• Benjamin Enke & Thomas Graeber & Ryan Oprea, 2023, "Confidence, Self-Selection, and Bias in the Aggregate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 7, pages 1933-1966, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220915.
• Michael Ostrovsky, 2023, "Choice Screen Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 9, pages 2486-2505, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220699.
• Eric Budish & Aditya Bhave, 2023, "Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 142-170, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180230.
• Dan Levin & James Peck, 2023, "Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 171-200, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200447.
• René Kirkegaard, 2023, "Contest Design with Stochastic Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 201-238, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200422.
• Greg Kubitz, 2023, "Two-Stage Contests with Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 239-287, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200071.
• Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu & Yuxuan Zhu, 2023, "Bid Caps in Noisy Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 426-473, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220046.
• Daniel Quint & Marek Weretka, 2023, "Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 306-318, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220078.
• Nils A. Breitmar & Matthew Harding & Carlos Lamarche, 2023, "Using Grouped Data to Estimate Revenue Heterogeneity in Online Advertising Auctions," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 161-165, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231095.
• Robert M. Townsend & Nicolas X. Zhang, 2023, "Technologies That Replace a "Central Planner"," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 257-262, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231031.
• Andrea Canidio, 2023, "Financial Bubbles in Infinitely Repeated Auctions with Tokens," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 263-267, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231032.
• Shraman Banerjee & Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2023, "Virtue of Simplicity in Asymmetric Auctions," Working Papers, Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics, number 2023-01, Feb.
• Gaurab Aryal & Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023, "Is Collusion-proof Procurement Expensive?," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 248, Jun.
• Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023, "Econometrics of first Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 252, Jun.
• Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023, "Detecting Collusion on Highway Procurement," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 263, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023, "The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2301.13827, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.07653, Apr.
• Dongwoo Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2023, "Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impacts of ad quality on search revenue," CeMMAP working papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number 05/23, Mar, DOI: 10.47004/wp.cem.2023.0523.
• Bo Young Chang, 2023, "Estimating the Slope of the Demand Function at Auctions for Government of Canada Bonds," Discussion Papers, Bank of Canada, number 2023-12, Jun, DOI: 10.34989/sdp-2023-12.
• Jason Allen & Milena Wittwer, 2023, "Intermediary Market Power and Capital Constraints," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 23-51, Oct, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2023-51.
• Dejan Trifunović, 2023, "Aukcije Sa Višedimenzionalnim Signalima (Auctions With Multidimensional Signals)," Ekonomske ideje i praksa, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, issue 50, pages 1-20, September.
• Claudia Allende & Juan Pablo Atal & Rodrigo Carril & José Ignacio Cuesta & Andres Gonzalez-Lira, 2023, "Drivers of Public Procurement Prices: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1413, Nov.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Elimination Games," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2312.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "All-Pay Matching Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2313.
• Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023, "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2317.
• Ori Haimanko, 2023, "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2318.
• Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023, "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 32, issue 2, pages 377-399, April, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12509.
• Mathieu Aubry & Roman Kräussl & Gustavo Manso & Christophe Spaenjers, 2023, "Biased Auctioneers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, volume 78, issue 2, pages 795-833, April, DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13203.
• Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2023, "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 71, issue 2, pages 570-592, June, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12331.
• Julia Giese & Charlotte Grace, 2023, "An evaluation of the Bank of England’s ILTR operations: comparing the product-mix auction to alternatives," Bank of England Staff Working Paper series, Bank of England, number 1044, Oct.
• Daniil Larionov, 2023, "Full Surplus Extraction From Colluding Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_392, Feb.
• Marco Reuter, 2023, "Revenue Maximization With Partially Verifiable Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_395, Feb.
• Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023, "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_434, Jun.
• Lorenzon Emmanuel, 2023, "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 155-179, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0009.
• Gangopadhyay Shubhashis & Mallios Aineas & Sjögren Stefan, 2023, "Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 19, issue 2, pages 213-231, July, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0042.
• Newbery, D., 2023, "Regulation of access, fees, and investment planning of transmission in Great Britain," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 2335, Dec.
• Anderson, E. & Holmberg, P., 2023, "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 2339, Dec.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2023, "Information-Forcing Effects of Non-Disclosure Rules," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 338, Aug.
• Kris De Jaegher & Michal Soltes & Vitezslav Titl, 2023, "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, number wp757, Jul.
• Clarissa Lotti & Arieda Muço & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Tommaso Valletti, 2023, "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10274.
• Dongwoo Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2023, "Nonparametric Estimation of Sponsored Search Auctions and Impacts of AD Quality on Search Revenue," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10312.
• Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2023, "Discrete Rule Learning in First Price Auctions," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 23-07.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023, "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 2023s-13, Jun.
• David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2023, "The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 786969000000001811, Feb.
• Willems, Bert & Yu, Yueting, 2023, "Bidding and Investment in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Discriminatory versus Uniform-Price Auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2023023, Aug.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2023, "The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17897, Feb.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2023, "Screening with Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17898, Feb.
• Levine, David & Mattozzi, Andrea & Modica, Salvatore, 2023, "The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17936, Feb.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Goldmanis, Maris & Penta, Antonio & Shakhgildyan, Ksenia, 2023, "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17942, Feb.
• Decarolis, Francesco & Rovigatti, Gabriele & Rovigatti, Michele & Shakhgildyan, Ksenia, 2023, "Artificial Intelligence & Data Obfuscation: Algorithmic Competition in Digital Ad Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18009, Mar.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Wu, Nick, 2023, "Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18087, Apr.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2023, "Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18374, Aug.
• Eilat, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir & Mu, Xiaosheng, 2023, "Privacy Preserving Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18662, Dec.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023, "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2338R2, Sep.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2343R, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023, "The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2353, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Nicholas Wu, 2023, "Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2359, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023, "Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2368, Aug.
• Karsten Neuhoff & Fernanda Ballesteros & Mats Kröger & Jörn C. Richstein, 2023, "Contracting Matters: Hedging Producers and Consumers with a Renewable Energy Pool," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2035.
• Kang, Sungwon & Kim, Daehwan & Kim, Geonhyeong, 2023, "Corporate entertainment expenses and corruption in public procurement," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, volume 84, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.asieco.2022.101554.
• Liu, Junhao & Hope, Ole-Kristian & Hu, Danqi, 2023, "Earnings announcements in China: Overnight-intraday disparity," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102471.
• Gabrielli, M. Florencia & Willington, Manuel, 2023, "Estimating damages from bidding rings in first-price auctions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106404.
• Raineau, Yann & Giraud-Héraud, Éric & Lecocq, Sébastien & Pérès, Stéphanie & Pons, Alexandre & Tempère, Sophie, 2023, "When health-related claims impact environmental demand: Results of experimental auctions with Bordeaux wine consumers," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 204, issue PA, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107663.
• Shinozaki, Hiroki, 2023, "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: A positive result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 223, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110989.
• Rong, Jianxin & Wang, Dazhong, 2023, "Contracting in hierarchical platforms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111079.
• De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pownall, Rachel & Press, Robert, 2023, "Surviving in the marketplace: The importance of network connectivity for art dealers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111312.
• De Leverano, Adriano, 2023, "Clustered bids in first-price auctions: Collusion or competition?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111393.
• Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023, "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 235, issue 2, pages 1172-1202, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.10.003.
• Enache, Andreea & Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbai, Erwann, 2023, "A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 235, issue 2, pages 1564-1588, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.12.007.
• Grundl, Serafin & Zhu, Yu, 2023, "Robust inference in first-price auctions: Overbidding as an identifying restriction," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 235, issue 2, pages 484-506, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.06.001.
• Luo, Yao & Xiao, Ruli, 2023, "Identification of auction models using order statistics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 236, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2023.04.003.
• Arozamena, Leandro & Ganuza, Juan-José & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2023, "Renegotiation, discrimination and favoritism in symmetric procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104566.
• Bru, Lluís & Cardona, Daniel & Sákovics, József, 2023, "Block sourcing plus," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 305, issue 3, pages 1130-1140, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.06.039.
• Bichler, Martin & Knörr, Johannes, 2023, "Getting prices right on electricity spot markets: On the economic impact of advanced power flow models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106968.
• Kim, Daehan & Ryu, Doojin & Webb, Robert I., 2023, "Determination of equilibrium transaction fees in the Bitcoin network: A rank-order contest," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102487.
• Pandey, Ashish & Guhathakurta, Kousik, 2023, "Use of Contingent Payment Mechanism in Nonperforming Loan Auctions," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.103519.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2023, "Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 68-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.013.