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Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -

Author

Listed:
  • Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

    (TU Berlin)

  • Sabine Kröger

    (Laval University, Quebec)

Abstract

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms and therefore quite challenging for sellers. The paper discusses the seller's curse, a bias that sellers might fall prey to in such combined mechanisms, and how experience counterbalances this bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy-It-Now auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023. "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 382, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:382
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; laboratory experiment; field experiment; auction; BIN-auction; Buy-It-Now auction; BIN-price; Buy-It-Now price; combined mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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