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Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt

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  • Gretschko Vitali
  • Ockenfels Axel
  • Wambach Achim

Abstract

The Federal Network Agency plans to extend the frequency usage rights of the established mobile network operators until 2030, combined with a negotiation requirement for 1&1’s access to frequencies below 1 GHz. This analysis identifies key weaknesses of the negotiation bid: lack of clarity regarding regulatory intervention in the event of a non-agreement, inefficient last-minute effects, asymmetric negotiating power and problems with the disclosure of sensitive information. As an alternative, a structured auction procedure is proposed that includes product definition by 1&1, an explicit maximum price and a “descending clock auction” to enable a more efficient and transparent award process.

Suggested Citation

  • Gretschko Vitali & Ockenfels Axel & Wambach Achim, 2024. "Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, vol. 104(11), pages 794-799.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:104:y:2024:i:11:p:794-799:n:1017
    DOI: 10.2478/wd-2024-0202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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