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Competition after mergers near review thresholds

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  • Weichselbaumer, Michael

Abstract

Size thresholds determine whether a national authority reviews a merger and separate national and supranational responsibility. Firms could pursue competition-reducing mergers before they come under any regulatory oversight. Using data on German procurement auctions, I analyse competition effects near review thresholds. Four years after a merger, competition in procurement auctions decreases after mergers that are reviewed by the German national authority, relative to mergers below the threshold. However, when acquiror and target competed in procurement auctions before the merger, competition relatively increases after a German national merger review. Anti-competitive effects after nationally reviewed mergers without pre-merger activity in procurement may get unnoticed by the authority.

Suggested Citation

  • Weichselbaumer, Michael, 2024. "Competition after mergers near review thresholds," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:94:y:2024:i:c:s0167718724000213
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103066
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers; Threshold; Competition; Procurement auctions; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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