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Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities and cognitive load

Author

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  • Andreas, Drichoutis
  • Rodolfo, Nayga

Abstract

This study further examines the failure of game form recognition in preference elicitation (Cason and Plott, 2014) by making elicitation more cognitively demanding through a cognitive load manipulation. We hypothesized that if subjects misperceive one game for another game, then by depleting their cognitive resources, subjects would misconceive the more-cognitively demanding task for the less-cognitively demanding task at a higher rate. We find no evidence that subjects suffer from a first-price-auction game-form misconception but rather that once cognitive resources are depleted, subjects' choices are better explained by random choice. More cognitively able subjects are more immune to deviations from sub-optimal play than lower cognitively able subjects.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas, Drichoutis & Rodolfo, Nayga, 2019. "Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities and cognitive load," MPRA Paper 97980, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Jan 2020.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:97980
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98424/1/MPRA_paper_97980.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game form recognition; game form misconception; Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism; first price auction; preference elicitation; cognitive load; cognitive resources; Raven test; fluid intelligence;

    JEL classification:

    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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