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Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing

Listed author(s):
  • Timothy N. Cason
  • Charles R. Plott

This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/677254
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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/677254
Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 122 (2014)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 1235-1270

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/677254
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/

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