An Experimental Study on Sequential Auctions with Privately Known Capacities
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KeywordsSequential auctions; capacity constraints; belief inconsistency;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-01-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-DES-2018-01-01 (Economic Design)
- NEP-EXP-2018-01-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2018-01-01 (Regulation)
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