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Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation

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  • Dakshina G. De Silva

Abstract

This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained. (JEL D44) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Dakshina G. De Silva, 2005. "Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(1), pages 55-66, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:1:p:55-66
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbi005
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    Cited by:

    1. Dakshina G. De Silva & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact Of Change In Auction Format On Bidding Behavior," Microeconomics 0512009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vermeulen, Dries, 2010. "Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 139-141, December.
    3. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2005. "Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 183-201, April.
    4. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. GUNAY, Hikmet & MENG, Xin, 2017. "Which good to sell first in a sequential auction?," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-45, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Leufkens Kasper & Peeters Ronald & Vorsatz Marc, 2012. "An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-28, January.
    7. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2007. "A change in the timing of auctions with synergies and its impact on bidding behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 60-65, April.
    8. Dakshina De Silva & Thomas Jeitschko & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2009. "Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 73-93, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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