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Buy or Wait, That is the Option. The Buyer’s Option in Sequential Laboratory Auctions

Author

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  • Philippe Fevrier

    (Crest)

  • Laurent Linnemer

    (Crest)

  • Michael Visser

    (Crest)

Abstract

This paper reports the results from an experiment on two-unit sequential auctions with and without a buyer’s option (which gives the winner of the first auction the right to buy the second unit at the winning price). The demand for the two items is either decreasing, flat, or increasing. The 4 main auction institutions (first-price, Dutch, second-price, English) are studied. We find that observed bidding behavior is close to Nash equilibrium bidding in the auctions for the second unit, but there are substantial deviations in the auctions for the first unit. Despite these deviations, the buyer’s option is correctly used in most cases. The revenue-ranking of the 4 auction institutions is the same as in single-unit experiments. Finally, successive prices are declining when the buyer’s option is available. The last 2 results are used to compare real-life auctions and to discuss the findings in related field-data studies.
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Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Fevrier & Laurent Linnemer & Michael Visser, 2001. "Buy or Wait, That is the Option. The Buyer’s Option in Sequential Laboratory Auctions," Working Papers 2001-30, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2001-30
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2022. "Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 45-69, December.
    2. Corazzini, Luca & Galavotti, Stefano & Valbonesi, Paola, 2019. "An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 289-315.
    3. Rosato, Antonio, 2014. "Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect"," MPRA Paper 56824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
    5. Dejan Trifunovic, 2014. "Sequential Auctions And Price Anomalies," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 59(200), pages 7-42, January –.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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