Centralizing Disconnected Markets? An Irrelevance Result
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More about this item
KeywordsDisconnected markets; divisible goods; multi-unit double auctions; trading;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-MIC-2017-02-12 (Microeconomics)
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